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PREFACE 
This dissertation is a business history of the Kansas 
City Live Stock Exchange, and a study of regulation in the 
American West. Historians generally understand the economic 
growth of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
and the business institutions created during that era, 
within the perspective of "progressive" history. According 
to that view, Americans shifted from a public policy of 
laissez faire economics to one of state regulation around 
the turn of the century. More recently, historians have 
questioned the nature of regulation in American society, and 
this study extends that discussion into the livestock 
industry of the American West. 1 
This dissertation relied heavily upon the minutes of 
the Kansas City Live Stock Exchange. Other sources were 
also important, especially the minutes of the Chicago Live 
Stock Exchange, which made possible a comparison of the two 
exchanges. Critical to understanding the role of the 
Exchange but unavailable in Kansas City, financial data was 
1Morton Keller, "The Pluralist State: American 
Economic Regulation in Comparative Perspective, 1900-1930," 
in Thomas K. McCraw, Regulation in Perspective: Historical 
Essays (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 56-94; 
Thomas K. McCraw, "Regulation in America: A Review 
Article," Business History Review 49 (Summer 1975) :159-183. 
iii 
obtained in chattel mortgage records in Texas, Oklahoma, and 
Kansas. This material outlined much of the involvement of 
commission merchants in financing the cattle trade. The 
records of the Wichita Cattle Loan Company, in Wichita, 
Kansas, clarified the processing of "cattle paper" out of 
the Southwest and filled in where other sources were 
unavailable. 
I wish to express my sincere gratitude to all those who 
assisted me in completing this dissertation and during my 
stay at Oklahoma State University. In particular, I am 
indebted to my major adviser, Dr. W. David Baird, for his 
intelligent guidance, concern, and invaluable help. I am 
also thankful to the other committee members, Dr. H. James 
Henderson, Dr. George F. Jewsbury, Dr. Joseph A. Stout, and 
Dr. Edward 0. Price III, for their advisement in the course 
of this work. 
Other faculty members, librarians, and data processing 
personnel contributed to the study. It owes much to Dr. 
Charles W. Cheape, now associate professor of history at 
Loyola University, Baltimore, Maryland. The initial ideas 
for this study originated in Dr. Cheape's research seminar 
in business history at Oklahoma State in the fall of 1983. 
Dr. James L. Huston, an economic historian, also read the 
dissertation and made helpful suggestions. Dr. Richard c. 
Rohrs, graduate advisor, was always available for an 
insightful critique on historical methodology. Heather 
Lloyd, John B. Phillips, Mary H. Evans and Mary R. Dean at 
iv 
the Edmon Low Library helped find many of the primary 
sources. Jack Haley of the Western Historical Collection at 
the University of Oklahoma, Norman, made helpful suggestions 
on the location of sources and microfilmed the records of 
the Chicago Live Stock Exchange. Paul P. Woods, Tom R. 
Buttress, and Roger Stevens of the University Computer 
center at Oklahoma State assisted in the completion of the 
dissertation by providing easy access to, and technical 
advice on, the University's word processing equipment. 
The livestock merchants assisted in answering questions 
on the nature of their trade. Most helpful were Delbert 
Fields, and Ray Davis of Kansas City, Missouri, August Riser 
of Omaha, Nebraska, and Darrel Overman of Joliet, Illinois. 
Special thanks are due to the Department of History at 
Oklahoma State University for the financial support I 
received in the form of the Townsend Dissertation Award in 
1985. 
Appreciation is also due to Vernie c. and Eva Reed 
Hazlett, Kansas farmers for four decades in Norton County, 
Kansas, who taught me most of what I know about livestock. 
Their generous financial support enabled me to finish this 
dissertation. 
v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter Page 
I. INTRODUCTION 1 
II. LIVESTOCK COMMISSION BUSINESS • 14 
III. LIVESTOCK COMMISSION FIRM 36 





ANTECEDENTS, IDEAS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE KANSAS CITY 
LIVE STOCK EXCHANGE . • • • • 
ADMINISTRATION AND REFORM • . • 
RESISTANCE TO REGULATION FROM THE 
SOUTHWEST . • • . . • • • . . 
81 
93 
. • 116 
• • 132 
IX. AMERICAN LIVESTOCK COMMISSION COMPANY • • • 154 
X. FINANCING THE CATTLE TRADE OF THE 
SOUTHWEST • • . • . o • • • • • • • • • 172 
XI. THE WICHITA CATTLE LOAN COMPANY . • • 191 
XII. TWENTIETH CENTURY TRENDS . 209 
XIII. CONCLUSION •. o • 225 




LIST OF TABLES 
Numbers and Percent of Cattle and Hogs 
Marketed by Commission Firms 






An organizational revolution occurred in the United 
States in the latter half of the nineteenth century. 
Historians have recognized the era as one of combination and 
merger of business organizations in the industrialized 
sections of the United States. In that sector the 
transportation and communications revolution resulted in the 
creation of large industrial firms by the 1880s. In fact, 
the railroad and telegraph companies were the first modern 
business enterprises in America. As a consequence, the 
changes concentrated business firms into a few large 
corporations after the turn of the century. Inevitably, 
this revolution led to the impersonalization of American 
society, and a search for new ways to regulate the American 
economy. 1 
1For a general treatment of these trends see Robert H. 
Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1967}; for a review of the literature see Louis 
Galambos, "The Emerging Organizational Synthesis in Modern 
American History," Business History Review 44 (Autumn 
1970) :279-306, and "Technology, Political Economy, and 
Professionalization: Central Themes of the Organizational 




A similar transformation occurred in the distribution 
of agricultural products in the American West. Commodities 
exchanges reflected the trend, especially the Chicago Board 
of Trade, the Merchants Exchange of st. Louis, and the New 
Orleans Cotton Exchange. 2 Although not discussed in the 
historical literature, livestock exchanges also appeared in 
major market centers of the West. Within five years, they 
were organized in Chicago (1884), st. Louis (1885), Kansas 
city (1886), and omaha (1889). 3 
Focusing upon one of those exchanges, this dissertation 
examines the origins and operations of the Kansas City Live 
Stock Exchange as well as the commission firms based there. 
The Exchange reformed and regulated the livestock trade of 
the American Southwest from 1886 to 1921. In the absence of 
a strong positive government, the Exchange became in essence 
a regulatory agency that promoted democratization of the 
trade rather than consolidation. 4 
Historians generally associate regulation with the 
power the twentieth century state. But the Kansas City Live 
2Emory R. Johnson, ed., "American Produce Exchange 
Markets," The Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social science 38 (September 1911):319-664. 
3william H. Thompson, President of the Chicago Live 
stock Exchange from 1888 to 1901 understood the connection 
between livestock and commodity exchanges. See, "Livestock 
Exchanges," Proceedings of the National Live Stock 
Association (Denver: The Smith-Brooks Printing Co., 1900), 
pp. 232-236. 
4The Kansas City trade area varied from decade to 
decade, but covered primarily Missouri, Kansas, Oklahoma, 
southern Nebraska, eastern Colorado, northeastern New 
Mexico, and northern Texas. 
3 
Stock Exchange from 1886 to 1921 performed all the functions 
of a regulatory agency, at least as defined by Kenneth Davis 
in Administrative Law Treatise. An administrative agency, 
according to Davis, was an organization other than a court 
or a legislative body that affected the economic activities 
of private parties through adjudication, rulemaking, 
investigating, prosecuting, negotiating, settling, or 
informally acting. 5 
Within the context of regulation, the history of the 
Kansas City Livestock Exchange remains within the scope of 
business history. Traditionally, business historians have 
analyzed their field either from the "robber baron" or the 
"industrial statesmen" perspective. These views represent 
sharply contrasting interpretations of the problems created 
by the economic growth during the late nineteenth century in 
the United States. A maldistribution of wealth, urban 
slums, farm distress, and a growing impersonalization of 
society accompanied the economic growth. The stewardship of 
the nation passed from politicians to a group of business 
leaders whose actions historians still evaluate and debate. 
Those who subscribe to the "robber baron" school have 
condemned these entrepreneurs as little more than greedy 
parasites on society; those who accept the "industrial 
5Kenneth c. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, Vol. I 
(St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1958), pp. 1-5. 
4 
statesmen" interpretation have emphasized their creative 
ability. 6 
In recent years, business historians have rejected both 
views as extreme and have concentrated instead on 
understanding why business institutions developed in the 
American economy. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.'s The Visible 
Hand (1977) represented the latest summation of this 
approach. Rather than adhere to the "robber baron" or 
"industrial statesman" line, Chandler looked beyond moral 
philosophy and searched for explanations as to why (as well 
as when, what, and where) modern business enterprises 
developed in the United States. 7 
Chandler argues that the questionable tactics of 
nineteenth century businessmen do not adequately explain the 
organizational revolution. Rather, he believes that the 
modern business enterprise was an administrative response to 
the challenges of an industrializing society. Chandler 
points out that businessmen rarely changed their daily 
routine, positions of power, or organizational forms except 
under the strongest of pressures. The rapid expansion of 
the American economy in the late nineteenth century brought 
those pressures to bear upon business organizations. 8 
6Thomas B. Brewer, ed., The Robber Barons: Saints or 
Sinners? (Huntington, New York: Robert E. Krieger 
Publishing Company, 1976), p. 1. 
7Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The 
Managerial Revolution in American Business (Harvard 
University Press, 1977), pp. 1-5. 
8 rbid., pp. 6-12. 
5 
Although the Visible Hand concentrates on the 
development of large industrial corporations, it also 
describes the organizational changes which occurred in the 
distribution of agricultural products in the nineteenth 
century. The discussion covers only grain and cotton. The 
livestock trade, however, followed a similar pattern of 
transformation. A comparison of the changes in the grain 
and cotton trade with the livestock trade provides the 
background against which the Kansas City Live Stock Exchange 
and the livestock commission merchants operated. 9 
According to Chandler, railroads and telegraphs 
initiated the first move toward an organizational 
revolution. Among other things they created a national 
market for some agricultural products by the 1850s. These 
concerns provided fast, regular, and dependable 
transportation and communications essential to high volume 
distribution. For the first time in the history of 
commerce, a man could transport grain and cotton overland 
faster than a horse could walk.1° 
As a result of the increased speed and volume, new 
administrative organizations were created. Prior to the 
1840s, the traditional mercantile firm marketed and 
distributed the nation's goods. Within a generation the 
modern commodity dealer replaced the mercantile firm by 
utilizing the railroad and telegraph. Of particular 
9rbid., pp. 207-223. 
10rbid., pp. 79-80. 
6 
importance was the appearance of various ancillary 
organizations and facilities in the trade: grain elevators, 
cotton presses, and commodities exchanges. This new 
administrative coordination reduced the number of 
transactions in the flow of goods, increased the speed and 
regularity of that flow, and consequently, lowered costs and 
improved the productivity of the American distributive 
system. 11 
To a degree the development of the livestock trade 
paralleled the commodity markets. Instead of the mercantile 
firm, the drover was the primary distributor of live 
animals. The railroad and telegraph were central to the 
transformation of the livestock trade, as it was with grain 
and cotton. Moreover, the livestock commission merchant 
replaced the drover in a generation. 
Although the animal trade lagged behind the other 
commodities by thirty years, the railroads created a 
national market for livestock. Such a market was not 
possible until the railroads penetrated the grasslands of 
the American West in the 1870s and regional specialization 
of livestock occurred. The trade in cattle, calves, hogs, 
and sheep flowed easily in and out of the cattle producing 
regions of the West, the corn feeding regions of the 
Midwest, and the dairy regions of the North. In this market 
the livestock commission merchants were the dominant 
middlemen by the 1890s. 
11 b'd I_±_., pp. 209-215. 
7 
Despite the similarities with other commodities, the 
nature of live animals channeled the livestock trade along 
different organizational patterns from grain or cotton. 
While bulk commodities graded and standardized easily, and 
were sold electronically through futures markets, live 
animals were not. Animals were alive, mobile, disease 
prone, and easily injured; each animal was unique in weight 
and quality of meat. Not until the late 1960s did livestock 
producers resolve these problems by the use of feed yards, 
selective breeding, and modern veterinary science. It was 
only in 1974 (over 100 years after the grain or cotton 
trade) that the Chicago Mercantile Exchange commenced 
trading in live cattle futures. 12 
In the nineteenth century the buyer had to actually 
"see" the animal. Since some animals were so sick or 
injured that they could not walk off the scales in the 
stockyards, the livestock markets remained a "spot cash" 
market. Instead of the wheat pit or cotton pit, the 
marketing of live animals took place in the "livestock pit" 
or stockyards. Unlike the commodity dealer, who never left 
the mercantile exchanges and only saw samples of the actual 
commodity traded, the livestock commission merchant traveled 
12Henry H. Bakken, ed., Future Trading in Livestock: 
Origins and Concepts (Madison, Wisconsin: Mimir Publishers 
Inc., 1970), p. 59; Arthur G. Peterson, "Future Trading with 
Particular Reference to Agricultural Commodities," 
Agricultural History 7 (April 1933):68-80; William L. Black 
discussed future trading in cattle in the mid-1880s, see 
Texas Livestock Journal, 25 August 1888 or Kansas City 
Livestock Indicator, 9 July 1888. 
8 
between the livestock producing areas and the market centers 
and monitored the actual movement of specific animals. 
There are no historical works which describe either the 
operation of a livestock commission merchant or a livestock 
exchange. This seems puzzling since the literature on the 
cattle trade of the American West is so vast. The lack of 
adequate sources partially explains this neglect, but the 
bias of historians also contributes to it. Their 
preoccupation with the "romance" of the cattle industry has 
been detrimental. As William W. Savage, Jr., concluded in 
The Cowboy Hero, this preoccupation virtually eliminated any 
serious examination of the trade. As a result, business 
historians know far more about the distribution of wheat and 
cotton than of live animals. 13 
The livestock trade took place in an emerging national 
market and included much more than cattle. Admittedly, 
there was little romance in sheep, and even less so in hogs, 
but both were essential to the operation of the American 
livestock trade. A study of the Kansas City Livestock 
Exchange is a study of hog traders, sheep herders, and 
cattlemen, and their relationship with middlemen. The 
traditional themes of "rugged individualism, unadorned 
masculinity, and ultimate heroism" has little to do with the 
development of the trade. 14 
13william W. Savage, Jr., The Cowboy Hero: His Image 
in American History & Culture (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1979), p. 15. 
14 b'd LL·, pp. 3-4. 
9 
That there was no "romance" in the stockyards 
undoubtedly discouraged historians from searching there for 
records. Indeed, the stockyards were a symbol of 
industrialization in the American West, and they did not fit 
into the idyllic image sought by historians, novelists and 
artists. In contrast, the stockyards were a world of loud 
noise, dirt, smoke, manure, offensive smells, and the 
unpleasantness of the slaughtering took place in nearby 
packing plants. 
As a consequence, no chronicler of cattlemen, cowboys, 
ranches, drovers, or longhorns, consulted the records of the 
livestock exchanges in the United states. 15 Yet the 
commission merchants in Chicago, Kansas City, and Omaha 
carefully preserved the minutes of their Exchange meetings; 
the records provide a rich commentary on the livestock 
trade. Of the three exchanges, Kansas City kept the best 
records and its secretary recorded aspects of the trade not 
found in Omaha or Chicago. 16 
1 5The literature is covered in Don D. Walker, Clio's 
Cowboys: Studies in the Historiography of the Cattle Trade 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981) and Henry E. 
Fritz, "The Cattlemen's Frontier in Trans-Mississippi West: 
An Annotated Bibliography," Arizona and the West 14 
(1972) :45-70, 169-190. 
16Kansas City Live Stock Exchange, Records, 1886-1958, 
Joint Collection, University of Missouri, Kansas City, 
Western Historical Manuscript Collection, State Historical 
Society of Missouri Manuscripts herein cited RKCLE 
(Microcopy Collection KC158); Chicago Live Stock Exchange, 
Proceedings of the Exchange, 1890-1986, and Proceedings of 
the Directors, 1890-1986, Microfilm, Western History 
Collection, University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, herein 
cited RCLSE (Microcopy Collection, University of Oklahoma) ; 
Indeed, the first secretary of the Kansas City Live 
Stock Exchange was the organization's first historian. R. 
P. Woodbury, secretary from 1886 to 1925, poured years of 
creative talent into his records. A graduate of Amherst 
10 
College in 1878 and a newspaper reporter in Kansas City 
until 1886, the Exchange records are a tribute to Woodbury's 
education and literary skills. He not only recorded the 
minutes of meetings, but he also copied into the record many 
of the letters and telegrams sent to and from the board of 
directors, the proceedings of the commercial courts, full 
length depositions presented as evidence in the trials, and 
much of the discussion surrounding the resolutions. 17 
If R. P. Woodbury was the first historian of the Kansas 
City Exchange, Edwin Snyder, a populist from Oskaloosa, 
Kansas, was its first "robber baron" historian. Of all the 
granger critics of the Exchange, Snyder was the best 
informed, publishing numerous attacks in Kansas newspapers 
in the 1890s. Eventually, his criticisms appeared in the 
Annual Reports of the Kansas State Board of Agriculture. 
Snyder served on the Board as a director in the 1890s, and 
Omaha Live Stock Exchange, Records, 1889-1986, Livestock 
Exchange Building, omaha, Nebraska. 
17cuthbert Powell, Twenty Years of Kansas Citv's Live 
Stock Trade and Traders (Kansas City, Missouri: Pearl 
Printing Co., 1893; Microfilm, New Haven, Conn.,: Research 
Publications Inc., 1975), pp. 112-113; Minutes of the Board 
of Directors, 9 July 1925, RKCLE (Microcopy KC 158). 
11 
his articles accurately reflected the sentiment felt by many 
livestock producers.18 
Snyder considered the commission merchants at Kansas 
City "robber barons" and believed the purpose of the live 
stock exchange was "fraud." He argued that the Exchange 
rules discriminated against the producer, and the commission 
charges of members were "inequitable and exorbitant." 
snyder declared that the Exchange "had no soul, nor bowels 
of compassion," but was rather a "combination" to prevent 
competition and a "conspiracy in restraint of trade. 1119 
The Kansas City Live Stock Exchange celebrated its 
100th anniversary in 1986 and enough time has passed to 
examine the formative years of the institution (1886-1921). 
This dissertation is more than an examination of the 
Exchange; it is also an attempt to more fully understand the 
role of regulation in the American society. Indeed the 
study of regulation in the American economy remains 
deficient. Early students like Solon J. Buck and John D. 
Hicks focused entirely upon state regulation. They argued 
that the public outrage at abuses committed by the railroads 
and middlemen brought federal intervention. 20 Nor have 
18united States Biographical Dictionary: Kansas Volume 
(Chicago: s. Lewis & co., 1879), pp. 139; Herbert Myrick, 
How to Cooperate (New York: Orange Judd Co., 1912), p. 226. 
19Edwin Snyder, "Livestock Exchanges: Their Influence 
Upon the Markets," Quarterly Report of the Kansas State 
Board of Agriculture for the Quarter Ending March 1892 
(Topeka: Hamilton Printing, 1893), pp. 49-50. 
20solon J. Buck, The Granger Movement: A Study of 
Agricultural Organization and Its Political, Economic, and 
12 
historians such as Gabriel Kolka or Louis Kohlmeir fully 
explained the history of regulation. Their argument 
suggested that federal regulation arose merely as an 
exercise in collusion between the interests involved and the 
federal government.2 1 
Only recently have historians recognized the importance 
of private regulation. Jonathan Lurie's pathbreaking study 
entitled The Chicago Board of Trade was the first thorough 
study, and provided, in addition to Chandler's Visible Hand, 
a model for understanding the Kansas City Live Stock 
Exchange. Lurie, an administrative and legal historian at 
Rutgers University, demonstrated that the Chicago board 
effectively regulated the worst features of the commodities 
trade. The greatest abuses were the "bucket shops" and the 
trade in options. Lurie concluded that private mercantile 
regulation was more effective in the late nineteenth century 
than has generally been assumed. 22 
The following chapters examine the development of 
regulation in the livestock trade. They emphasize the self-
reforming and self-regulating nature of the Kansas City 
Livestock Exchange. A full appreciation of those 
Social Manifestations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1913); John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1931). 
21Gabriel Kolka, Railroads and Regulation, 1877-1916 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); Louis M. 
Kohlmeir, The Regulators: Watchdog Agencies and the Public 
Interest (New York: Harper & Row, 1969). 
22Jonathan Lurie, The Chicago Board of Trade, 1859-
1905: The Dynamics of Self Regulation (Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 1979). 
characteristics, however, first require an explanation of 
the operations of the commission merchants. 
13 
CHAPTER II 
THE LIVESTOCK COMMISSION BUSINESS 
The Kansas City livestock commission merchant 
revolutionized the distribution of live animals in the 
American Southwest. The speed and volume in animal traffic 
fostered by the railroads forced entrepreneurs in the trade 
to seek new business methods. This revolution began as the 
Kansas Pacific Railroad pressed into Kansas and Colorado in 
the 1860s and as the Missouri, Kansas, and Texas Railroad 
(MK & T) opened the Texas overland trade in the early 1870s. 
Utilizing the railroad and telegraph, the livestock 
commission merchant eliminated the drover as the dominant 
middleman in the trade in a generation. The operations of 
livestock commission merchants from the producing areas in 
Kansas and Texas to the stockyards in Kansas City explains 
why they competed so effectively with the drovers. 1 
Newspapers recorded the movement of the commission 
merchants as they followed the railroads into the livestock 
1For a description of a similar transformation in the 
wheat trade, see Thomas D. Odle, "Entrepreneurial 
Cooperation on the Great Lakes: The Origins of the Methods 




producing areas of the Southwest. In 1872, a special 
correspondent for the st. Louis Daily Globe reported several 
"cattle dealers" on their way into Cooke, Denton, Parker, 
and other north central Texas counties to find livestock 
even before the MK & T crossed the Red River. 2 The first 
advertisement of a commission merchant appeared in the Fort 
Worth Democrat on 3 May 1873. John Finn, cattle and stock 
broker, solicited "consignments of Texas cattle and 
guaranteed satisfaction in every particular." 3 
The merchants also competed for the livestock trade in 
the Kansas cowtowns. In the Abilene Chronicle of Abilene, 
Kansas, there were similar advertisements to those in Texas. 
Joseph G. McCoy, proprietor of the Great Western Stockyards 
at Abilene, advertised: "having decided to do a commission 
business exclusively, I will buy, sell, or ship and sell 
livestock on commission. 114 
2st.Louis Daily Globe, 1 
description of the commission 
1850s was included in Rudolph 
and Meat Industry (New York: 
88. 
September 1872; a brief 
merchants in Chicago in the 
A. Clemen, American Livestock 
Ronald Press Co., 1932), p. 
3Fort Worth Democrat, 3 May 1873; the idea of using 
advertisements as a source of business history came from Don 
M. Dailey, "The Early Development of the Note Brokerage 
Business in Chicago," Journal of Political Economy 46 
(April 1938) :202-217. 
4Abilene Chr~nicle, 3 May 1870; McCoy was the author of 
Historical Sketches of the Cattle Trade of the West and 
Southwest (Washington D. C.: Rare Book Shop, 1874; reprint 
1932); see also Robert R. Dykstra, The Cattle Towns: A 
Social History of the Kansas Cattle Trading Centers, 
Abilene, Ellsworth, Wichita, Dodge City and Caldwell, 1865 
to 1884 (New York: Atheneum, 1979) for the development of 
the Kansas cattle towns. 
16 
The old and new methods of business interacted on the 
Kansas frontier. The buyers from "California, Colorado, 
Nebraska, Illinois, and Missouri," met the Texas cattle 
droves. at the rail head on the Kansas Pacific. The Texas 
drovers generally sold cattle to numerous buyers, but they 
were never certain of the value of their stock (the best 
indicator of price was the Chicago market). The commission 
merchants convinced some Texas drovers to retain title to 
their stock and ship them to market on consignment. 5 
Livestock commission merchants learned there were ways 
of commanding the trade. The firm of Hunter, Evans & Co. 
proved adept at trying new methods. It learned by the 
example set by Joseph G. McCoy in Abilene. When the Kansas 
Pacific reached the town of Ellsworth, Hunter, Evans & Co. 
was there. R. D. Hunter was in charge of the stockyards 
which "could load 200 rail cars a day." Hunter lived in 
Chillicothe, Missouri, but in the summer of 1873 he 
monopolized the trade at Ellsworth through his control of 
the stockyards. 6 
At the same time, Hunter, Evans & Co. sought 
consignments in north Texas. The company advertised in the 
local Texas papers in 1877, but learned that in a livestock 
producing area the critical contact for a commission firm 
5Abilene Chronicle, 29 September 1870; for an 
inadequate study of drovers see Jimmy M. Skaggs, The Cattle 
Trailing Industry: Between Supply and Demand, 1886-1890 
(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1973). · 
6Ellsworth Reporter, 17 April, 8 May, 10 July, 23 
October 1873. 
17 
was the local cattlemen's association. Neither R. D. Hunter 
nor A. G. Evans could cover all of the producing areas of 
north Texas, so they hired a "drummer or solicitor" well-
connected with the cattle raisers to make contacts. Hunter, 
Evans & co. convinced George B. Loving of "Lost Valley, Jack 
County" to work as its solicitor. There could not have been 
a more important contact for Hunter, Evans & Co., as Loving 
was the secretary of the Northwest Texas Cattle Raisers' 
Association (the largest and most influential in Texas). 7 
Even so, Hunter, Evans & Co. did not monopolize all the 
Texas trade with this influence. Other solicitors of 
commission firms attended the meetings of the Northwest 
Texas Cattle Raisers' Association. L. G. Cairns, agent at 
Denison, Texas, for Gregory, Cooley & Co. Livestock 
Commission Company of Chicago, was among the "foreigners" in 
attendance at the association meeting in Graham, Texas, in 
1878. Nor could Hunter, Evans & Co. maintain a continuing 
relationship with their most important solicitor. Loving 
left the employment of the firm in 1879, whereupon he became 
the agent for Mulhall & Calling of st. Louis. Later, Loving 
established his own commission company. 8 
7Frontier Echo, 9 March, 23 March 1877; for the history 
of the association see Mary W. Clarke, A Century of Cow 
Business: A History of the Texas and Southwestern Cattle 
Raisers Association (Fort Worth: Texas and southwestern 
cattle Raisers Association, 1976). 
8Frontier Echo, 15 March 1878; Fort Griffin Echo, 17 
May 1879; Minutes of the Texas and Southwestern Cattle 
Raisers' Association, 15 March 1878, p. 13, Microfilm, 
Barker Texas History Center, Archives & Manuscripts, 
University of Texas, Austin, Texas herein cited (Microcopy 
18 
The livestock commission merchants learned how to 
utilize market information to their advantage. They were in 
constant contact with the markets and became experts at 
judging the value of livestock on any particular day. In 
addition, commission firms published circulars quoting the 
markets. These reports were the first reliable information 
on price trends in the marketplace drovers and shippers 
could get (short of telegraphing for market information 
every day). In the Abilene Chronicle in November 1870, 
there was a note that "Texas stock is quoted in Chicago by 
W. T. Kennan & Co.'s circular of the 17th. 119 The Ellsworth 
Reporter received an update on the Kansas City market from 
Rogers Powers & Co. 10 In 1875, Irwin, Allen & Co. offered 
"all information regarding the markets gratuitously. 1111 
The livestock commission merchants learned they could 
direct more business to their firms by giving "advances" on 
shipments. For example, Irwin, Allen & Co., working out of 
Kansas City, promised "liberal advances" on cattle consigned 
to their house. 12 Rogers, Powers & Co. also advertised 
Collection, Barker History Center) ; James Cox, Historical 
and Biographical Record of the Cattle Industry and the 
Cattlemen of Texas and Adjacent Territory (New York: 
Antiquarian Press, Ltd., 1895; reprint 1959), vol. 2, p. 
216. 
9Abilene Chronicle, 14 November 1870. 
10Ellsworth Reporter, 14 May 1874. 
11Ibid., 17 June 1875. 
12 Ibid. 
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advances. 13 This money was not a loan of any duration; it 
became a "general custom" for the shippers to draw upon the 
commission firms for a part, at least, of the purchase price 
of the animals shipped. The draft accompanied the bill of 
lading. 14 
In the mid-1870s the Kansas City livestock commission 
merchants left the cowtowns and operated out of the Kansas 
City Stockyards. The trade centered at Kansas city because 
it was a railroad terminal and a packer location. There 
were eight rail lines which funneled livestock into the 
city, and ten packing plants competed for the incoming 
livestock. The rise of the Kansas City market caused a 
decrease in the Chicago market. According to Charles H. 
Taylor in History of the Chicago Board of Trade, beef 
packing "dwindled into comparative insignificance in Chicago 
because of the increasing number of cattle slaughtered at 
Kansas City." Indeed, Plankington & Armour and Morrison 
Packing Co. moved to Kansas City in 1870 creating a large 
demand for meat. 15 
13Ibid., 3 June 1875. 
14u. s. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Animal 
Industry, Annual Report, 1884, pp. 245-270; Texas Livestock 
Journal, 7 May 1890. 
. 15Eva L. Atkinson, "Kansas City's Livestock Trade and 
Packing Industry, 1870-1914: A study in Regional Growth" 
(Ph.D dissertation, University of Kansas, 1971), pp. 253; 
Charles H. Taylor, History of the Chicago Board of Trade 
(Chicago: o. Law, 1917), Vol. I, p. 442; the most recent 
history of the packers is Mary Yeager, Competition and 
Regulation: The Development of Oligopoly in the Meat 
Packing Industry (Greenwich: Jai Press, Inc., 1981). 
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The operations of a livestock commission merchant 
became more specialized over time. The merchants operating 
in the early 1870s were commission merchants, shippers, as 
well as speculators. 16 They received livestock on 
commission, but they also traded "on their own account." 
This "speculating" aspect of the business caused deep 
resentment among the livestock producers. The Kansas City 
Live Stock Exchange eventually defined a livestock 
commission merchant as "one who receives, sells, or buys 
livestock and charges a commission for the same. 1117 But the 
definition did not stop the speculating. The Exchange only 
decided "by a unanimous vote of the Directors" as late as 
1915, that it was a violation of the rules for an employee 
of a commission firm to speculate on the yards, "hence the 
same is forbidden."18 
The commission merchants in Kansas city were 
overwhelmingly cattle merchants, although hogs and sheep 
were a significant part of the trade. If computed in terms 
of the total pounds weighed at Kansas City, and not the 
number of animals, the ratio between cattle, hogs, and sheep 
averaged near a 75:20:5 ratio from 1871 to 1915. 19 
16The next chapter describes the activities of the 
shippers and speculators. 
17Minutes of the Board of Directors, 14 March 1892, 
vol. 3, RKCLE (Microcopy KC 158). 
18Minutes of the Board of Directors, 9 September 1915, 
vol. 4, Ibid. 
19Atkinson, "Kansas City Trade," pp. 336-337. 
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The actual number of animals determined the amount of 
work involved in marketing. One hog or sheep took as much 
work in handling, transporting, and selling as one steer. 
The number of hogs often outnumbered either sheep or cattle, 
and the number of sheep increased astronomically in the late 
1890s. In the 1870s, the yearly average of cattle received 
was 351,000, the average receipt of hogs was 268,400, and 
th'e average of sheep was 29,800. From 1906 to 1915 the 
number of hogs averaged more than the receipts of cattle: 
2.7 million hogs, 2.2 million cattle, and 1.8 million 
sheep. 20 
The Kansas City livestock commission merchants 
dominated certain areas of the Southwest in large part 
because of the direction of the railroads. Historians have 
generally explained the development of institutions in the 
American West as due to the frontier or environmental 
factors. 21 This was not the case in the livestock 
commission business. According to a Bureau of Animal 
Industry report in 1890, the direction of two railroads 
through the Southwest determined where livestock was 
marketed. Albert Dean, a Bureau official at Kansas City, 
posted inspectors along the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe 
2°rbid., pp. 328-331. 
21The foremost frontier historian in the cattle trade 
was Edward E. Dale, The Range Cattle Industry: Ranchinq on 
the Great Plains from 1865 to 1925 (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1960; for an environmental interpretation 
see James C. Malin, History and Ecology: Studies of the 
Grasslands (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984). 
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Railroad (AT & SF) and the MK & T to monitor the movement of 
tick infested cattle out of the Southwest. An inspector 
stationed at Argentine, Kansas, along the AT & SF recorded 
8,988 rail cars of cattle shipped out of the Southwest from 
1 April to 1 December 1890. Of these, waybills indicated 
that 85 percent of the cars (7,640) went to Kansas City. 
Fifteen percent (1,348) went to Chicago, while none traveled 
to st. Louis. These figures suggest that the Kansas City 
livestock merchants dominated the trade out of Southwest 
Kansas, Indian Territory, the Panhandle of Texas, and New 
Mexico. 
But the Chicago market, because of the route of the MK 
& T, dominated the trade from Texas. An inspector at 
Parsons, Kansas, reported that for the same months in 1890 
there were 8,500 cars shipped out of the north Texas area. 
sixty-nine percent of these cars (5,865) went to Chicago, 
seventeen percent (1,445) traveled to St. Louis, and only 
fourteen percent (1,190) went to Kansas city.22 
These figures pointed out a major problem for the 
Kansas City market; railroads out of Kansas City were slow 
getting into Texas. Prior to 1887, the only access Texas 
cattle had to Kansas City was via the overland trail to the 
Kansas rail heads. Not until 1887 was a link established 
directly between Kansas City and Texas. In that year the 
Chicago, Rock Island, and Pacific (CRI & P) completed a rail 
22u. s. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Animal 
Industry, Annual Report, 1889-1890 (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1891), p. 339. 
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line to Amarillo, Texas. It was two years later that the MK 
& T established a direct link into Texas. Even then, the 
shippers in north central Texas shipped to the st. Louis and 
Chicago market, refusing to change their habits to 
accommodate the Kansas City market. 23 
The railroads impacted the livestock commission 
business in other ways. Moving live animals great distances 
from some areas of the Southwest to the stockyards emaciated 
the livestock. The producers closest to the stockyards were 
at an advantage in as much as they were only a few hours 
away from Kansas City by train and the livestock experienced 
little "shrinkage" of weight. For this reason, Indian 
Territory was a favorite holding area for southern cattle. 
Drovers grazed their herds on the rich grasses of Indian 
Territory south of Caldwell, Kansas, until the price of 
cattle in Kansas City rose to an adequate level. They then 
quickly loaded their herds on the stock trains and shipped 
them to Kansas City to take advantage of the price change. 24 
But shippers farther to the Southwest were not so 
fortunate. A trip from Las Animas, Colorado, to Kansas City 
in 1873 lasted two days; the trip to Chicago took five 
days. 25 The law required the trains to rest the livestock 
every 28 hours, which increased the cost of transportation. 
23Terry Lynch, Railroads of Kansas City (Boulder, 
Colorado: Pruett Pub. Co. 1984), p. 71. 
24Texas Livestock Journal, 9 March 1889. 
25Las Animas Leader, 9 August 1873. 
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Trains moved at an average speed of ten miles per hour. Ten 
years later in 1883, the journey to Kansas City could be 
made in one 28 hour trip, for the average speed of the stock 
trains increased from 10 to 18 miles an hour. To reach 
Chicago took three days. Nevertheless, the cattle prices 
changed too frequently for these shippers to take any 
advantage of the periodic high prices in the market. 26 
The trains also injured livestock. The use of link and 
pin couplings to connect the rail cars, and hand brakes to 
stop them, jerked and shoved the animals about the car. The 
stock trains ran over short, light, iron rails joined 
together by "iron chairs" spiked into wooden railroad ties. 
Moreover, the railroad beds were rough and poorly ballasted, 
and the trains pulled up excessive grades and over wooden 
bridges and trestle works. The consequence was further 
battering of the animals. The bumping and rolling of the 
train knocked the weaker animals down, and the other animals 
trampled them until helpless or dead. Also, the range 
cattle had long and sharp horns which gouged the flesh of 
many steers. 27 
The frequency of injured stock was higher when shippers 
sent a rail car containing cattle, hogs, and sheep. In 
26Texas Live Stock Journal, 29 May 1889. 
27George T. Angell, Autobiographical Sketches and 
Personal Recollections (Boston: Franklin Press: Rand, Avery 
& Co., 1884), pp. 1-3 (Angell was the president of the 
American Humane Society); Breeder's Gazette, 25 August 1921; 
Daily Drovers Journal of Chicago, 27 February, 22 October 
1883. 
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addition to injury, the smallest animals were inevitably 
"dirty" and required extra effort to clean before selling. 
Consequently, the stock arrived at the stockyards in various 
conditions. The unloading gangs carried ropes for the 
purpose of dragging out dead and crippled livestock. The 
American Humane Society reported that 1,000 dead hogs were 
taken off a single train on a hot day in Chicago in 1881. 
It also reported: "hardly a cattle train arrives that horned 
cattle are not found lying on the floors, their limbs 
crushed, sometimes their bodies flattened out by the 
trampling of their fellows in misfortune. 1128 
The stock eventually arrived at Kansas City. The 
Kansas City stockyards were on the banks of the Kansas River 
and extended over the boundary line from Kansas into 
Missouri. The exchange building was in Kansas until 1913 
when the stockyards company completed a new structure in 
Missouri. (The move was due in large part because of the 
hostility the Kansas State Legislature exhibited towards the 
commission merchants.) In 1886 2,234 employees worked at 
the seven packing plants. In 1893 there were 12 scales in 
the yards, the alleys and pens were floored with three-inch 
cypress plank, and the yards covered about 100 acres of 
land. The daily capacity of the yards in 1893 was 20,000 
28Angell, Recollections, p. 3. 
cattle, 35,000 hogs, and 15,000 sheep, and 300 men yarded 
and fed the stock and cleaned up the pens. 29 
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Upon arriving at the stockyards, the employees of the 
stockyards company unloaded the trains. They then delivered 
the livestock to the alleys and pens assigned to the 
commission firm. The employees of the commission company 
fed and watered the stock preparatory to sale the following 
day. This process took place 24 hours a day, and 7 days a 
week, until 1892 when the Kansas City Livestock Exchange 
limited the hours of marketing. 30 
Each morning the commission merchant stood at the 
entrance of the alley in which he had stock. Packer's 
buyers, order buyers, feeders, and farmers rode horses 
through the alleys or walked along the catwalks constructed 
over the pens, and selected the stock they wanted. Upon 
observing a lot of cattle they desired, the buyer approached 
the commission merchant and tried to "arrange a deal." Such 
contracts were private treaties and transacted orally (there 
were no auctioneers) . The notes taken by either buyer or 
seller were the only paperwork in this process. Many 
commission men kept the figures in their head until they 
29Atkinson, "Kansas City Trade," pp. 121-123; u. S. 
Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Animal Industry, Annual 
Report, 1884, p. 247; Kansas City: An Illustrated Review of 
Its Progress and Importance, May 1886, p. 19; Snyder, 
"Livestock Markets of Kansas," pp. 53-54. 
30Minutes of the Board of Directors, 4 January 1892, 
vol. 3, RKCLE (Microcopy Collection 158). 
returned to the commission office in the exchange 
building. 31 
27 
Similar processes occurred throughout the stockyards. 
After the sale, yardmen herded the animals to the scales and 
weighed them. There the first record of the transaction 
occurred. The employees attached the "scale ticket" to the 
waybill and delivered it to the Stockyards Company; the 
animals went to the buyer. The commission merchant received 
payment for the livestock from the purchase at the 
stockyards company office in the exchange building. The 
company charged the commission firm for the rail freight and 
the yardage fees. The latter then remitted the revenue from 
the stock sale less commission, freight, and yardage fees to 
the producer. The banks in the stockyards handled the 
deposits. 32 
The commission firms had little difficulty transferring 
funds into the frontier areas, such as Texas. Some drovers 
carried cash back to their home region, but there were safer 
ways of doing it. He could, for example, buy exchange in 
Kansas City and sell it in Texas. 33 Private banks followed 
31Interview, Delbert Fields, National Livestock 
Commission Company, 18 June 1985, Kansas City, Missouri; 
American Live Stock Commission Company v The Chicago Live 
Stock Exchange, Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court 
Building, Springfield, Illinois, "Brief for the Appellee," 
p. 18; this method of marketing is still used in Joliet, 
Illinois and Omaha, Nebraska. 
32American Live Stock Commission Company v The Chicago 
Livestock Exchange, p. 19; U. s. Department of Agriculture, 
Bureau of Animal Industry, Annual Report, 1884, p. 265. 
33McCoy, Historical Sketches, p. 324. 
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the livestock producer into frontier areas and handled this 
exchange. In Ft. Worth in February 1873, Tidball & Wilson 
advertised "a general banking" business. They received on 
deposit and paid out coin, Treasury and National Bank Notes, 
and currency. The company bought and sold exchange and 
drafts on New York, New Orleans, and Kansas City banks. 
Their correspondents in Kansas City were the Exchange Bank, 
and in New York City, they used Northup & Clark. 34 In 
Graham, Texas, ninety miles west of Ft. Worth, a local 
merchant was the private banker who handled these 
transactions. 35 Upon receipt of the cash from the 
commission merchant, the process of marketing livestock from 
the livestock producing areas in the Southwest was complete. 
The only competitor for the commission merchant was the 
drover. Before the arrival of the railroad, the drover was 
the only middleman in the trade. He was a factor in the 
American livestock economy dating back to the colonial era. 
Anytime the distance to market was too great for the 
producer to sell his own livestock, a drover appeared to 
serve that function. Drovers in the Connecticut river 
valleys supplied Boston with livestock in the 1750s; 
34Fort Worth Democrat, 8 February 1873. 
35Fort Griffin Echo, 26 June 1880; for an explanation 
of private banks and correspondent banks see John A. James 
Money and Capital Markets in Postbellum America (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1978); or see Richard Sylla, 
"Forgotten Men of Money: Private Bankers in Early u.s. 
History," The Journal of Economic History 36 (March 
1976):173-188 and Larry Schweikart, "'You Can Count It': 
The Birth of Banking in Arizona," Journal of Arizona History 
22 (Autumn 1981):349-365. 
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Pennsylvania Dutch drovers bought thin cattle in the 
carolina piedmont and drove them to Philadelphia after 
several months of corn feeding in the 1790s; drovers herded 
cattle over the Appalachian Mountains from west to east in 
the 1840s; and drovers from the Midwest delivered cattle to 
St. Louis and Chicago in the 1850s. The Texas drover 
operated little differently than his colonial antecedents; 
he purchased livestock in Texas and sold them in Colorado, 
Wyoming, Nebraska, or Kansas in the 1860s and 1870s. 36 
The Texas drover easily succumbed to the competition of 
the livestock commission merchants. The exorbitant profits 
of the drover in periods of high prices brought about their 
demise. The average rate of profit per drive from Texas to 
Kansas on a four year old steer in 1873 was 219.9 percent! 
More specifically, a four year old steer in 1873 cost a 
drover in Texas $10.12. When he delivered that steer to 
Kansas, it marketed for as high as $36.40, earning a profit 
of $26.28. Put differently, the Texas producer received 
only one-third of the sale price, while the middleman 
received two-thirds. The producer was justifiably irritated 
and open to a new method of doing business. 37 
36Paul c. Henlein, Cattle Kingdom in the Ohio Valley, 
1783-1860 (Lexington: University Press, 1959), pp. 32-35; 
David c. Smith and Anne E. Bridges, "The Brighton Market: 
Feeding Nineteenth Century Boston," Agricultural History 56 
(January 1982) :1-15; Troy J. Cauley, "Early Business Methods 
in the Texas Cattle Industry," Journal of Economic and 
Business History 4 (May 1932):461-486. 
37David Galenson, "The Profitability of the Long 
Drive," Agricultural History 51 (October 1977) :752; Galenson 
calculated profits for all the years between 1867 and 1885. 
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The livestock commission merchant was the solution. 
For a consignment of cattle the commission merchant charged 
50 cents per steer, but large shippers forced the commission 
charges down to 25 cents a head. Instead of extorting 66 
percent of the value of the animal, the commission merchant 
received one percent or less. In addition, he provided more 
services. 
The merchant also multiplied the possibilities for 
marketing other types of livestock. He could handle swine, 
as well as cattle and sheep. Historically, the drover 
seldom operated in the swine trade. Hogs traveled long 
distances only with great difficulty. Before the railroad, 
pork packers went to the producers and built plants in hog 
producing areas, but the supply area was local. 
Consequently, producers had few options other than the local 
packer. 38 
The railroad and the commission merchant opened new 
options for the pork producer. Any producer in the corn 
Belt could easily market hogs in either Chicago, st. Louis, 
or Kansas City. The railroads did not open a swine trade in 
the Southwest, for the climate was too hot and dry. That 
"Uncle Charlie Adair" could drive over 500 hogs out of 
38Margaret Walsh, The Rise of the Mid-Western Meat 
Packing Industry (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 
1982)' pp. 23-24, 45. 
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Jacksboro, Texas, 60 miles to Denison in 1876 was an 
exceptional feat, one not generally followed in the trade. 39 
The livestock commission merchant not only reduced the 
cost of marketing and multiplied the types of animals a 
producer could market, but he also presented the small 
producer with the opportunity to market his own livestock. 
The records of the cattle driven out of Palo Pinto County, 
Texas, dramatically illustrated this possibility. Texas law 
required the county clerk to register any cattle moved out 
of the county. Before 1873 and the arrival of the MK & T at 
Denison, the small farmer or rancher sold his livestock to 
the local drover. These middleman gathered all the newly 
purchased cattle into one herd and drove them out of the 
region. Most of the "long drives" into Kansas numbered from 
1,000 to 1,500 cattle. 40 
Ranchers started circumventing the drover in the Palo 
Pinto County area in 1874. Leo w. Vaughn, a county rancher, 
drove 108 cattle to the MK & T rail head at Denison on 14 
July 1874. 41 Other small herds did the same that year: J. 
39J'Neill La Verne Pate, "Livestock Legacy: A History 
of the Fort Worth Stockyards Company, 1893-1982," (Ph.D 
dissertation, North Texas State University, Denton, 1982), 
pp. 125-149; Frontier Echo, 14 April 1876. 
40Mary w. Clarke, The Palo Pinto Storv (Fort Worth: 
The Manney Co., 1962), pp. 4-15; Dale, Range cattle 
Industry, p. 46. 
41Bill of Sale, 14 July 1874, p. 106, Palo Pinto County 
Clerk, Palo Pinto, Texas. 
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z. Butler drove 100 "mostly cows": 42 J. w. McDonald sent 50 
head; 43 s. J. Strawn shipped 70 head. 44 With the MK & T, 
therefore, the small producer had the option of marketing 
his own livestock. This process marked the beginning of the 
end of the Texas drover, a process which took a generation 
to complete. 
While the commission merchants permitted the producer 
to by-pass the drover, they also marketed the livestock in 
Kansas City. As long as the Kansas City Stockyards remained 
small, a producer could find a buyer on his own. Over time, 
however, as the volume of animals increased and the markets 
became large, impersonal, and confusing, the occasional 
producer could not effectively market his livestock. 
The confusion in the stockyards was well recognized. 
A. P. Bush, a rancher from Colorado, Texas, testified before 
the Vest Committee on 21 November 1888. The committee, 
chaired by Senator George Vest of Kansas City, was the first 
investigation of the meat packing industry in the United 
States. Vest invited cattlemen to testify before the 
committee and while they blamed the packers for their 
troubles, they also described the operations of the 
livestock trade in Kansas City. Bush testified that before 
42Bill of Sale, 12 July 1874, p. 191, ibid. 
43Bill of Sale, 17 August 1874, p. 206, ibid. 
44Bill of Sale, 19 April 1874, p. 212, ibid. 
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he shipped cattle to Kansas City, he found it necessary to 
board the train and go to the market himself. In 1877, Bush 
stayed in Kansas City the entire summer so that he could 
watch the markets in Chicago and St. Louis through 
telegraphic reports. Only in this way could he make the 
best decisions as to where to ship. Ironically, even though 
Bush remained in the market all summer, he used a commission 
merchant to sell his cattle when the decision was made. 45 
The increased volume and speed of animals moving 
through the market caused problems. Eastern shippers 
realized the Kansas city market offered a better selection 
of animals, and at better prices, than those markets at 
Buffalo, New York, or Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and they 
traveled to Kansas City in large numbers. With the 
concentration of buyers and sellers in the Kansas City 
yards, prices changed dramatically, sometimes 30 percent in 
one day. A producer who attempted to market his own 
livestock frequently sold for less than market value--no one 
but an expert could detect the shifting values within the 
Kansas City market. 4 6 
Additionally, when a producer brought a load of 
livestock into the market, he had to find numerous buyers, 
not just one. For example, there were 14 classifications of 
cattle alone: fancy cattle, choice cattle, good shipping 
45u.s. Congress, Senate Report no. 829, Transportation 
and Sale of Meat Products, 51st Cong., 1st sess., 1889-1890, 
p. 44. 
46 b'd ~., pp.30-31. 
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steers, medium shipping steers, common to fair steers, 
common to choice bulls, good to choice cows, poor to medium 
cows, stocker and feeders, northern range steers, Texas 
steers, Texas cows, veal calves, and milch cows. This 
myriad of classifications meant the seller had to find 
multiple buyers. 47 
For a Texas rancher to find all the necessary buyers 
was a complicated process. Export buyers from Boston or a 
packer from Kansas City or Chicago were in the market for 
the fancy or choice cattle. Corn Belt feeders looked for 
the shipping steers which weighed less than 1000 pounds (and 
most Texas steers did), who after purchase fattened the 
steers for six months and re-marketed them as choice or 
fancy cattle. Cows, in times of low prices, went to 
canners. For the veal calves, the rancher looked for a 
Pennsylvania farmer or an order buyer. Finding all these 
buyers was increasingly difficult, and only the commission 
merchants operating in the market at all times knew the 
buyers and what class of cattle they sought. 
The operations of a livestock commission merchant were 
simple but revolutionary. The merchant was a new business 
institution created in the American West, resulting from the 
speed and volume brought to the livestock trade by the 
railroad and telegraph. Ironically, there was no protest 
from the producer at the passing of the drover or with the 
advent of the commission merchant. Producers appreciated 
47 b'd ~., pp. 47-48. 
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the lower costs and greater flexibility granted by the new 
business institution in the initial phases of the 
organizational revolution in the American West. 
CHAPTER III 
THE LIVESTOCK COMMISSION FIRM 
Although the livestock exchanges were part of the late 
nineteenth century revolution in business organizations, the 
livestock commission firm remained a very traditional 
enterprise. This chapter discusses the organization of the 
firm, the background and training of the personnel, and the 
reasons for the domination of the Kansas City trade by a few 
firms. 
The livestock commission firms were all small 
enterprises in the 1880s. The advertisements in a Blue 
Book, published by the Kansas City Stockyards in 1887, 
described their organization and detailed various aspects of 
the Kansas city market. 1 All of the 40 commission firms 
operating in the stockyards advertised in the edition. From 
the advertisements we learn how the firms were organized, 
how many employees were in a firm, how many were family 
firms, when the firms were established, and the different 
divisions within the firm. 
1Kansas City Stockyards, Blue Book (Kansas City, 
Missouri: Bishop Bros. Printing, 1887), pp. 28-41. 
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All of the commission firms listed were either a single 
proprietorship or a partnership--with one exception. Fish, 
Keck & Co. was the only incorporated firm in 1887 but other 
commission firms followed its example in later years. 2 Two 
reasons account for the exceptions: firms loaned its own 
money to producers and desired the limited liability 
protection granted a corporation; it incorporated to by-
pass the rules of the Kansas City Live Stock Exchange 
(explained in detail in Chapter 9). 
Commission firms organized to conform to the 
peculiarities of the animal trade. To maximize the 
opportunity presented by the commission business, a firm 
covered both the hog and cattle markets at the same time. 
Consequently, there was a minimum of two specialty areas in 
each business. Furthermore, the hog pens and cattle pens 
were in different locations in the stockyards and required 
two people to cover them. In 1887, few commission firms 
employed full time sheep traders. 
The majority of the firms, however, had more than two 
members. The 40 firms under examination averaged five 
employees each. The four largest houses (also the oldest) 
listed nine employees, while the younger ones had the least 
number. I. B. McFarland & Co. was the only business with 
one employee, but it shared an office and administrative 
expenses with Winstead & Custer, and Stephens & Dobyns. 3 
2 Ibid.,pp. 12, 33. 
3 rbid., p. 30. 
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The majority'of the commission firms in Kansas City 
were not family firms. Forty-five percent (18) of those 
listed in the Blue Book had at least one member with the 
same last name as a managing partner. These family firms 
comprised either a father and son team (C. c. Means & Sons) 
or one of brothers (Nutter Bro.). One firm, Dunham & 
Roberts, had one family member in Wray, Colorado, as a 
solicitor. 4 
Of the 40 firms at Kansas City, only six were branch 
offices of commission firms in other markets. Hunter, Evans 
& Co. and James H. Campbell & Co. listed offices in Chicago 
and st. Louis. 5 J. M. Emmert & Co. was a branch of a St. 
Joseph firm, and c. M. Keys & Co. had their home office in 
st. Louis. 6 
The years the firms were established indicated a high 
turnover rate. The founding dates of the four oldest firms 
(1870) predated the founding of the Kansas City livestock 
market. The financial crisis of 1873 was a watershed year 
for the firms. Since they were speculators as well as 
commission merchants, and the prices of cattle dropped so 
precipitously, they went bankrupt along with many drovers 
and banks in the cattle trade. Two firms, Quinlan, 
Montgomery & co., and Irwin, Allen & Co., organized after 
4rbid., pp. 28, 40. 
5rbid., pp. 35, 36, 56, 85. 
6Ibid., pp. 29, 35, 96, 97, 116, 117. 
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the market eliminated many of the traders in Kansas City. 7 
Two livestock commission firms at Kansas City were also 
formed by Texas drovers. Hunter, Evans & Co. and Quinlan, 
Montgomery & Co. herded cattle from Texas to Kansas as well 
as selling on commission. 8 
The firms at Kansas City were young relative to the age 
of the Kansas City Stockyards. Twenty-six of the 40 
commission firms (65 percent) were six years old or less; 
half of the 26 organized in 1886 and were only one year old. 
Although the minimum number of personnel needed to 
effectively function as a commission firm were salesmen for 
hogs and cattle, there were generally four divisions in the 
firm. These included the salesmen, the office men, the yard 
men, and solicitors. Of the 40 firms, there were 58 cattle 
salesmen, 46 hog salesmen, and four sheep salesmen. One 
sheep salesmen was also a hog salesman, and another doubled 
as a cattle salesman. There were twenty five solicitors 
listed, 47 office men, and 30 yardmen. 
The managing partners of any one firm were generally 
the lead cattle salesman and the lead hog salesman. The 
cattle commission merchants frequently traveled from the 
country to the stockyards, but the hog merchants operated 
principally in the stockyards. 
7Ibid., pp. 28, 32, 81. 
8rbid., p. 
Texas (Austin: 
1985) 1 PP• 240, 
1881. 
82; George W. Saunders, The Trail Drivers of 
University of Texas Press, 1924; reprint 
289, 873, 936; Caldwell Commercial 28 April 
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The solicitors were a significant part of the livestock 
commission business. That the commission firms listed only 
25 solicitors in the Blue Book understated their importance. 
The solicitors lived in the livestock producing areas, most 
often they were employed at other occupations, and used 
their influence upon shippers to consign stock to specific 
commission houses for half of the commission. These 
solicitors were a controversial part of the business, and 
commission firms rarely identified them. Solicitors had 
little loyalty to any one commission firm; they easily 
switched firms for a better deal. 
In a rare display of openness, Hunter, Evans & Co. 
published a circular throughout Texas regarding the 
solicitor. As published in the Texas Live Stock Journal in 
1888, Hunter, Evans & Co. declared that 
The soliciting agent has always been the expensive part 
of the commission business. Heretofore we have paid 
the soliciting agent a large share of the commission 
earned on business secured by him, but we very much 
prefer to dispense with all agents. 9 
Hunter, Evans & Co. offered to rebate the commission 
normally given the solicitor to the "patron." The trade, 
however, did not follow the lead of this large commission 
house. 
The office men were the administrative and financial 
arm of the commission firrn. 10 The titles carried by these 
9Texas Live Stock Journal, 18 February, 14 July 1888. 
10Blue Book, pp. 74-80. 
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47 were either office men, cashier, bookkeeper, or assistant 
bookkeeper. They rarely dominated the firm. In only one 
case was the office man a managing partner: F. o. Fish of 
Fish, Keck & Co. was the office man for Andy Snider & Co. 
before 1886. When Snider sold his commission firm to James 
H. Campbell & Co., Fish left and formed a new commission 
firm with G. 0. Keck (also previously employed by Snider as 
a cattle salesman). 11 
The yardmen handled the livestock consigned to the 
commission firms in the stockyards. They fed and watered 
the stock in the pens assigned to the company and also 
delivered the stock to the buyer. There were no yardmen who 
were partners of any of the commission firms, as the job was 
often held by a man wanting to learn the livestock 
commission business. 12 
While the advertisements of the Kansas City firms 
described their organization, cuthbert Powell's Twenty Years 
of Kansas City's Livestock Trade and Traders, published in 
1891, provided biographical data on personnel. This source 
identified the commission merchants and explained how they 
got into the business. Specifically, Powell detailed the 
biographies of 64 commission merchants men in the Kansas 
City Stockyards from the 1870s to 189o. 13 
11rbid., p. 33. 
1 2rbid., pp. 44, 46, 48. 
13 Powell, Kansas City Traders, pp. 195-340; suggestions 
on this composite biography came from Burton w. Folsom, "The 
Collective Biography as a Research Tool," Mid-America 54 
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The livestock commission merchants were not "retired 
cowmen-bankers" as Edward E. Dale, historian of the range 
cattle industry, surmised in an article in the Cattleman in 
1923. 14 A typical commission merchant at Kansas City in 
1886 was not retired but a thirty-nine year year old white 
male. Although he most likely had contact with livestock in 
his earlier years, the typical commission merchant did not 
come from the range cattle regions of the Great Plains; 
instead, he was more apt to be born in the Midwest. There 
was little possibility of the typical commission merchant 
being a banker; instead, he was most likely a livestock 
shipper, speculator, yard trader, or salesman before 
becoming a comm~ssion merchant. 
The barriers to entry into the commission firm were in 
part cultural. The business, for example, was the province 
of white males--all others needed not apply. The majority 
of the merchants at Kansas City in 1886 were in their late 
thirties or early forties. Their ages ranged from 18 to 58, 
but the average age was 39. 15 
(April 1972) :108-122 and Richard c. Rohrs, "The study of 
Oklahoma History during the Territorial Period: An 
Alternative Methodological Approach," Chronicles of 
Oklahoma 60 (Summer 1982) :174-185. 
14Edward E. Dale, "Passing of the Range: Cattle 
Business in Oklahoma," Cattlemen, vol. 11, no. 6, November 
1924, p. 15. 
15Among business historians Thomas Cochran is the best 
on the cultural influences, see 200 Years of American 
Business (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1977); more 
specifically see Richard H. Peterson, The Bonanza Kings: 
The Social Origins and Business Behavior of Western Mining 
Entrepreneurs (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1972) . 
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There were no women among the merchants listed in 
Powell's Traders. Nor were there any women merchants 
mentioned in the Exchange records from 1886 to 1921. Women 
acquired me~erships in the Kansas City Live Stock Exchange 
only upon the death of a family member who was also part of 
the Exchange. 
There was one exception. In 1895 Jennie Goodwin 
applied for membership in the Exchange. She was also a 
clerk in the office of the secretary and worked for R. P. 
Woodbury. The board voted to accept her application "by 
eight yea votes" in September. 16 However Jennie Goodwin 
failed to follow through with the board's approval so the 
body invited her to "show cause for not securing a 
membership" in November 1895. 17 Goodwin was given until 
January 1896 to take out a membership. In the meantime 13 
members signed a petition for a special meeting. The 
petitioners wanted the Exchange to "give her a membership." 
At the meeting, with 50 members present, Jennie Goodwin 
addressed her supporters and explained that she did not want 
the Exchange to make a precedent by giving her a membership 
and that she had decided not to pursue a career as a 
merchant. 18 
16Minutes of the Board of Directors, 9 September 1895, 
vol. 3, RKCLE (Microcopy Collection 158). 
17Minutes of the Board of Directors, 3 November 1895, 
Ibid. 
18Minutes of the Exchange, 19 December 1895, Ibid. 
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Although there was no evidence of a Black or Hispanic 
livestock commission merchant, ethnicity worked to the 
advantage of some merchants. Henry Theis (who started a 
commission firm in 1885) was the son of German immigrants. 
Theis spent his childhood on the "west bottoms" in Kansas 
City near the stockyards where his father worked. Theis 
remembered the children of Irish immigrants ridiculed and 
beat him, but years later, Theis discovered that being a 
German had commercial advantages. His first major contacts 
with producers were among the German communities in central 
Kansas; he was one of the insiders in these ethnic 
communities, and the Kansas Germans trusted Theis with their 
livestock. 19 
The birth place of the merchants was not a barrier to 
entry to the commission business, but most of the Kansas 
City merchants were from the same geographical region. 
Fifty-nine percent of their number (38) came from the Corn 
Belt; 25 percent (16) came from the Dairy Region. There was 
only one Kansas City merchant born in Texas, the largest 
cattle producing state in the nation. There was only one 
commission merchant born outside of the United States. 20 
19Henry Theis Testimony, 1 February 1892, Ibid.; Carl 
Theis, Interview, Henry Theis & Sons, 13 June 1985, Kansas 
City, Missouri. 
20charles o. Paulin, Atlas of the Historical Geography 
of the United States (Washington: Carnegie Institution, 
1932), plate 142; the birth places and number of merchants 
in the Corn Belt were Iowa (2), Illinois (6), Indiana (6), 
Kansas (2), Missouri (12), and Ohio (10); in the Hay and 
Dairy Region were New York (4), Pennsylvania (7), Vermont 
(2), and Wisconsin (3); other states included North Carolina 
45 
Thirty-seven of the 64 merchants in Kansas City came 
from a farm background, or had experience with livestock as 
a child. Of these, 33 merchants listed their father's 
occupation as a farmer. Three fathers worked in the 
stockyards of Chicago or st. Louis. Only one father had 
been a Kansas city commission merchant. But failure to 
acquire training in livestock at an early age proved no 
barrier to three merchants. George Barse's father was a 
steamboat captain; 21 David Tuckerhan's was a dealer in 
billiards; 22 and Frank Siegel's was a glass blower. 23 
An analysis of the occupations of these commission 
merchants before they entered the business revealed a 
significant pattern for training a livestock commission 
merchant. Powell listed 14 different occupations. 24 The 
career path of each trader generally included more than one 
occupation. For example, Frank Cooper was a school teacher, 
a clerk in a mercantile firm, an attorney, and then a 
livestock commission merchant. While Powell identified 14 
(1), Tennessee (1), Texas (1), Virginia (1), Kentucky (5), 
and New Hampshire (1). 
21Powell, Kansas City Traders, p. 201. 
22rbid., p. 337. 
23rbid., p. 311; Siegel ended his career in 1901 by 
defrauding an endorser of a note for $21,000, see Trial of 
Frank Siegel, 23 May, 1 July 1901, val 4., RKCLE (Microcopy 
Collection 158). 
24The occupations and the corresponding number of 
commission merchants are shipper (30), trader (21), salesman 
(22), farmer (9), rancher (6), freighter (2), grain trade 
(2), stockyards employee (12), government contractor (5), 
merchant (14), miner (7), bookkeeper (7), drover (9), 
teacher (7) . 
occupations, the 64 commission merchants listed them 153 
times. 25 
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The essential qualification for a commission merchant 
was to have some familiarity with the livestock markets at 
the stockyards. Over half of the 64 traders in Kansas City 
were shippers, speculators, yard traders, or salesmen in the 
livestock trade prior to entering the commission business, 
or they had worked as a stockyards employee at one period in 
their lives. Of the 153 times that the 14 occupations were 
listed, 55 percent (85) of the occupations were one of these 
five categories. These occupations brought the entrepreneur 
into constant contact with the operations of the stockyards, 
familiarized him with the functions of the commission 
merchants, and provided the opportunity to watch closely the 
changing nature of prices within the stockyards market. 
Of the occupations mentioned in the five categories, 
the livestock shipper was the most frequent (30 out of 153 
times) • Shippers were middlemen, like the commission 
merchants, who appeared in the livestock trade concurrently 
with the railroad. They speculated on making a profit by 
buying cattle, hogs, or sheep at a low price in the 
"country" and selling high in the Kansas City market. The 
shippers operated much like the drover, except they dealt in 
hogs and sheep, as well as cattle, and they shipped 
livestock on the railroad instead of "driving" them 
25Powell, Kansas City Traders, p. 261. 
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overland. Unlike the commission merchant, the shipper took 
possession of the livestock. 26 
Shippers operated in areas occupied by small farmers. 
Any producer who had enough animals to fill a rail car could 
ship his own stock to market, but many farmers (especially 
in Kansas) did not have enough animals to ship at any one 
time. Thus there was an opportunity for a middleman in the 
trade. The shippers generally traveled throughout the 
livestock producing areas buying livestock. They gathered 
the stock at shipping stations near the railroad and shipped 
to market when they regarded the price adequate to make a 
profit. Although there was no precise data available on the 
number of these shippers, one trader estimated that 90 
percent of the stock shipped to Kansas City in the 1890s 
came from them. Shippers were less frequent in Texas where 
producers generally had enough cattle to fill several rail 
cars (20-22 Texas steers filled a rail car). 27 
Another "prior" occupation listed by the Kansas City 
commission merchants was that of livestock trader. Twenty-
one merchants claimed they had been traders either in 
Chicago, st. Louis, or Kansas City. The trader was 
scurrilously called a "scalper" or a "speculator," but 
unfairly so. Any cattle merchant who took possession of the 
livestock he traded, from the producer, drover, to the 
shipper, was speculating in livestock. Most commission 
26McCoy, Historical Sketches, pp. 298-299. 
27Kansas City Livestock Indicator, 23 February 1893. 
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merchants speculated "on their own account," but it was not 
the major focus of their business. 28 
These traders stayed in the stockyards at all times and 
made money principally by taking advantage of the volatility 
of the prices in the market. Traders seldom held stock in 
their possession more than a few days. When the receipts 
for livestock were heavy in the stockyards, the packer could 
force the price of livestock down below market value. The 
trader then bought as many livestock as he could, competing 
with the packer, anticipating that in a few days the 
receipts in the stockyards would decrease, and the prices 
would be forced back up to market level or above. The 
trader made his money trading on these margins and when the 
market was brisk and the prices were volatile, the trader 
made more money on the market than the commission merchant. 
Like the drover and the shipper, the trader took possession 
of the stock. 29 
Although not recognized as such, the yard trader was 
the ally of the producer, and the enemy of the packer. 
Without these speculators in the yards, the packer could 
have controlled the prices of livestock at critical times. 
In the mid-1880s, the packers, in fact, tried to force the 
traders out of the stockyards. In 1885 the Daily Drovers 
28McCoy, Historical Sketches, pp. 292-293 
29August Riser, Interview, Riser & Sons, 15 August 
1986, Omaha, Nebraska; Proceedings of the Sixth Annual 
Convention of the National Livestock Association (Denver: 
Smith Brooks Printing Co., 1903), pp. 301-302. 
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Telegram of Kansas City reported "the packers precipitated 
their semi-annual row with the scalpers today by refusing to 
buy any of their holdings." The traders accumulated from 
8,000 to 10,000 hogs in the stockyards that the packers 
refused to purchase. Eventually the packers lost the 
gamble, and the traders remained a vital part of the 
business. K. B. Armour later admitted to the Vest Committee 
in 1888 that the packers in Kansas city circulated a black 
list of scalpers from time to time, but they were never able 
to force them out of the market. 30 
The yard trader also sorted livestock into marketable 
groups for the small producer. When a farmer from Kansas or 
Missouri traveled to the Kansas City market to purchase 
stock, he looked for small lots, not the large consignments 
received by the commission firms, and he looked for a 
specific type of cattle or hog. Generally, the farmer 
needed around 100 animals, and he preferred them all uniform 
in size and weight. For example, the farmer frequently 
sought shipping steers all weighing approximately 1,000 
pounds. 
Before the mid-1870s the farmer went from pen to pen 
selecting a few animals out of each. In the mid-1870s the 
traders started sorting the livestock in advance of the 
farmer, and so the farmer went straight to the trader's pens 
to find the livestock he desired. A. w. Gillette innovated 
3°Daily Drovers Telegram, 7 December 1885; U. s. 
Congress, Senate Report no. 829, Transportation and Sale of 
Meat Products, 1889-1890, p. 365. 
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this practice 1878, and later became a commission merchant 
on the Kansas City yards. 31 
An aspiring livestock commission merchant often worked 
for a commission firm before becoming an actual merchant. 
Twenty-two merchants were salesmen for others prior to 
forming a firm of their own. Five had been salesmen sent to 
Kansas city to start a branch office for a Chicago firm in 
the early 1870s. W. A. Rogers went to Kansas City as a 
representative of Strahorn & Co. of Chicago, while George R. 
Barse was a representative of Kennan & Co. Two years later 
Barse started his own firm.32 
Other occupations aided in training of a livestock 
commission merchant. Of the 64 traders, nine were farmers 
and six were ranchers. Seven of the older commission 
merchants had gone to California or Colorado to mine gold, 
and two had been freighters in the West before the arrival 
of the railroad. Seven mentioned they had been teachers, 
and seven others indicated they had been book keepers. 
While the commission firms remained small in size, and 
the personnel in the firms received their training through 
other occupations related to the livestock industry, extant 
records indicate that a few firms dominated the cattle 
commission business. Gene Gressley noted this pattern in 
Banker's and Cattlemen for the years 1880 to 1886. He 
31Powell, Kansas City Traders, p. 121. 
32 b'd . . h I_b_., pp. 200, 201; McCoy, H1stor1cal Sketc es, pp. 
282-283. 
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pointed out that A. J. Snider controlled as much as 40 
percent of the cattle trade out of Kansas City. But 
Gressley provided no figures on the rest of the firms in the 
Kansas City market. 33 
Nevertheless, appropriate data is available. The 
Kansas City Livestock Indicator published the price and 
number of animals which each commission firm marketed from 
1882 to 1885. Unfortunately, the Indicator stopped printing 
the sales by commission firm in December 1885, leaving later 
information impossible to retrieve from any source. 
Doubtlessly, the Kansas City Livestock Exchange (organized 
in February 1886) stopped publication of sales by commission 
firm because the smaller firms did not want the information 
transmitted to the producers in the "country." The 
publication of sales helped the larger firms. For example, 
A. w. Penny entered the commission business in 1885 and 
tried to expand his operations. The Indicator published 
that Penny sold only 71 cattle in October 1885, while A. J. 
Snider sold 18,790. Producers could rightly question 
Penny's ability to market cattle. 
Information recorded in the Indicator reflected which 
firms dominated the trade (see Table I). The number of 
cattle and hogs marketed in October 1885 established the 
sample. October was the month when most of the range cattle 
33Gene M. Gressley, Bankers and Cattlemen (New York: 
Knopf, 1966), pp. 181-182. 
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arrived in Kansas City. Western cattle producers marketed 
their cattle only after a summer's fattening on grass. 
There was a striking difference between the firms in 
the cattle and hog trade. Four commission companies out of 
26 dominated three-quarters of the cattle trade, but no one 
firm controlled the hog trade. A. J. Snider & Co. marketed 
18,790 cattle or 44 percent of the 42,602 cattle in October 
1885! That confirmed the figure reported by Gressley in 
Bankers and Cattlemen. Three firms followed Snider in 
livestock sales: J. R. Stroller & Co. sold 4,686 cattle or 
11 percent; Irwin, Allen & Co. sold 4,454 or 10 percent; and 
Quinlan, Montgomery & Co. marketed 3,871 or 9 percent of the 
total cattle marketed in Kansas City. 
The hog trade was more democratic. The three largest 
firms controlled only a third of the business. c. c. Means 
& Co. received the largest number of hogs (17,762 out of 
113,246), but that constituted only 16 percent of the total 
trade. Only two other firms handled a significant portion 
of the hog market. White & Holmes marketed 11,888, or 10 
percent, while Gillespie & Co. sold 10,506, or 9 percent. 
The remaining 23 firms competed for the other 66 percent of 
the hog trade, but no one firm received more than 6 percent 
of the trade. 
These figures permit some conclusions. Vigorous 
competition made the cattle trade more difficult for new 
firms to enter. At the same time, competition in the swine 




























NUMBERS AND PERCENT OF CATTLE AND HOGS 
MARKETED BY COMMISSION FIRMS 
OCTOBER 1885 
CATTLE ~ 0 HOGS 
J.R.STROLLER & CO. 4,454 11.0 6,235 
IRWIN,ALLEN & CO. 4,387 10.0 4,852 
GILLESPIE & co. 523 1.0 10,506 
GEO.R.BARSE & CO. 531 1.0 5,543 
MCCOY & UNDERWOOD 636 2.0 5,963 
QUINLAN,M. & co. 3,871 9.0 4,360 
A.J.SNIDER & CO. 18,790 44.0 5,609 
GREGORY & STEPHEN 1,666 4.0 2,939 
GILMAN,REED & CO. 113 0.0 1,526 
ROGERS & ROGERS 686 2.0 5,229 
METCALF & MOORE 118 0.4 4,722 
CAMPBELL,L.& CO. 935 1.0 6,136 
C.M.KEYS & co. 146 0.3 4,599 
D.THOMPSON 651 2.0 232 
WORDEN & CO. 015 0.0 000 
WHITE & HOLMES 2,779 7.0 11,888 
HOUSTON & CO. 041 0.0 610 
MOUNTJOY & CO. 1,182 3.0 1,788 
EMMERT & CO 060 0.1 1,915 
D.L.JONES 554 1.0 1,060 
W.J.DILLINGHAM 016 0.0 3,035 
A.W.PENNY 071 0.1 1,095 
LARMON & CO. 064 0.1 1,373 
C.C.MEANS & co. 246 1.0 17,762 
NUTTER BRO. 000 0.0 3,030 
HOUSTON & PENNY 000 0.0 11239 





























Source: Kansas City Livestock Indicator, october 1885. 
53 
a respectable portion of the trade, because no firm 
dominated the market. 
54 
The age of the firm explained in part the difference 
between the cattle and hog trade. The four controlling 
cattle firms were the oldest commission houses in the Kansas 
city Stockyards. And all the successful cattle commission 
merchants started after the Panic of 1873. Snider, Quinlan, 
and Montgomery began in 1873; Irwin and Allen started in 
1874; Stroller followed in 1875. 34 
The pattern in the hog trade was different. c. c. 
Means & co. only entered the commission business in 1880, 
yet it was the leader in Kansas City. The second and third 
ranking hog commission firms were older firms, yet they 
ranked far behind Means in their sales. White & Holmes and 
A. J. Gillespie & Co. had opened operations in 1870 and 1871 
respectively. 35 
The age of the firm, however, did not fully explain why 
A. J. Snider dominated the cattle markets. Biographical 
data on Snider, as well as J. R. Stroller, L. A. Allen, 
Peyton Quinlan, c. c. Montgomery, and J. N. and s. D. Irwin 
points to another factor: early association with western 
cattle producers. While a composite biography of all the 
commission merchants in 1886 contradicted the conclusion of 
Edward E. Dale that the commission merchants were "retired 
34Powell, Kansas City Traders, pp. 32, 81, 100, 212. 
35Ibid., pp. 28, 30, 34. 
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banker-cowmen," an examination of the more successful 
merchants suggests he may have been at least half right. 
All of these Kansas City livestock commission merchants 
spent considerable time in their earlier years developing 
contacts in the West. Snider carried the mail across the 
plains long before the railroad arrived, and later became a 
cattle drover. As with Hunter, Evans & Co., Snider also 
made the essential contacts with cattle associations. In 
1874, Snider and Andrew Drumm bought a ranch in Indian 
Territory; Drumm later became the secretary of the Cherokee 
strip Livestock Association, while Snider was the treasurer 
and marketed the association's cattle. 36 Quinlan, 
Montgomery & co. were Texas ranchers long before entering 
the commission business; they were drovers and financiers of 
the trade as well as commission merchants. 37 
J. R. Stoller moved to Denver, Colorado in 1873 and 
engaged in "stock raising on the plains." In 1875, he 
created a commission firm in Kansas City to market the 
cattle of Colorado producers, and 12 years later he moved 
there. 38 J. N. and s. D. Irwin became familiar with the 
trade in the West as freighters from Leavenworth, Kansas to 
Salt Lake City, Utah in the 1860s. In Leavenworth, the 
Irwin brothers made important contacts with a private 
36Prose and Poetry of the Livestock Industry of the 
United States (New York: Antiquarian Press, Ltd., 1959), 
pp. 747-749. 
37Blue Book, p. 81; Powell, Kansas City Traders, p. 212 
3SBlue Book, p. 101. 
banker, J. W. Powers, who later financed them in the 
livestock commission business. 39 
L. A. Allen followed a similar pattern. At fourteen 
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years of age, Allen traveled west from Kansas City as a cow 
hand to Bent County, Colorado. While in southeastern 
Colorado, Allen entered a partnership with a local rancher 
"on shares" and accumulated "a little capital." He played 
an active role in the formation of the Bent County Stock 
Growers' Association (the first cattlemen's association in 
the West) in 1867. He proved popular with the local 
ranchers, who trusted him to market the Bent County cattle 
in Kansas City from 1868 to 1873. Allen also spoke Spanish 
fluently and marketed the cattle of Hispanic producers in 
southern Colorado. In 1874, Allen moved to Kansas City and 
formed with the Irwin brothers Irwin, Allen & co. 40 
There were other reasons these cattle brokers 
succeeded. At various times, commission merchants at Kansas 
City complained that the business was difficult to break 
into because "a few wealthy firms" dominated the trade. 
They accused the larger firms of rebating commissions to the 
39Powell, Kansas City Traders, pp., 239; 224-227; 
Ellsworth Reporter, 17 June 1875; McCoy, Historical 
Sketches, p. 333. 
40c. Hurd, Boggsville: cradle of the Colorado Cattle 
Industry (Boggsville, Colorado: Bent County Democrat, 
1957), pp. 11; Kansas city Live stock Indicator, 6 August 
1884; Allen and Stoller retired poor men. The Kansas City 
Live Stock Exchange confiscated their memberships for non-
payment of debts, see Minutes of the Board of Directors, 6 
August 1900, 6 May 1914, vel. 4, RKCLE (Microcopy Collection 
158) 0 
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shippers, undercutting the younger firms even to the point 
of taking a loss. The railroads also reduced freight rates 
for larger shipments. Their contacts with cattle 
associations consolidated the larger firm's positions. 41 
This concentration of the trade into a few firms did 
not take place in the hog trade. Hogs came out of the Corn 
Belt and were widely dispersed. No "hog associations" 
controlled the supply of animals, and numerous railroads ran 
through the region. So the opportunity for concentration 
never presented itself. 
In sum, the livestock commission firms in Kansas City 
generally were small enterprises. They were usually single 
proprietorships or partnerships; few commission firms 
incorporated. The average number of employees was five, and 
less than half were family firms. These firms were Kansas 
City based, although a few were branch offices of concerns 
in Chicago, st. Louis, or st. Joseph. The majority of the 
firms were less than six years of age in 1886. The 
commission business was essentially a marketing organization 
with little administrative backing, although the office men 
and yardmen served an important role in the firm. 
The personnel of the commission firm were white males 
of an average age of 39 in 1886. They were from areas east 
of Kansas City. The commission merchants generally got into 
the business through other occupations related to the 
41American Live Stock Commission Company v Chicago Live 
Stock Exchange, "Brief for Appellee," pp. 18-24. 
58 
livestock trade, such as livestock shippers, yard traders, 
and speculators or as working as an employee of the 
stockyards. Some commission merchants learned the trade as 
salesmen for another commission firm. 
A few commission firms dominated the cattle trade. 
They were the oldest firms, but the merchants associated 
with them also made earlier contacts in the West with cattle 
associations. The older firms dominated the business 
through these contacts and by rebating commissions to 
shippers when necessary. The hog trade, on the other hand, 
resisted any domination on the part of commission firms. 
There were no livestock associations which controlled the 
supply of hogs and the railroads provided a greater choice 
of transportation than afforded to cattle producing areas. 
Despite the fact that the livestock commission merchant 
revolutionized the trade, there were various 11 evils and 
abuses 11 which became prevalent in the mid-1880s. The next 
chapter describes these problems and how they brought about 
the first organization of livestock exchanges in the 
American West. 
CHAPTER IV 
"EVILS AND ABUSES" OF THE 
LIVESTOCK TRADE 
Various "evils and abuses" attended the revolution in 
livestock marketing in the late nineteenth century. These 
problems eventually led to the regulation of the middlemen 
in the form of the livestock exchanges. Angry hog traders 
in the Corn Belt and dissatisfied cattle raisers from the 
Southwest forced the organization of the Chicago and Kansas 
City Livestock Exchanges. The foremost issue was a national 
epidemic of livestock diseases, but producers also demanded 
regulation of the buyers and commission merchants in the 
market place. This chapter examines the timing and the 
forces behind the organization of the livestock exchange as 
a regulatory body. 
The organization of the Chicago and Kansas City 
Exchanges were part of the same movement. Any discussion of 
the abuses in the Kansas City livestock trade must take into 
account the Chicago market; both organized their trade 
within two years of one another. So when the Chicago 
merchants created an exchange in 1884, the Kansas city 
merchants were under pressure to do the same two years 
59 
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later. Nevertheless, the precise issue which sparked the 
organization of these two leading livestock exchanges was 
different. The Chicago Exchange responded primarily to a 
national crisis in disease control, although it was also 
under pressure to reform the buying practices commonly known 
as "hog dockage." While the issues of disease control and 
hog dockage were significant factors in Kansas City, the 
Exchange there formed in response to the actions of 
cattlemen's associations in the Southwest. 
The nature of live animals predetermined the 
organizational pattern of the livestock exchanges. Contrary 
to grain or cotton, as the railroads carried live animals 
from the producing regions of the West to the urban centers 
in the East, and back again, livestock diseases followed, 
and reached epidemic proportions by the mid-1880s. Until 
then, the United States remained relatively free from 
epidemics among livestock; animals were driven in small 
herds over short distances, and diseases did not spread in 
any significant manner. 1 
The railroad obviously changed all that. The first 
movement of large herds of cattle from one section of the 
United States to another, and through concentrated market 
points, occurred when the Texas cattle herds trailed north 
to the Kansas railroads in the 1860s. These longhorns 
carried ticks which transmitted Texas fever to northern 
1J. F. Smithcors, The American Veterinary Profession: 
Its Background and Development (Ames: Iowa State University 
Press, 1963), p. 439. 
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herds. The disease threatened devastation upon the northern 
plains livestock trade as well as Corn Belt feeding 
operations. 2 
The railroads carried other diseases more damaging than 
Texas fever. In the 1870s hog cholera, pleuro-pneumonia, 
and tuberculosis appeared throughout the nation's livestock 
producing areas. The origins of these diseases was little 
understood, but some scientists believed the railroad was 
the primary reason for the wide distribution. The market 
centers of Chicago and Kansas City were possible 
transmission points for the diseases nationwide. 3 
The United States had no stated policy on the control 
of animal diseases before 1884. There was no department 
within the federal government empowered to act, yet 
infectious diseases placed at risk urban populations in 
Chicago and Kansas City as the livestock trade grew. 
Scientists counted twenty-three diseases transmitted between 
animals and humans, but tuberculosis and anthrax were the 
most serious. 4 
2smithcors, The Veterinarian in America, 1625-1975 
(Santa Barbara, California: American Veterinarian 
Publications, 1975), pp. 45-46. 
3smithcors, Profession, p. 444; u. G. Houck, The Bureau 
of Animal Industry of the United States Department of 
Agriculture: Its Establishment, Achievements and Current 
Activities (Washington D.C.: Hayworth Printing, 1924), p. 
31. 
4u. s. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Animal 
Industry, Annual Report, 1885, p. 348. 
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In addition to the danger to the human population, 
these diseases threatened the very existence of the national 
livestock trade. Hog traders were reluctant to buy feeder 
hogs in the urban markets for fear of transmitting hog 
cholera onto their farms. Cattle feeders in Illinois and 
Iowa were increasingly unwilling to purchase dairy calves 
shipped out of Wisconsin for fear of tuberculosis. 
(Tuberculosis was a problem with dairy cattle because 
farmers confined them in barns.) Western ranchers were 
uncertain as to whether the expensive pure bred bulls 
purchased in the East carried pleuro-pneumonia. Following 
suit, England, France, and Germany stopped importing 
American beef and pork. 5 
Livestock producers laid aside their economic 
individualism and demanded that the federal government 
intervene. In response, u. s. Commissioner of Agriculture 
George B. Loring invited stock breeders to meet Department 
of Agriculture officials in Chicago in November 1883. The 
place and time for this meeting coincided with the annual 
conventions of numerous livestock associations. A sampling 
included the Hereford Cattle Breeders, Berkshire 
Association, Holstein Breeders' Association, Durock-Jersey 
Red Swine Association, and the National Association of Swine 
5Richard Perren, "The North American Beef and Cattle 
Trade with Great Britain, 1870-1914, 11 Economic History 
Review 24 (August 1971) :430-431; Bureau of Animal Industry, 
Annual Report, 1885, p. 330; Houck, Bureau of Animal 
Industry, p. 86. 
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Breeders. Cattlemen's associations from Wyoming, Colorado, 
Texas, and Nebraska were also present. 6 
The convention demanded the United States Congress pass 
legislation to stop the spread of animal disease within the 
nation. They agreed that no individual state could 
effectively eliminate contagious diseases spread by an 
interstate transportation network. From this convention 
came the impetus to create the Bureau of Animal Industry. 
In March 1884, three months after the Chicago meeting, an 
Animal Industry Bill passed in the U. s. House of 
Representatives and was sent to the Senate. The bill gave 
the head of the proposed Animal Industry Bureau broad powers 
in identifying and destroying diseased animals. It also 
gave the Bureau the ability to quarantine any stockyards it 
determined infected. In short, the Bureau would have the 
power to shut down the Chicago Union Stockyards if 
circumstances warranted it. The measure therefore, 
threatened the livelihood of the livestock commission 
merchants. 7 
The announcement of how the proposed legislation would 
be implemented moved the Chicago livestock commission 
merchants to organize into the Chicago Live Stock Exchange 
in March 1884. Commissioner Loring announced that Dr. D. E. 
Salmon, a veterinarian, would head the new department once 
6smithcors, Profession, p. 440; Kansas City Livestock 
Indicator, 22 November 1883. 
7Houck, The Bureau of Animal Industry, p.38; Kansas 
City Livestock Indicator, 25 February 1884. 
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it was established. The merchants supported the concept of 
the Bureau of Animal Industry but wanted it headed by a 
commission of livestock producers. That a veterinarian 
would have the power, without recourse, to shut down the 
livestock trade of Chicago alarmed the businessmen. 8 
They had good reason. In the 1880s livestock producers 
of the nation held veterinarians in low regard. "Quack" 
veterinarians outnumbered professionally trained ones, and 
livestock producers insisted they knew more about livestock 
diseases than these "doctors." In addition, a bitter 
controversy over the infectious nature of pleuro-pneumonia 
and hog cholera raged between leading veterinarians in the 
United States. The outcome of the dispute affected the 
entire livestock economy; if scientists proved pleuro-
pneumonia and hog cholera were not contagious, there would 
be no need to arbitrarily close the Union Stockyards. The 
Chicago livestock commission merchants knew Salmon was the 
leader of one faction to that controversy, holding 
(correctly) that pleuro-pneumonia and hog cholera were 
highly infectious. Moreover, Salmon had made it clear that 
the proposed Bureau under his supervision would quarantine 
any livestock yards necessary. 9 
8Daily Drovers Journal of Chicago, 11, 26 February 
1884; 18, 21, 23 March 1884; Kansas City Livestock 
Indicator, 17 April 1884. 
9Daily Drovers Journal of Chicago, 23 September 1884; 
Ellis P. Leonard, A Cornell Heritage: Veterinary Medicine, 
1868-1908 (Ithaca: New York State College of Veterinary 
Medicine, 1979), p. 61; Bureau of Animal Industry, Annual 
Report, 1885, p. 348. 
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The other faction in the scientific dispute, led by 
Dr. H. J. Detmer of Illinois, purportedly "proved" that 
pleuro-pneumonia and hog cholera were not infectious. An 
advisor to the Union Stock Yards, Detmer warned the Chicago 
merchants about Salmon. Consequently, they demanded that a 
commission of "practical livestock producers" administer the 
Bureau of Animal Industry rather than an antagonistic 
veterinarian. 10 
Dr. H. J. Detmer was not a quack practitioner, in fact, 
he was one of the leading veterinarians in the United 
states. A native of Germany, he received scientific 
training at the Royal Veterinary Colleges in Hanover and 
Berlin which were considered the best veterinary colleges in 
the world. Detmer emigrated to the United states in 1862 
and lectured at the University of Illinois, University of 
Missouri, Iowa State College, and Kansas State College, 
respectively, from 1869 to 1879. In 1884 he accepted the 
chair of professor of medical science at Ohio State 
University. The veterinary profession considered him as an 
eminent pioneer bacteriologist and pathologist. 11 
Upon the advice of Detmer, the Chicago merchants led 
the fight opposing the organization of the Bureau of Animal 
10Daily Drovers Journal of Chicago, 18 March 1884; B. 
w. Bierer, A Short History of Veterinary Medicine in America 
(East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1955), p. 
63; U. s. Department of Agriculture, Report of the 
Commissioner of Agriculture. 1878-1879 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1878-1880), pp. 364-435. 
11Bierer, Short History, pp. 62-63; Leonard, Veterinary 
Medicine, p. 61. 
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Industry. They found allies among the Texas livestock 
associations. The bill declared Texas fever a contagious 
disease and therefore empowered the Bureau to shut all Texas 
cattle out of northern markets. The Texas producers and 
Chicago merchants succeeded in getting Texas fever redefined 
as not contagious and they emasculated the final legislation 
by reducing the appropriations for the Bureau and sharply 
limiting the power of the department head. 12 
The western cattle associations were furious. The 
Wyoming Stock Growers' Association threatened to boycott 
Chicago as a market. The Colorado Cattle Growers' 
Association and the New Mexico Cattle Raisers' Association 
counselled together on how they might best eliminate the 
obnoxious commission merchants from the livestock trade 
entirely. These events convinced the Chicago merchants that 
they could no longer act as individuals. 13 
In brief summary, the coming of the railroad to the 
livestock industry in the American West was both a blessing 
and a curse. It established a national market for 
livestock, but it also threatened to destroy the very market 
it created. The United States Department of Agriculture had 
new powers of quarantine, and livestock producers were 
increasingly hostile, pressing the national government for 
vigorous action. The timing of the organization of the 
12Daily Drovers Journal of Chicago, 11 February, 18 
March 1884. 
1 3Ibid., 18 March 1884. 
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Chicago Exchange coincided with the organization of the 
Bureau of Animal Industry in March of 1884, but there were 
other "evils and abuses" which had accumulated for a number 
of years; all of them related to the unique aspects of 
marketing live animals. The events of March 1884 were 
simply the ones which finally moved the commission merchants 
to act. 
Hog dockage was an "abuse" of the trade in both Kansas 
City and Chicago. Along with an increasing involvement in 
the livestock trade by the national government, hog dockage 
added fuel to the drive toward regulation and to the 
formation of the livestock exchanges. Hogs sold at both 
stockyards by the pound and were subject to shrinkage or 
dockage. Buyers docked 40 pounds off the actual weight of a 
"piggy (pregnant) sow" and 80 pounds off each "stag" 
(castrated boar) . This reduction occurred because consumers 
considered the flesh of both unfit for consumption. The 
dockage system existed in the Union Stockyards as early as 
1865. It flourished later in the Kansas City market. An 
employee of the buyer (called a docker) docked the animals 
after the sale. As an inevitable result, this practice 
became arbitrary and grossly unfair to the hog producer over 
time. 14 
14American Live Stock Commission Company v Chicago Live 
stock Exchange, "Brief for the Appellee," p. 17; H. R. 
Davidson and W. E. Coey, The Production and Marketing of 
Pigs (London: Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1966), p. 96; 
Powell, Kansas City Traders, p. 265; Daily Drovers Journal 
of Chicago, 23 December 1885. 
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The inequities occurred because of the peculiarities of 
the livestock trade, especially the volatility in hog 
prices. They changed as much as 30 percent in one day. 
Dockers easily adjusted the high price of hogs bought early 
in the day to a lower price if the "scale tickets" were not 
marked. The farmers noticed the dock was fairer if the 
price worked against the packers and went up during the day. 
It did not take the farmers long to figure out why: the 
buyers were manipulating the prices. 15 
Buyers and sellers never had a true picture of how many 
hogs were ready for market in the "country." For example, 
livestock traders had no statistics on the number of hogs in 
Iowa, let alone how many were on the way to market. 
Therefore, the supply of live animals in the stockyards 
determined the "spot" price. If all the pens were full of 
fat hogs, the packers were never in a hurry to buy. 
According to one account, they arrived in the yards about 
three o'clock in the afternoon to fill their requirements, 
putting pressure on the shippers to sell. (Each day a 
shipper's hogs were in the yards, it increased the yardage 
and feed charges.) But if the supply of fat hogs in the 
yards was small, the packers rushed to the stockyards early 
in the morning and competed with the other buyers, although 
15u. s. Congress, Senate Report 829, Transportation and 
Sale of Meat Products, p. 31. 
they could always dock the hogs if they price were too 
high. 16 
This dockage of hogs reached a crisis point in 1884. 
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After attaining a peak of $9.35 per hundred pounds in 1882, 
the prices fell to a low of $3.20 in 1885, a 66 percent 
decline. Beginning early in 1883, letters to the editor of 
the Daily Drovers Journal of Chicago from traders throughout 
the Corn Belt described different aspects of the dockage 
issue. 17 
For example, Charles R. Luther, a hog shipper from 
Valparaiso, Indiana, shipped 168 hogs to Chicago in January 
1883 "mostly of my own feeding." He had carefully inspected 
his herd before loading them on the train and "none were 
piggy." Anticipating trouble from the packers, Luther asked 
"several old shippers" from Valparaiso to inspect his stock; 
they found only one "piggy sow." With that assurance in 
mind, Luther boarded the train with his hogs and traveled to 
the Union Stock Yards in Chicago. 
When Luther arrived at the Stockyards, he encountered 
the dockage problem. The stockyards employees unloaded the 
hogs into a sorting pen, and the commission merchant invited 
bids from buyers. One packer's buyer bought forty-six of 
Luther's heaviest hogs. As the hogs moved off the weighing 
scales, Luther heard the "docker" cry out "five piggy sows, 
two hundred pounds off!" Luther wrote that he 
16Daily Drovers Journal of Chicago, 3 January 1883. 
17rbid., 30 December 1884. 
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"remonstrated" loudly at the buyer and asked the commission 
merchant to arbitrate the matter. The buyer defiantly 
walked off, looking for another herd of fat swine. Luther's 
hogs headed toward the packing house for slaughter, and 
there was nothing Luther could do about it. 18 
Another hog trader, z. W. Montague from LaMotte, Iowa 
also wrote to the Drovers Journal with another aspect of the 
dockage system in the Chicago yards. In his case, the 
commission merchant sold the hogs early in the morning, but 
the stockyard employees weighed and docked late in the 
afternoon. During the day the price of hogs declined 25 
cents a hundred weight. During the afternoon the buyer 
decided "he had paid too much for this load of hogs," and 
reported to the commission merchant "the hog producer must 
stand for a big dock." To make his actions less obvious to 
the hundreds of buyers and sellers in the yards, the buyer 
hurriedly rushed the load of hogs out of the pen six or 
eight abreast and had the docker cry out his dockage. 
Montague was astonished. He followed and watched the 
hogs closely through several gates and alleys. In 
Montague's opinion there was "one straight dockable hog" in 
the lot, but the packer managed to reduce the price of this 
lot 25 cents from the high morning price to the low 
afternoon price. As with the Luther example, Montague found 
18Luther's letter appears in Daily Drovers Journal of 
Chicago, 23 January 1883. Other letters not quoted in this 
chapter appear in Ibid., 3 January 1883; 27 May 1884; 5 July 
1884; 6 August 1884; 30 December 1884. 
his efforts to find a remedy to this "outrage" were 
"fruitless. 1119 
This system was not entirely a matter of the "robber 
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baron" exploiting the poor farmer for the hog traders were 
partly responsible for the very dockage system they hated. 
Farmer L. G. Heaps from Galena, Illinois wrote to the 
Drovers Journal and explained the custom of dockage had 
evolved over time. Both hog traders and packers agreed, in 
principle, there was a legitimate dock for imperfect hogs. 
While Heaps was quick to condemn the packers, he urged his 
fellow agrarians to admit that 
•.. we all know that we used to turn the boars among our 
fattening hogs, so that the sows would fat (sic) 
better, and if they go piggy they would weigh more. 20 
The letters in the Drovers Journal during the mid-1880s 
from such hog traders as Luther, Montague, and Heaps, 
highlighted the imperfections of an outdated business 
system. As the Chicago market grew from a local market in 
the 1850s to a national one in the 1880s, the pressure 
forced businessmen to find new ways of conducting the trade. 
It was no longer adequate for buyer to meet seller in the 
market place: there was a need for some system of 
administrating the disputes between all parties concerned in 
a fair and expeditious manner. The livestock industry 
elected regulation by a livestock exchange over the 
regulation by the state in 1884. 
19rbid., 12 August 1884. 
20rbid., 16 January 1883. 
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Part of the encouragement to organize the Chicago Live 
Stock Exchange also came from the threat of state 
interference. The legislature of Illinois considered 
intervention, but failed to act. The Western Rural, the 
leading agricultural newspaper, sharply criticized the 
legislators. The Farmers' Club of Tiskilwa, Illinois, 
considered hog dockage a "shameless robbery" and threatened 
the General Assembly with political consequences if it did 
not declare the practice of dockage a misdemeanor. 
Nevertheless, the farmers organizations in the Midwest 
remained ambivalent to the question and permitted private 
regulation to solve the problem. 21 
These producers viewed the dockage question in the 
livestock trade and the warehouse "swindle" in the grain 
trade as one and the same issue. By the 1870s in the grain 
trade, Chicago elevator operators extracted high fees from 
producers for storing their grain. Farmers remembered that 
the Chicago elevator men were as "imperious and high minded 
then as the packers are now." The Chicago Board of Trade 
unsuccessfully applied private regulation to this warehouse 
"swindle"; the State of Illinois then addressed the issue 
and created a system of public inspection for grain 
elevators. 22 
21Ibid., 6 August 1884. 
22Guy A. Lee, "The Historical Significance of the 
Chicago Grain Elevator," Agricultural History 11 (January 
1937) :23, 28-29. 
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While the question of dockage brought the attention of 
farmers to the "evils and abuses" of the packers, there were 
equally reprehensible actions on the part of unscrupulous 
commission firms. Fraud in the commission business was 
easily practiced. The unique nature of marketing live 
animals created opportunities for abuse in the trade. 
Commission merchants committed these frauds in the 
confusing activity of the stockyards. Thousand of livestock 
changed hands every day in both Kansas City and Chicago. 
Hundreds of buyers and sellers moved in and out of the yards 
at all times during the day; stock trains arrived hourly, 
while others left the yards for points throughout the United 
States. All the contracts between the buyers and sellers 
were oral (there were no witnesses to the oral contract and 
therefore unenforceable in a court of law) ; only the 
integrity of the commission merchant protected the shipper 
from fraud. Only when the commission merchant rendered the 
expense bills at the office of the Stockyards Company was 
there an identifiable contract. 23 
Unscrupulous merchants and buyers took advantage of the 
time lag between the oral contract and the time for payment. 
By the 1880s, dishonest buyers frequently denied agreements 
made with the commission merchant in the yards when the 
price of livestock declined during the day. Consequently, 
the commission man re-marketed the producer's stock at lower 
23American Livestock Commission Company v Chicago Live 
stock Exchange, "Brief for Appellee," p. 18. 
prices. Neither the buyer nor the commission merchant 
reported these frauds to the shipper, the end result of 
which was that the producer was at a disadvantageous 
position in the market. 24 
The absence of the producer presented other 
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opportunities for fraud. The commission merchant frequently 
traded "on his own account," and inevitably, poorer quality 
stock came into his possession (injured or diseased 
animals) . An unscrupulous commission agent easily 
substituted his own inferior stock for his customer's high 
quality stock. The commission merchant only reported the 
sales of the number of livestock, and a few inferior animals 
placed in a large load went undetected. 25 
An unscrupulous commission merchant could also falsify 
the account of sales. An example surfaced in Chicago in 
1886. J. S. McFarland was a merchant who operated out of 
the Union Stock Yards. The Chicago Live Stock Exchange 
discovered McFarland habitually returned fraudulent accounts 
to his unsuspecting shippers. On 4 February 1886, McFarland 
sold for D. P. Taylor of Avoca, Iowa, 66 heavy cattle 
weighing 93,030 pounds at $4.70 a hundred weight toT. c. 
Eastman. McFarland returned to Taylor only $4.60 (short 
changing the producer 10 cents per hundred weight) on the 
sale and pocketed $93.03 as a reward for his fraud. 
McFarland dealt a double fraud against Fred Eaton, of 
24 rbid. 
25 b'd ~., pp. 18-19. 
Kellogg, Iowa. He substituted a crippled steer for a 
healthy one, but also returned to Eastman $40.00 of the 
$50.00 received in payment for the cripple. The Chicago 
board discovered further, in auditing McFarland's account 
books, that he conducted similar illegalities upon four 
other shippers from Iowa and Nebraska totaling $138.50. 26 
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The cutting of commission rates was the greatest abuse 
of the market according to the traders. The problem was the 
absence of any uniformity in rates charged among the 
commission merchants. The unscrupulous commission merchant 
offered shippers commission rates below the costs of 
operations; he made up the loss by defrauding the shipper in 
returning a false return of sales. 27 
As with the problems of disease control and the 
"dockage swindle," shippers eventually discovered the deeds 
of unscrupulous livestock commission merchants. In the mid-
1880s they pressed for reform. The Kansas City livestock 
commission merchants felt an increasing pressure to follow 
the example of the Chicago merchants in organizing an 
exchange, but delayed it for two years. In 1886, powerful 
cattlemen's associations in the Southwest forced them to 
act. 
The organization of the Kansas City Live Stock Exchange 
flowed directly from the activities of the cattlemen's 
26oaily Drovers Journal of Chicago, 14, 15 September 
1886. 
27American v Chicago, p. 21. 
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associations. In the Southwest, the latter had organized as 
early as the 1860s. In the absence of a positive government 
in frontier areas, these private associations organized and 
controlled the livestock industry. 28 Unique forces in the 
mid-1880s encouraged a movement toward organization of 
regional cattle associations. As already mentioned, the 
first was disease control. The second was an industry-wide 
depression from 1883 to 1887. In this period the cattle 
business suffered heavy losses through cold winters and 
severe droughts; the ranges were seriously overgrazed; 
quarantines from western states hindered the flow of 
livestock traffic to market; and foreign meat markets were 
demoralized. During this time of crisis, cattlemen 
reevaluated the marketing of cattle and beginning in 1883 
organized regional associations on a national level. By 
such mechanisms cattlemen from Colorado and New Mexico hoped 
to invigorate the weak attempts of the Bureau of Animal 
Industry to deal with pleuro-pneumonia that still endangered 
western herds. Increasingly intolerant of the middlemen in 
the trade, they determined to eliminate them entirely. 
Galvanized into action: western cattlemen's associations 
formed the International Range Association. 29 
28 Dale, The Range cattle Industry, pp. 11, 58, 85, 89, 
105-106; Earnest S. Osgood, The Day of the Cattlemen 
(Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1929), pp. 
114-118. 
29 Dale, Range cattle Industry, pp. 171-185; Louis 
Pelzer, The Cattlemen's Frontier (New York: Russell & 
Russell, 1936) ,_ pp. 138-150. 
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The organizers of the International Range Association 
believed the Bureau of Animal Industry would act too late to 
save western cattle herds from pleuro-pneumonia. Taking 
matters into their own hands, they established an 
association of cattle producers in 1885 to quarantine all of 
the range country against livestock shipped from states east 
of the Missouri River. As a result of those efforts, the 
New Mexico Territorial Cattle and Horse Growers' 
Association, the Colorado cattle Growers' Association, and 
the State Livestock Association of Texas invited rangemen 
from Mexico, British Columbia, and the United States to meet 
with them on 27 January 1886 in Denver, Colorado, to 
formulate a plan of action.3° 
A radical venture, the International Range Association 
lasted only two years. It and other cattle associations 
lacked effective power. Other than appealing to the 
unsympathetic legislatures (which more often than not 
ignored them), there was little they could do. By 1886 the 
fate of national cattlemen's associations was clear: high 
hopes were doomed to failure. This fate inevitably forced 
cattlemen to consider ideas about internal control and 
centralization. These were the notions which threatened the 
Kansas City livestock commission merchants. 31 
3°Kansas City Livestock Indicator, 12 November 1885. 
31cattlemen and farmers made several attempts at 
constructing a trust, see Gene Gressley, "The American 
Cattle Trust: A Study in Protest," Pacific Historical 
Review 30 (February 1961):61-77; for the American Beef Pool, 
see Kansas City Live Stock Indicator 15 September 1887; for 
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The movement towards centralization came out of New 
Mexico. In November 1885, J. W. Dwyer, president of the New 
Mexico Cattle Growers' Association, launched an attempt at 
controlling the industry from a producer's perspective. He 
argued the inability of cattlemen's associations to act in 
unison and with force hindered them. Dwyer reorganized the 
New Mexico Cattle Growers' Association and delegated all 
authority to an Executive Committee. The International 
Range Association, because of the influence of Dwyer, even 
copied this organizational pattern. 32 
The membership had few checks upon the Executive 
Committee, which administered the Association through a 
series of bureaus. One bureau timed, adjusted, or regulated 
the shipments of cattle from different regions in order to 
prevent a surplus in the markets. To prevent the spread of 
contagious disease another could formulate quarantine 
regulations without consulting the members affected. A 
third bureau was to control stock thieves by prosecuting 
violators throughout the range areas. 
The association created a black list of every stock 
owner and cowboy deemed dishonest. They prohibited members 
of the International Range Association from employing, or 
cooperating with, those on the blacklist. The Executive 
the Farmers' Trust see Texas Livestock Journal, 31 March 
1885. 
32Breeders Gazette, 3 December 1885, 4, 25 February 
1886; Kansas City Livestock Indicator, 10 December 1885, 17 
February 1886; Daily Drovers Journal of Chicago, 30 January 
1886. 
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Committee threatened to expel any person divulging their 
actions. As the editor of the Breeders' Gazette opined, 
these actions meant that the committee members determined 
all questions concerning the manner in which cattlemen 
conducted their business, the health of their animals, their 
own morals, and the kind of people with whom they would 
associate. 33 
Although these actions foreordained the International 
Range Association to failure, the organization had an impact 
beyond its own membership. This new radicalism disturbed 
the Kansas City livestock merchants, especially the threat 
to eliminate the commission firms. The International Range 
Association discussed their tactics in open session in 
January 1886. Reporters from the Kansas City Livestock 
Indicator stenographically recorded, and later reported, the 
sessions in detail. This was the stimulus which brought 
about the organization of the Kansas City Live Stock 
Exchange one month later in February 1886.34 
In short, there were reasons the livestock exchanges 
organized in the mid-1880s. The technological revolution 
brought by the railroad created a national market for 
livestock, but it also created problems never before 
experienced. These new pressures called for new 
administrative institutions. The railroads spread diseases 
nation wide and threatened the collapse of the national 
33Breeders' Gazette, 4 February 1886. 
34Kansas City Livestock Indicator, 4 February 1886. 
80 
livestock economy. Livestock producers pressured the 
national government for assistance in the area, but the 
potential solutions threatened the existence of the 
livestock markets, particularly in Chicago. In response the 
Chicago livestock commission merchants organized the first 
livestock exchange in the West. 
The creation of some administrative organization was 
inevitable, for there were other abuses in the trade which 
demanded attention. Buyers in the hog market manipulated 
the pricing mechanism through the use of hog dockage, and 
unscrupulous livestock commission merchants took advantage 
of the impersonalization of the marketplace to defraud 
producers. Finally, the cattlemen's associations in the 
Southwest moved to control the spread of diseases into their 
areas on their own, and also determined to eliminate the 
middlemen from the trade. These actions forced the 
commission merchants in Kansas City to follow the example of 
the Chicago Exchange and organize the Kansas City Live Stock 
Exchange. 
When the Exchange organized in February 1886, the 
merchants followed a pattern of organization long 
established in the history of commerce. The next chapter 
discusses the ideas and precedents behind the organization 
of the Kansas City Live Stock Exchange. 
CHAPTER V 
ANTECEDENTS, IDEAS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
There was more to the formation of the Kansas City 
Livestock Exchange in 1886 than materialistic forces. 
Ideas, rooted in the commercial history of Western 
civilization and in the unique thinking on public policy in 
nineteenth century America, also directed and molded the 
specific organizational form. The Kansas City livestock 
commission merchants were not "robber barons" conspiring to 
create monopolies or combinations of trade; they were 
nineteenth century liberals following a pattern of 
regulation commonly accepted during that era. 
The struggle between the livestock exchanges and the 
producer associations from the 1870s to the 1920s was a 
contest of two differing concepts of public policy. 
Beginning in the granger era in the 1870s, economic 
doctrines took a new turn in the United States. The 
agricultural agitators borrowed ideas from .the physiocrats 
of eighteenth century France: they believed the land was the 
source of all wealth, and consequently, only agrarians 
created real wealth because they worked the land. The 
physiocrats considered middlemen engaged in the distribution 
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of the agricultural products as a necessary evil. The 
grangers in the United States adapted these ideas to their 
own struggle of economic survival and came to view 
commission merchants, in all commodities as well as 
livestock, as enemies. In the opinion of the grangers, the 
commission merchants controlled the market and fixed the 
prices; any method found to eliminate the menace was 
laudatory. 1 
Historians have generally written the history of the 
conflict between the various agricultural interests from the 
point of view of the grangers. The "common man" did battle 
with the "interests" after the Civil War and gained victory 
only during the progressive era from 1900 to 1917. Indeed, 
the struggle ended in the livestock trade with the passage 
of the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921. With that 
measure, the historians write, the grangers won their point: 
the act declared the stockyards a public market subject to 
state control. But to view the conflict simply within the 
context of a struggle between "good and evil" overlooks the 
nineteenth century views of public policy which explained 
why the Kansas City merchants acted as they did. 2 
1solon J. Buck, The Granger Movement: A study of 
Agricultural Organization and Its Political, Economic, and 
Social Manifestations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1913)' pp. 16-17. 
2For the latest argument along this line see Charles 
Wood, Kansas Beef, pp. 159-185; also see John T. 
Schelbecker, Cattle Raising on the Plains, 1900-1961 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963), pp. 77-78; 
for an agricultural economist's point of view see Austin A. 
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Consequently, it is appropriate to ask questions aimed 
at understanding the Kansas City commission merchants within 
the context of their own assumptions about economic 
regulation. For example, were there organizational 
antecedents which pre-dated even the nineteenth century? 
What was the intellectual framework within which these 
merchants organized the Exchange? What were the accepted 
assumptions of nineteenth century public policy which 
granted the merchants the right to act on their own? How 
much of the organization was a new innovation, or was it 
patterned after similar organizations in the trade? 
The Kansas City Live Stock Exchange had roots in the 
commercial development of medieval Europe. The livestock 
exchange was a descendant of the international fairs and 
markets in the eleventh and twelfth centuries in Europe. An 
agricultural revolution occurred there and significantly 
increased the production of agricultural products. 
Inevitably, this change brought about new institutional 
arrangements in the business community. A new class of 
commercial merchants appeared in Europe and marketed the new 
agricultural surpluses. There was also a dramatic rise in 
the number of cities. Prior to this, in the ninth and tenth 
centuries, commercial relations existed only on a limited 
scale. Traveling merchants sold some agricultural products, 
and there were fairs and markets, although not a great 
Dowell and Knute Bjoka, Livestock Marketing (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1941), pp. 389-413. 
number. A hundred thousand agrarian villages and manors 
made up the Western economy. 3 
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The agricultural revolution in the eleventh and twelfth 
centuries also created the need for a new system of 
commercial law. Great international fairs assembled 
regularly in scores of cities and towns throughout Europe. 
For the first time, merchants carried trading goods over 
long distances. The question of how to enforce contracts 
over a wide trading area with different governmental units 
became a problem. These complexities called for a new legal 
system to handle international trade. 4 
The law merchant evolved out of the conflicts of this 
new trade, and they developed a commercial code which 
transcended local trade. The code included the customary 
law of fairs and markets, maritime customs relating to 
trade, and the commercial laws of cities and towns. The law 
merchant governed a special class of people (merchants) in 
special places (fairs, markets, and seaports). Between 1050 
and 1150, the merchants reduced the obligations of 
commercial law to writing. The emphasis was upon the 
impartial adjudication of commercial disputes and the 
emergence of new forms of commercial courts. 5 
3The discussion of the law merchants was taken from 
Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the 
Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1983), pp. 333-356. 
4Ibid., p. 333. 
5Ibid., pp. 334-335. 
85 
The merchant laws became universal and trans-national. 
Merchants traveled to London, Paris, or Cologne, and 
proceeded on the assurance that any disputes encountered in 
these cities would be settled according to a universal code 
among merchants. The disputes were processed quickly, and 
lengthy litigation was unnecessary. The commercial courts 
were non-professional community tribunals, and the merchants 
elected the judges by themselves. 6 
The organizational pattern of the Kansas City Live 
stock Exchange was similar to the European fairs. The 
railroads carried livestock commission merchants across 
state boundaries and into unorganized territories in 
nineteenth century America. State and local governments did 
not address the problems faced in the interstate marketing 
of live animals. Nevertheless, there were opportunities for 
fraud and dishonest gain; there were no rules or uniformity 
in the conduct of the business. So when the Exchange 
organized in 1886, the major function became making rules 
and adjudicating disputes. The Kansas City Live Stock 
Exchange governed the conduct of the commission merchants 
more than the state and local governments. 
Nineteenth century Americans adapted these concepts to 
their own thinking on regulation of agricultural products. 
The concept of an exchange to regulate the flow of grain, 
6rbid., pp. 341-344; see a similar argument in Thomas 
L. Haskell, "Capitalism and the Origins of the Humanitarian 
Sensibility," American Historical Review 90 (April 
1985) :339-361 and (June 1985) :547-566. 
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cotton, produce, and livestock were accepted. They looked 
to Europe for organizational antecedents, yet a unique view 
of public policy held by nineteenth century Americans 
reinforced these concepts. 
Agrarians questioned this view of regulation as 
industrialization proceeded into the American West through 
the railroads. Edwin Snyder, the robber baron historian of 
the Kansas City Livestock Exchange, raised these questions 
about the Exchange, questions that would be asked again and 
again in the twentieth century. In an article entitled 
"Livestock Markets," he queried as to why the "community" 
allowed an "irresponsible, voluntary association of less 
than 200 men" to arbitrarily dictate to hundreds of 
thousands of livestock producers the terms and conditions 
upon which their livestock were sold. Neither Snyder nor 
other Kansas agrarians offered an explanation beyond the 
conspiracy thesis. Yet the question was a perceptive one. 7 
James W. Hurst's concept of "release of energy" 
explained the answer. In Law and the Condition of Freedom 
published in 1956, Hurst set forth the nineteenth century 
thinking on public policy. Using as a case study the Pike 
River Claimant Union on the Wisconsin frontier, he 
illustrated the "release of energy" concept. The Pike River 
Claimant Union was a land claims club of the 1840s. Members 
7Edwin Snyder, "Livestock Markets of Kansas," 
Quarterly Report of the Kansas State Board of Agriculture 
for the Quarter Ending 31 March 1892 (Topeka: Hamilton 
Printing, 1892), p. 51. 
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of the Union were land squatters who had illegally moved on 
to unsurveyed government land to claim a homestead. 
Inevitably there were conflicts over boundaries which a 
court of law could not settle because the pioneers were on 
the land illegally. So how did they resolve the conflicts? 
Primarily, Hurst argued, on the basis of assumptions 
frontier Americans made about the organization of society 
common to nineteenth century Americans, assumptions of 
fairness and justice which governed their construction of 
economic order on the Wisconsin frontier. 8 
Of prime importance was the assumption that union and 
cooperation, not economic individualism, should determine 
economic order. To that end and well in advance of the 
United States government, these pioneers assumed the role of 
regulating the land claims, settling disputes, and securing 
claims against speculators. The Pike River constitution 
stated the reason cooperation was essential: "neighbors 
were driven from their homes, and land procurement was 
unjust." A society built on the concept of every man for 
himself was "calculated to produce anarchy, destroy fair 
prospects, subvert the good order of society, and render our 
homes the habitation of terror and distrust."9 The Claimant 
8James W. Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in 
Nineteenth Century United States (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1956), pp. 1-20; for another view of the 
claims clubs see Allan G. Bogue, "The Iowa Claims Clubs: 
Symbols and Substance," Mississippi Valley Historical 
Review 45 (1958) :231-253. 
9Ibid., p. 8. 
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Union, in fact, created an extra legal government on the 
frontier which followed nineteenth century thinking. They 
elected their own officers to record their land claims, and 
the members of the association abided by the records and 
decisions of their elected officials. 10 
Hurst believed the Pike Creek document implied the 
"base lines" of nineteenth century public policy. Since 
human nature was creative, it was socially desirable for 
society to insure broad opportunity for the release of this 
creative energy. Liberty meant citizens should possess as 
wide a range of options as possible. 11 
From these premises, the Wisconsin pioneers assumed 
that the legal order would accept their land claims. They 
believed that the law was for the benefit of the people; the 
legal order should protect and promote their own "release of 
energy" to the greatest possible extent compatible with the 
broad sharing of opportunity. The Pike Creek Claimant Union 
wanted the "community" to guarantee its claims and to be let 
alone in working the land. Yet, the membership desired the 
community to lend its force to support their dealings with 
the land. They wanted the general government to use its 
resources positively to enhance their opportunity, and they 
wanted preference given to the settler over the 
speculator. 12 
10rbid. 
11 b'd .LJ,_. ' pp. 5-6. 
12 b'd .LJ,_. ' pp. 7-8. 
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Hurst argues that nineteenth century public policy was 
more than laissez faire. It was not the jealous limitation 
of the power of the state, but the "release of energy" that 
was the dominant value. Where legal regulation might 
promote the greater release of energy, nineteenth century 
Americans had no hesitancy in making affirmative use of the 
law. Under a federal constitution committed to limited 
government, Americans loaned the organized force of the 
community to private planners, and the courts sustained the 
rights of these planners to act. As the market expanded, 
private associations increasingly assumed the role of 
regulating the marketplace. 13 
The Kansas City Livestock Exchange operated under these 
assumptions. No clearer statement by a commission merchant 
regarding their attitude toward the economic order was made 
than that of M. L. McClure, president of the Exchange in 
1914 
There are those who criticize our Exchange, claiming it 
biases competition with the declaration that 
'competition is the life of the trade.' But at the 
same time we must all agree that unrestrained, 
ignorant, dishonest, unfair and expensive competition 
destroys trade and disorganization comes.l4 
The livestock commission merchants at Kansas City from 1873 
to 1886 operated in a market whose volume grew 
astronomically and without control. The "evils and abuses" 
of the trade restricted opportunity and diminished 
13rbid. 
14Presidential Address, 10 July 1914, vol. 4, RKCLE 
(Microcopy Collection 158) 
competition. Like the Pike Creek Union, the Kansas City 
Livestock Exchange acted alone; it created a voluntary 
association of 144 members in 1886. 
In organizing a commercial exchange, the merchants 
"assumed" the right of regulation from the "community." 
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They "assumed" the right to organize their trade, to put a 
stop to the anarchy, and to promote uniformity in business 
conduct. They "assumed" the right to set rates in the 
livestock trade for any livestock consigned to Kansas City. 
And they "assumed" the community delegated to them the right 
to settle disputes in a speedy and equitable manner outside 
the normal judicial system. 
The Kansas City Exchange did not incorporate during the 
period under examination. Thus, it did not follow the 
pattern of the Chicago Board of Trade explained by Jonathan 
Lurie in his study of that organization. Lurie linked 
private regulation to the corporate charter. He argued that 
in the mid-nineteenth century legislatures granted corporate 
charters to business organizations quite freely. 
Originally, state aid and public credit backed these 
charters. The aim was the construction of turnpikes and 
canals, the improvement of harbor facilities, and the 
building of railroads. 15 These corporations generally 
failed, and by the Civil War, virtually every state had 
erected its own rigid constitutional barriers against 
further involvement in construction projects. Consequently, 
15Lurie, Chicago Board of Trade, pp. ix-x. 
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according to Lurie, state governments developed a narrowly 
defined view of their own power. 
This experience paved the way for private associations 
such as the Chicago Board of Trade. The state delegated to 
the Board the right to regulate the grain trade through the 
corporate charter. A similar pattern developed in the 
livestock trade in Illinois. The state of Illinois 
delegated to the Chicago Live Stock Exchange via a charter 
granted in March 1884 the power to regulate aspects of the 
livestock trade. 
The Kansas City merchants followed the Chicago example 
in organizing an Exchange in 1886, but they did not apply 
for a corporate charter. With no stipulated authority from 
the state, they simply "assumed" they had the right to 
regulate the livestock trade of the Southwest. The Omaha 
Live stock Exchange followed the Kansas City example, and 
remained an unincorporated private association. The 
corporate charter played no role in the delegation of the 
right of regulation from the "community" to the Exchange in 
either Kansas City or Omaha. 
Implied in the constitution of the Kansas City Live 
Stock Exchange was the answer to Edwin Snyder's question 
concerning the right of the Exchange to regulate interstate 
commerce. Southwesterners believed it socially desirable 
that broad opportunity exist among the middlemen of the 
livestock trade for the "release of creative energy." 
Competition resulting from this opportunity benefited the 
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producers, shippers, the national economy, as well as the 
commission merchants. The Kansas City merchants, in turn, 
wanted the legal order to protect their right to regulate 
the trade from aggressive producers or shippers, to decide 
who would participate in that trade, and who would not. 
These were not laissez faire individualists; they had 
no hesitancy in asking the "community" to allow them to 
regulate the livestock trade. The courts sustained the 
right of the Kansas City Live Stock Exchange to regulate its 
trade in cases brought before state supreme courts in 1889 
and 1906. The Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 ended that 
grant of power. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE KANSAS CITY 
LIVE STOCK EXCHANGE 
The Kansas city Live Stock Exchange organized in 
February 1886 and permitted the "release of energy" for the 
maximum number of participants within a controlled 
community. Instead of following the pattern of industrial 
corporations which concentrated economic power into the 
hands of a few, the Kansas City Live stock Exchange 
decentralized power from the few to the many. Its 
government was not oligopolistic as it encouraged widespread 
participation from the membership. 1 The organization of the 
Exchange was a reform in itself, but its rules also reformed 
the most pressing concern in the first months of operation--
hog dockage. 
The initial organizers moved quickly to avoid past 
mistakes. The conflict between the large and small cattle 
1This is in contrast to most private associations, 
including labor unions and trade associations; see Lurie, 
Chicago Board of Trade, pp. 36-37; Seymour M. Lipset, The 
Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 1966; reprint 1981), pp. 357-
399; Grant McConnell, "The Spirit of Private Government," 




commission firms had heretofore blocked any organizational 
effort. As early as 1873 the traders at Kansas City 
recognized the need for an organization. All attempts 
failed, however. An 1877 effort met the same fate because 
the larger cattle commission firms refused to sign the by-
laws and constitution. Of paramount importance to the 
initial organizers was the participation of all the 
commission firms, the packers, and the Kansas City 
Stockyards Company. For that the first resolution committee 
had included five commission merchants, one packer, and one 
representative from the Stockyards Company. 2 
The Kansas City Live Stock Exchange was not a carbon 
copy of the Chicago or st. Louis exchanges. Its merchants 
borrowed ideas on organization from these earlier 
precedents, but the Kansas City Exchange was unique in that 
it received most of its animals from the Southwest while the 
Chicago and St. Louis markets received livestock primarily 
from the Corn Belt. 3 
The members of the Kansas City Live Stock Exchange 
delegated the government of their body to a Board of 
Directors. The members initially delegated the power to 
2walter Prescott Webb, The Great Plains (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1936), p. 232; St. Louis Globe, 29 
January 1973; Daily Drovers Journal of Chicago, 21 March 
1884; Kansas City Live Stock Exchange, History of the Kansas 
City Livestock Market and the Kansas City Stock Yards 
Company, (n.d. n.p.), p. 5; Minutes of the Board of 
Directors, 29 January 1886, vol. 3, RKCLE (Microcopy 
Collection 158). 
3Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 25 January 
1886, Ibid. 
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administer the Exchange to 11 Directors, but they revised 
the number down to 9 in 1893. The members elected a 
President and Vice President annually. For the first seven 
years the 9 Directors served a one year term, but in 1893, 
the Exchange extended the term to three years. 4 
There was no evidence any one faction controlled the 
Kansas City Live Stock Exchange between 1886 and 1921. The 
most any president served was four years. To be sure G. M. 
Walden was the chief executive officer from 1900 to 1903, 
but the normal pattern was a two year term. 5 The most any 
one commission merchant served as a director was six years. 
The Kansas City Stockyards Company and the packers appointed 
representatives on the Board of Directors, and their terms 
were longer than the elected Directors. For example, A. E. 
Beggs was a buyer for the packers and served nine years as a 
director; 6 the Stockyards Company appointed J. W. Martin for 
4constitution, Rules, and Bylaws, 1903, vol. 8, Ibid., 
p. 2.; Annual Report, 9 February 1893, vol. 3, Ibid. 
5Powell, Kansas City Traders, p. 210; Report of 
Elections, 4 June 1900, 3 June 1901, 2 June 1902, vol. 4, 
RKCLE (Microcopy Collection 158) 
6Powell, Kansas city Traders, p. 202; Report of 
Elections, 11 February 1889, 8 February 1890, 8 February 
1892, 5 February 1895, 7 February 1896, 15 February 1897, 14 
February 1898, vol 3; 3 June 1901, 2 June 1912, vol. 4, 
RKCLE (.Collection 158) 
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nine years. 7 Nevertheless, the commission merchants always 
controlled the board. 
The Board of Directors generally conducted the affairs 
of the Exchange without interference from the membership. 
The board met a minimum of 12 times a year, but held special 
meetings for unexpected situations. The number and reason 
for special sessions varied from year to year; the highest 
number was 18 in 1906. In that year, the Exchange raised 
the charge on commissions on hogs and sheep, a decision that 
encountered strong opposition from the membership. The 
result was a number of crisis meetings. In contrast, the 
year 1912 was an uneventful year, and the Exchange held no 
special meetings. 8 
The membership never delegated total power to the 
board, however. By signing a petition ten members could 
force the Directors to call a general meeting. On 27 June 
1898, such a petition came before the board. One hundred 
and twenty-six angry members (out of 298 total) showed up at 
the general meeting and expressed their sentiment concerning 
a new ruling made by the board the previous week which 
lessened the restrictions imposed upon solicitors in the 
country. The petition stated: "in our opinion the ruling 
7Powell, Kansas City Traders, p. 190; Report of 
Elections, 8 February 1890, 9 February 1891, 3 February 
1892, 9 February 1894, 5 February 1895, 7 February 1896, 15 
February 1897, vol. 3; 4 June 1900, 2 June 1902, vol. 4, 
RKCLE (Collection 158) 
8constitution, 1903, vol. 8, Ibid. p. 6; Annual Report, 
1 June 1907, 27 July 1913, vol. 4, Ibid. 
97 
was contrary to precedents passed by previous Boards and 
menace the better interests of the Livestock Exchange." By 
a vote of the membership, the rule was repealed. 9 
As with special meetings, the number of general 
meetings of the membership varied from year to year. Since 
there were no such gatherings in 1891, the Board directed 
the Exchange without interference. But in 1896 there were 
14 general meetings. At issue was the price of membership. 
The Board wanted the price of a membership at $2,500, while 
the members fought for a reduction to $1,00o.1° 
Nineteen hundred and two was another crisis year for 
the Exchange. Two issues produced 14 general meetings. 
First, the commission merchants wanted the Stockyards 
Company to clean up the Kansas City facility. Embarrassed 
because shippers considered it a disgrace, the commission 
firms requested the company to make the necessary 
improvements. Stockyard officials, however, deemed the work 
unnecessary. After the commission merchants threatened to 
boycott the facility, the company made the requested 
changes. 11 
The second issue producing general meetings was the 
conflict with the National Live Stock Exchange over the 
9constitution 1903, vol 8. Ibid., p. 7; Minutes of the 
Exchange, 27 June 1898, vol. 3, Ibid. 
10Annual Report, 8 February 1892, 14 February 1889, 
ibid. 
11Minutes of the Exchange, 3 February-6 July 1902, vol. 
4, Ibid .. 
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national organization's ineffectiveness. The members 
demanded the Kansas City Exchange withdraw from the national 
organization. Contrary to the advice of the Board of 
Directors, the Exchange withdrew from the national body upon 
a vote of the membership. 12 
The degree to which members participated actively in 
the Kansas City organization depended upon the issues before 
it. Generally participation was greater during years of 
crisis. The highest participation in elections was 89 
percent of the membership in 1886, the founding year of the 
Exchange. Out of 144 memberships, 128 voted. In 1895 (the 
first year government inspectors moved into the stockyards) 
69 percent of the membership voted, or 201 out of 293. The 
lowest percentage of participation in an annual election was 
in 1911. In this year of rising livestock prices and 
relative calm in the industry, only nine percent of the 
membership voted, 25 out of 285 members. 13 
The members always retained control of the of the 
Kansas City Live Stock Exchange. Rumors that the packers 
and the Stockyards Company exercised pervasive influence 
were unfounded. Only during four administrations of the 
Exchange did a packer or officer of the Stockyards Company 
possess executive power. C. F. Morse and H. P. Child were 
managers of the Stockyards Company while they were 
12Minutes of the Exchange, 1 January-14 May 1902, Ibid. 
13Report of Elections, 8 February 1886, 5 February 
1895, vol 3; 5 June 1911, vol. 4, Ibid. 
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presidents of the Exchange; Morse in 1886 and Child in 1893. 
K. B. Armour, president of Armour Packing co., was the 
second president in 1888; S. B. Armour was the vice 
president of the Exchange from 1886 to 1887. W. s. Hannah, 
an independent packer, was president for a short time in 
1899. 14 
Historian Edwin Snyder understood the implications of 
having the Stockyards Company and major packers as the first 
presidents of the Kansas City Live stock Exchange. He 
suggested the commission men were powerless to organize the 
Exchange themselves and that they had to have the Stockyards 
Company and packers do it for them. Later historians 
retained this view. Even Charles Wood in Kansas Beef, 
published in 1980, believed the commission merchants had no 
autonomy in the stockyards. He wrote that the Stockyards 
Company dominated the Exchange until 1913, and after that 
the packers. Wood notes that in 1913 Edward Morris of 
Morris Packing Co. bought control of the Stockyards Company 
and became the new master of the Exchange. 15 
The records of the organization relate a different 
story. From 1886 to 1921 there was a growing antagonism 
14Report of Elections, 8 February 1886, 13 February 
1887, 13 February 1888, vol. 3; 13 February 1899, vol 4, 
Ibid. 
15Edwin Snyder, "Cooperation," Quarterly Report of the 
Kansas State Board of Agriculture for the Quarter Ending 31 
March 1892 (Topeka: Hamilton Printing, 1892), p. 119; 
Charles L. Wood, The Kansas Beef Industry (Lawrence: The 
Regents Press of Kansas, 1980), p. 159-185; Kansas City Live 
Stock Exchange, "History .. Market .. Yards Company," p. 11. 
between the Exchange on the one hand and the stockyards 
Company and packers on the other. The only amiable years 
experienced by those parties were from 1886 to 1888. 
Ironically, the years of greatest antagonism in the 
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stockyards were after 1913 when the packers controlled the 
Stockyards Company. 
In the initial organizational stages in 1886 the 
commission merchants understood that unless they got the 
cooperation of the packers and Stockyards company, the 
Exchange would not work. They wanted to avoid another 
disaster similar to 1877. Although there was a feeling of 
deference on the part of the merchants for men such as s. B. 
and K. B. Armour, that did not translate into subservience. 
In 1888 the records indicated that some of the commission 
merchants so irritated K. B. Armour that he resigned after 
only one month as president of the Exchange. Armour resumed 
office only after a committee begged him to stay on. He, 
however, never functioned as president; Vice President H. P. 
Child chaired all of the meetings in 1888. 1 6 
The Exchange made a second attempt at having a packer 
as president in 1899. Elected in that year was w. s. 
Hannah, a small independent packer in Kansas City, who had 
served as a director from 1894 to 1898. For him the 
16Minutes of the Board of Directors, 8 March 1888, vel. 
3, RKCLE (Collection 158). 
conflict of interest was too great: like K. B. Armour, 
Hannah resigned while in office. 17 
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There was a natural antagonism between the Stockyards 
Company and the Live Stock Exchange also. It was there from 
the beginning. In 1887 the Exchange deliberated on how to 
prevent the larger commission firms from violating the rules 
and undermining the institution. It understood that unless 
it obtained appropriate evidence, it could never prove, for 
example, that Hunter, Evans & Co. was "cheating." A 
committee hired detectives to track down the necessary 
evidence to convict these firms. It also passed a 
resolution that the Stockyards Company should pay for the 
detectives. c. F. Morse, manager of the Stockyards Company 
and the first President of the Exchange found himself in a 
quandary. As expected, Morse sided with the Stockyards 
Company; he declared emphatically that the company would not 
fund the business of the Exchange.18 
This conflict with the Stockyards Company reached its 
zenith between 1913 and 1917, at the very time the packers 
owned the stockyards. The commission merchants took 
pleasure in sending the Stockyards Company insulting 
resolutions. In September 1913, for example, they accused 
the Stockyards Company of incompetence, charging that 
employees of the yards frequently lost track of animals for 
17Minutes of the Board of Directors, 13 March 1899, 
Ibid. 
18Minutes of the Board of Directors, 3 April 1887, 
Ibid. 
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which they were responsible. There were too many stray 
animals in the yards for which there were no owners! The 
commission merchants threatened to go to the Public 
Utilities Commission of Missouri if better service was not 
rendered. The company, for the first time in the history of 
the Exchange, submitted the disagreement to an arbitration 
committee. 19 
While the government of the Kansas City Live Stock 
Exchange resided with a Board of Directors, appointed 
committees accomplished much of the work. In 1886 the 
directors appointed an Executive Committee, an Arbitration 
committee and an Appeals Committee. In 1899, they formed an 
Investigating and Judiciary Committee as the prosecuting arm 
of the organization, which in the twentieth century 
overshadowed all others.2° 
There were five members of the Exchange on each 
committee, including one member from the Stockyards Company 
and one member from the packers. The constitution required 
commission merchants to submit all disputes of a commercial 
nature to the Arbitration Committee (a shipper could also 
force a member to arbitrate a dispute) , although any award 
or finding could be appealed. The Appeals Committee 
reviewed such cases, and decisions were final and binding. 
When a member refused to pay an award settled upon, the 
19Minutes of the Board of Directors, 4 September 1913, 
vol 4, Ibid. 
20constitution, 1903, vol. 8, Ibid., pp. 11-15, 29-30. 
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Board of Directors convened a court session and tried the 
transgressor. The rules of the Exchange barred any member 
from taking these commercial disputes into any court of 
law. 21 
The Investigating and Judiciary Committee was the 
prosecuting arm of the Exchange. From 1886 to 1899 the 
Board of Directors found it could not prosecute an offending 
member, and at the same time, effectively serve as an 
impartial panel in the case. So when the Exchange 
reorganized in 1899, it created a new committee for this 
purpose. The board wanted this committee investigating 
violations of the rules aggressively (even a rumor of a 
violation was enough to precipitate an investigation), and 
to present the charges against the offending member during 
the commercial trials.22 
The Executive Committee provided the solution to the 
problem of hog dockage. This question dominated the 
attention of the Exchange for the first few months of 1886. 
After inviting all of the packers and shippers (no shippers 
came) to Kansas City for consultation, the directors created 
an ad hoc committee in the stockyards to solve the question. 
The packers, however, at first opposed any inspection 
system, but yielded under pressure from the commission 
merchants. An ad hoc committee of one commission merchant, 
one member of the Stockyards Company, and one representative 
21 b'd ~., pp. 8-11. 
22 b'd ~-, p. 10, 29-30. 
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of the packers reviewed and made final judgment upon the 
dockage in question. Any buyer or seller could call for an 
arbitration of the decision. But this system proved 
inconvenient, the personnel on the committee were often not 
in the yards. Thus the process slowed the traffic through 
the stockyards down and created more problems than it 
solved. 23 
After one year of trial, the Exchange junked the idea 
of an ad hoc committee and created an Executive Committee in 
1887 to adjudicate dockage issues. The packers, Stockyards 
Company, and the Exchange were also represented on this 
committee, but instead of performing the inspection 
themselves, they merely supervised. The Executive Committee 
hired "public inspectors" and placed one at each of the 12 
scales in the yards. For these posts the committee sought 
personnel "experienced" in identifying "imperfect" 
animals. 24 
The job of the inspector was to watch all hogs as they 
crossed the scales and to mark the imperfect ones. If the 
inspector spotted "piggy sows" or "stags," he deducted 40 
pounds from the weight of the piggy sow and 80 pounds from a 
stag, and recorded it on the scale ticket. Other hogs 
considered unmarketable were "boily," crippled, badly cut, 
or "frozen" hogs. The Exchange also ruled that hogs under 
23Report of the Executive committee, 26 January-31 May 
1886, vol. 2, Ibid.; Minutes of the Board of Directors, 15 
February, 1 May 1886, vol. 3, Ibid. 
24Annual Report, 12 February 1887, Ibid. 
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150 pounds were of lesser quality (called skip stags and 
skip sows) and instructed the inspectors to deduct 40 pounds 
and 20 pounds respectively from each category. 25 
Inevitably there was conflict over the decision of the 
inspector. In 1887 the Executive Committee appointed a 
chief inspector to adjudicate all disputes. There was no 
appeal from his decision. This was done to expedite the 
flow of live animals through the yards. Surprisingly, this 
simple reform worked satisfactorily and remained in place 
from 1887 to 1921 with few alterations. 
The u. s. Bureau of Animal Industry later pointed out a 
major flaw in this system. The inspectors hired by the 
Exchange could not necessarily spot a diseased hog. That 
was a task better left to a professional veterinarian. 
Accordingly, the United States Congress passed legislation 
and placed qualified professionals in all the major markets. 
These veterinarians did not replace the inspectors, but 
merely stationed themselves near the scales and watched for 
diseased animals while Exchange personnel monitored the 
remaining imperfect animals. 26 
The first government inspectors appeared at the Kansas 
City Stockyards in 1894. Initially, the Exchange opposed 
these professionals on the grounds that they were unneeded 
25Report of the Executive Committee, 8 March 1887, 
Ibid. 
26Houck, Bureau of Animal Industry, pp. 29; Testimony 
ofT. Fitzhugh, 2 January , 9 February , 10 May, 7, 9, 21 
June, 1894, vol. 3, RKCLE (Collection 158). 
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but that attitude changed over time. In 1906 the federal 
government increased the inspection in the yards, but with 
the cooperation of the commission merchants. By then the 
government veterinarians had convinced the Exchange members 
that their services were essential. In 1920, when the 
appropriations for the Bureau were cut, the Kansas City Live 
Stock Exchange sent an urgent message to Congress setting 
forth the need for these inspectors. When the 
appropriations were not forthcoming, the Exchange hired 
their own veterinarians and paid for them by levying a 20 
cents a car tax on each rail car of hogs received at the 
Kansas City market. 27 
The numbers of hogs inspected illustrated the magnitude 
of this inspection system. From February 1890 to February 
1891, for example, there were 3,932,575 hogs inspected. 
Among this number, there were found 108,592 piggy sows, 
28,469 stags, 5,501 skip sows, and 150 skip stags. Of the 
decisions made by the inspectors, only 464 were 
arbitrated. 28 
Although the packers initially opposed the system of 
inspection, over time they came to use it more than the 
sellers. From 1886 to 1921 the number of arbitrations 
called by the buyers gradually increased over those called 
27speech by Bureau of Animal Industry Inspector, 4 
January 1894, Ibid.; Minutes of the Directors, 5 July 1907, 
val. 4, Ibid.; Minutes of the Exchange, 30 June 1920, Ibid. 
28Report of the Executive Committee, 5 February 1891, 
vol 3, Ibid. 
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by sellers. For example, in 1901 of the 1,069 arbitrations 
called, 531 were by the buyers and 538 were by sellers. By 
1921, the buyers called twice the number of arbitrations as 
the sellers, that is 979 to 475. 29 
The idea of having inspectors in the stockyards 
overseeing aspects of the market place was not new nor did 
it change the traditional system of marketing. Indeed, 
inspectors had always been present in the stockyards. All 
of the cattlemen's associations had brand inspectors looking 
for stolen cattle, and the humane society kept an inspector 
in the yards to prevent cruelty to the animals. 30 
City and state governments also had inspectors in the 
yards. In 1888, Harry P. Child, superintendent of the 
Kansas City Stockyards, reported to the Vest Committee that 
there were five inspectors appointed by the State of Kansas, 
and two from the Bureau of Animal Industry to insure that 
rail cars received from the tick infested areas of Texas 
were disinfected. The two cities of Kansas City, Kansas and 
Missouri had two inspectors each in the yards to insure that 
diseased meat did not get onto the local market. 31 
29Report of the Arbitration committee, 1 May 1901, 25 
May 1921, vol 4, Ibid. 
30oale, Range Cattle Industry, p. 21; Minutes of Texas 
and Southwestern Cattle Raisers' Association, 1894, 
(Microcopy Collection, Barker Texas History Center), pp. 21-
24; General Meeting, 26 March 1894, vol 3, RKCLE (Collection 
158); A. P. Bush, President of the Cattle Raisers of Texas, 
to President of Chicago Live Stock Exchange, Proceedings of 
the Directors, 2 April 1894, RCLSE (Microcopy Collection, 
University of Oklahoma) . 
31u. s. Congress, Senate Report no. 829, pp. 376-379. 
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It is also instructive to note that public inspection 
in the yards was overwhelmingly a problem with hogs, and not 
cattle or sheep. The nature of the animal made the critical 
difference; cattle and sheep endured the transportation 
system better and were less susceptible to injury, and it 
was easier to spot a diseased cow or sheep than a hog. 
There were minor problems with cattle. Periodically, 
cattlemen complained the Exchange docked injured cattle in 
the stockyards unfairly. George B. Loving, former solicitor 
for Hunter, Evans & Co. and secretary of the Northwest Texas 
Cattle Raisers' Association, complained of a "broken rib 
steal," but this question never became a major issue. 
Injured cattle received an adjustment (broken ribs were only 
one problem) or dockage like that of hogs, the number of 
inspections did not run into the thousands as with hogs. 32 
The only special system of inspection for cattle 
concerned animals afflicted with "lump jaw." An open cancer 
on the animal's jaw, "lump jaw" was offensive to look at but 
not infectious. The sores offended the public, their 
Congressional representatives passed legislation and 
required a special quarantine area constructed, and the 
packers butchered the cancered animals separately. If the 
state appointed veterinarian found the animal diseased, the 
carcass was saturated with kerosene oil and "immediately 
32Minutes of the Texas and Southwestern Cattle Raisers' 
Association, 1893, (Microcopy Collection, Barker Texas 
History center) 1 . pp. 193-194. 
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tanked" so irresponsible butchers could not buy the animal 
and sell it in the local meat market. 33 
The constitution of the Kansas City Livestock Exchange 
granted the Board of Directors the power to prosecute and 
discipline violators of the rules. The board of directors 
fined, censured, suspended, or expelled offending members, 
but it could not discipline a member without a trial by the 
board of directors. The member had the right to defend 
himself, but he could not use professional counse1. 34 
The constitution also restricted the rights of Exchange 
members. Refusal to appear before any "committee or 
tribunal" or to answer any questions brought an automatic 
suspension from the Exchange. The constitution stipulated 
that if a member got an injunction from any court of law 
against the Exchange, the members considered them to have 
33Bureau of Animal Industry, Annual Report, 1893, 
"Investigations Relating to the Treatment of Lumpy-Jaw, or 
Actinomycosis in Cattle," pp. 109-176; Committee Report, 9 
February 1893, val 3, RKCLE (Microcopy Collection 158); 
Instruction of the Bureau of Animal Industry, 23 May 1894, 
RCLSE (Microcopy Collection, University of Oklahoma). 
34constitution, 1903, val. 8, Ibid., pp. 7-11; As an 
example of the disposition of cases in Chicago, the board 
reported in 1902 there were 2 acquitted, 2 awaiting further 
evidence, 1 decision withheld pending the outcome of the 
preceding case against the defendant, 5 dismissed, 1 
awaiting trial, 3 awaiting decision, 9 dismissed upon 
recommendation of the prosecuting committee, 1 arbitrated 
and settled, 3 in hands of prosecuting committee and 2 
settled before the trail, Minutes of the Board of Directors, 
1 February 1902, RCLSE (Microcopy Collection, University of 
Oklahoma). 
"forever and irrevocably resigned and surrendered their 
membership herein.n 35 
The Kansas City Live Stock Exchange exercised 
discipline over its membership frequently. This was in 
sharp contrast to the Chicago Board of Trade, the only 
commodities exchange examined by a historian on this 
question. According to Jonathan Lurie the Chicago Board 
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rarely exercised discipline, and when it did the fines were 
no more than five dollars. The actions they disciplined 
were for provoking disorder on the trading floor, pushing, 
cursing, and throwing sample bags of grain. In the Kansas 
City Live Stock Exchange, the punishment was harsher and the 
fines much higher.3 6 
Undoubtedly, the reason for this was the difference 
between a grain pit and the stockyards. The commodity 
dealers interacted on a daily basis within the same 
building. Moreover, social pressure controlled the ethics 
of the traders. The livestock commission merchants 
encountered one another infrequently, and they spent much of 
their time on the railroads or in the "country." The 
impersonal nature of their business weakened any social 
responsibility traders felt to their fellows. 
In the first year of operation, the Kansas City 
Exchange meted out remarkable discipline. It expelled N. M. 
35constitution, 1903, vol. 8, RKCLE (Collection 158), 
p. 11. 
36Lurie, Chicago Board of Exchange, p. 35. 
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Nutter for "uncommercial conduct." This action imposed a 
supreme hardship upon Nutter, and he requested re-admission 
to the Exchange each year for two years. In 1889, the Board 
of Directors re-admitted him but only on the condition that 
he take the rules seriously. The Exchange also expelled 
James c. McFarland. Earlier the Chicago Live Stock Exchange 
convicted McFarland of returning to shippers false returns. 
He then moved to Kansas City and joined the Exchange there. 
When word from Chicago on the nature of the charges against 
McFarland were received, Kansas City expelled him 
immediately. 37 
The suspension of a member was less severe than 
expulsion. The Board of Directors suspended Greer, Mills & 
Co. in 1896 after they were tried, found guilty of over 
charging commissions, and fined $1,000. When Greer, Mills & 
Co. refused to pay the fine, the board suspended the firm 
from the Exchange. At that point the commission firm 
committed the most offensive act possible. Greer, Mills & 
Co. sought an injunction from the District Court of 
Wyandotte County, Kansas against its suspension. The Board 
of Directors thereupon expelled the firm. To make the 
expulsion order more effective, the Board directed the 
Executive Committee not to dock any of the firm's hogs. It 
even posted the expulsion order upon the Exchange bulletin 
37charges against N. M. Nutter, 1 February 1887, 6 May 
1889, vol 3, RKCLE (Collection 158); Petition for Re-
admission, 6 June 1887, Ibid.; Minutes of the Board of 
Directors, 1 August 1887, Ibid. 
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board where it remained for two years. Greer, Mills & co. 
ceased operations in the Kansas City Stockyards during that 
time. 38 
The board used censure less frequently than other forms 
of discipline, but it was not afraid to take that action 
against their most esteemed members. It censured L. A. 
Allen, pioneer in the trade and a charter member, in 1904 
while he was on the Board of Directors itself. The board 
charged the L. A. Allen Cattle Commission Company of not 
filing the name of a salesman with the secretary of the 
Exchange "even after attention had been called to the 
violation. 1139 
Although the discipline of the board was rarely abused, 
one case recorded in 1907 and 1.908 was a blatant exception. 
On 9 August 1907, the Board of Directors "ordered the 
Secretary to pay J. P. Peters & Co. the sum of $250 upon the 
presentation of an order from the Circuit Court." The 
charge against the Exchange was never disclosed, but Peters 
obviously won a judicial decision against the Exchange. The 
manner in which the officers treated Peters in the following 
months suggested there was an intentional effort to 
discipline him without incurring the wrath of the judicial 
38Trial of Greer, Mills & Co., 7, 17 September, 7 
October 1896, Ibid; Minutes of the Board of Directors, 7 
November 1898, Ibid. 
39Minutes of the Board of Directors, 9, 14 January 
1904, vol 4, Ibid. 
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system. To the Exchange's credit, this action was the only 
one of its kind recorded in the records from 1886 to 1921. 40 
Four months after paying the fine to Peters, the 
Investigating and Judiciary Committee preferred charges 
against J. P. P~ters Live Stock Commission Company on a 
matter completely unrelated to the circuit court case. It 
alleged that "on or about" 16 December 1907 the Fowler 
Packing Company bought 20 head of cattle of J. P. Peters and 
that before the cattle were weighed Peters had ordered two 
cattle of inferior quality added to the twenty head. The 
committee determined that Peters took this action with the 
intent of defrauding the Fowler Packing Co. and was an act 
of bad faith against the Exchange. In short, it was 
"attempted extortion and dishonorable and uncommercial 
conduct. 1141 
The Board of Directors refused to accord consideration 
to Peters generally extended to any commission merchant on 
trial. On 6 February 1908, J. P. Peters asked for further 
time to prepare a defense in the case. In all cases 
previous to this one, the board was conciliatory to members 
who requested additional time before a trail. Not so in 
this case. The secretary notified Peters that on 14 
February 1908 at 2 p.m. in the rooms of the .Exchange the 
40Minutes of the Board of Directors, 9 August 1907, 
Ibid. 
41charges of the Investigation and Judiciary Committee, 
2 January 1908, Ibid. 
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trial would be held and that J. P. Peters must be ready, "as 
no further continuance could be granted. 1142 
On the following day, the Investigating and Judiciary 
Committee charged Peters with further violations of the 
rules. Claiming the original charges excluded relevant 
material, the committee filed eight further specifications 
of dishonorable and uncommercial conduct. The board 
believed one charge was adequate to make its point and they 
found Peters guilty of the original charge, and dropped the 
others. The fine was $1,000. Peters paid it and quietly 
resumed business. Few commission merchants seriously 
considered taking the Exchange to court after observing the 
example made of Peters. 43 
The Kansas City Live Stock Exchange began the process 
of regulating the Livestock trade in the Southwest in early 
1886. The government of the Exchange permitted the "release 
of energy" for the livestock traders. Unlike most modern 
business enterprises, the Exchange was not oligopolistic. 
The power within the Exchange was disbursed widely 
throughout the membership, and no one faction dominated. In 
consultation with the packers and the Stockyards Company, 
the Kansas City Live Stock Exchange instituted a major 
reform in the trade. Specifically, it created a system of 
42Petition of J. P. Peters, 6 February 1908, Ibid; 
Secretary to J. P. Peters, 6 February 1908, Ibid. 
43charges of the Investigation and Judiciary Committee, 
7 February 1908, Ibid.; Trial of J. P. Peters, 17 February 
1908, Ibid. 
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public inspection. The Exchange also used the powers under 
its constitution to discipline members. Indeed, it moved 
quickly and harshly to insure that the system worked 
properly for all, and not just the few. 
Hog dockage was a major reform implemented by the 
Kansas City Livestock Exchange, but there were minor reforms 
and changes which the Exchange also implemented. All were 
of major consequence in the industry. The next chapter 
describes those minor reforms and administrative changes. 
CHAPTER VII 
ADMINISTRATION AND REFORM 
The organization of the Kansas City Live Stock Exchange 
in February 1886 began the process of reforming the 
livestock trade of the Kansas City market. Hog dockage was 
the first concern, but there were other reforms implemented 
without pressure from producer's associations. The Exchange 
performed an administrative role with the railroad traffic 
in the Kansas City market not appreciated by producers, or 
even anticipated in the initial organizational phases of the 
Exchange. It also acted as a lobby group on questions 
important to cattle producers in the Southwest. 
Additionally, the Exchange implemented reforms in the use of 
market information, controlled the hours of the stockyards, 
taxed producers for its services, audited the books of 
commission firms, forced traders to put up a bond to insure 
payment to the producer, and prevented other abuses in the 
trade. 
The first task the Exchange undertook was in 
coordination. As noted previously, much of the traffic from 
the Southwest by-passed Kansas City and went to St. Louis or 
Chicago. Although the Kansas City commission merchants 
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could not reconstruct the railroads, they redirected traffic 
in various ways. They sought, for example, to get new rail 
mileage into Kansas City. From 1886 to 1893, the number of 
rail cars of hogs, sheep, and cattle increased from 63,224 
cars in 1886 to 90,727 in 1893 (a 44 percent increase). The 
significant change did not come from an increase of receipts 
from existing railroads. In fact, the Southern Kansas, 
Union Pacific, Kansas City, Fort Scott & Memphis, and the 
Kansas City, St. Joseph & Burlington railroads carried less 
livestock in 1893 than in 1886. The greatest increase came 
from new railroad mileage. 1 
Mileage and traffic data illustrate the growth. In 
1886, ten railroads funneled traffic into Kansas City; in 
1893, they numbered 16. The number of rail cars received in 
1893 was 27,483 greater than in 1886; over half (52 percent) 
increase coming from new railroad mileage Thirty percent of 
the increase came from one railroad alone, the Chicago, Rock 
Island and Pacific Railroad opened rail connections to the 
Panhandle of Texas in 1887. By 1893, the CRI & P rivaled 
the AT & SF for the livestock traffic of the Southwest. 2 
The Kansas City commission merchants also exerted 
significant influence to get the MK & T Railroad into Kansas 
City. Built in 1865, it traveled from Denison, Texas to 
Junction City, Kansas or to St. Louis, Missouri. Before 
1886, the line sent no traffic to the Kansas City market. 
1constitution, 1903, pp. 19-41. 
2Ibid. 
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Due to their efforts, however, by 1893 there were 10,405 MK 
& T rail cars received, some 6 percent of the rail traffic 
in 1893 and 20 percent of the increase over 1886. 
This increase occurred after commission merchants 
joined livestock producers of southern Kansas to get the new 
trade route open. The producers around Yates Center, 
Girard, and Independence, Kansas had sent committees in 1886 
to Kansas City, to solicit the help of the Exchange to 
persuade the railroads and national government to allow live 
stock traffic directly into Kansas City from the south. In 
response the Exchange raised $3,000 and lobbied for the 
project. Both the producers and the commission merchants 
aided in the creation of the "Paola Extension" linking the 
Kansas towns. The MK & T was able to acquire a charter 
previously issued to the Kansas City & Pacific Railroad that 
allowed the line to enter Kansas City by way of a trackage 
agreement with the Kansas City, Fort Scott & Gulf Railroad 
from Paola, Kansas.3 
The shippers and commission merchants soon discovered 
there were "dead spots" along the railroads from southern 
Kansas, spots that delayed livestock trains. For example, 
both the st. Louis, Fort Scott & Wichita Railroad and the 
Missouri Pacific Railroad stopped stock trains at Yates 
Center, LeRoy, Harrisville, and Pleasant Hills, Kansas to 
wait for other freight trains coming from the opposite 
3Petition of Committee, 13 April 1886, vol. 3 , RKCLE 
(Microcopy Collection 158); Minutes of the Board of 
Directors, 12 February 1887, Ibid. 
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directions. The delays caused shrinkage loss and additional 
charges for feed along the route. Shippers complained a day 
lost on these side tracks prevented them from getting their 
stock to market when the price was high. 4 
Once the livestock commission merchants got a new rail 
channel open to Kansas City, they continued their efforts to 
enhance traffic. On the opening of the Kansas City, 
Wyandotte & Northwest Railroad in 1889, for example, the 
merchants launched a typical campaign that budgeted $200 to 
entertain stockman living along the railroad line. In this 
manner, the merchants created the good will in the new 
territory, solicited new customers, and diverted the stock 
traffic away from the Chicago, Omaha, and St. Joseph 
markets. 5 
In the late 1880s, the Southwestern sheep herders 
complained of an inadequate number of double-deck cars to 
cover their shipping needs. Producers noted the railroads 
kept most double-deck cars east of the Mississippi River for 
hog producers. By 1890 the issue became a crusade against 
the railroads. Both the Kansas City and Chicago Livestock 
Exchanges joined forces with the sheepmen to demand that 
roads allocate more double-deck cars for Southwestern 
sheepmen. When the lines accommodated their requests, the 
4complaint of Shippers, 6 September 1886, Ibid. 
5Minutes of the Board of Directors, 4 February 1889, 
Ibid. 
Exchanges considered the achievement a milestone in their 
relationship with the railroads. 6 
The Kansas City Exchange also discovered in 1887 the 
freight rate to Kansas City for sheepmen in the Southwest 
was higher than to St. Louis or other "Mississippi River 
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towns." The Exchange promptly protested to the Chicago and 
st. Louis Exchanges against the discrimination, and 
together, the Exchanges convinced the railroads to eliminate 
the problem. 7 
The Kansas City Exchange also coordinated efforts 
between the shippers and railroads on the timing of stock 
trains into Kansas City. In February 1887, the commission 
merchants pointed out to officials of the Kansas Pacific 
Railroad that their schedule of trains into and out of 
Kansas City was a burden to livestock producers. Hundreds 
of cattle arrived too late in the day for sale and were held 
over until the next day. Subsequently the railroad changed 
the arrival of its 10 a.m. and 3 p.m. trains to 8 a.m. and 
10 a.m. The alteration increased the flow of livestock into 
and out of Kansas City. 8 
A similar problem occurred in 1900. By then, the 
Kansas City Stockyards was overcrowded, but the railroads 
ruled (without consulting other parties involved) all 
6Texas Live Stock Journal, 6 February, 15 May 1886; 
Minutes of the Board of Directors, 12 February 1887, vol. 3, 
RKCLE (Microcopy Collection 158). 
7Annual Report, 12 February 1887, Ibid. 
8Ibid. 
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stockers and feeders not ready for shipment by 3 p.m. would 
be held in the stockyards for the next day's shipment. The 
commission merchants explained to railroad officials the 
action would bring the market to a halt. By the railroads 
holding their trains an extra few hours, the overcrowded 
conditions were alleviated, and the action kept the cost to 
the shipper at a minimum. 9 
The flow of paperwork through the stockyards impacted 
the speed with which the livestock passed through the yards. 
Prior to the organization of the Exchange, there was no 
coordination of the paper flow from the railroads to the 
stockyards company. In 1887, the Exchange began conferences 
with both the railroads and the Stockyards Company to change 
that system. It asked the railroads to send the expense 
bills (detailing the freight charges) along with the bills 
of lading through the stockyards. By keeping the two 
together, the time the paper flow took through the yards was 
reduced by half. 10 
The administration and coordination of the flow of 
livestock traffic through the concentrated market at Kansas 
City made it more effective and increased the productivity 
of the producers. But the Kansas city Exchange also used 
its united strength to lobby for alterations of policy set 
by the United States Congress and the Department of 
9Meeting of the Exchange, 1 October 1900, vol. 4, Ibid. 
1°speech of the President, 12 February 1887, vol. 3, 
Ibid. 
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Agriculture. In 1892, for example, the national government 
ordered the cattlemen out of the Cherokee Strip in Indian 
Territory by October. The Exchange sent a letter to 
Commissioner of Agriculture J. M. Rusk condemning the 
decision. It argued that it was in the "general interest of 
western agriculturalists" to delay the expulsion. Because 
the Cherokee Strip contained from 125,000 to 170,000 cattle, 
the expulsion order would glut the Kansas city market by 
throwing at least 100,000 cattle on it. The Cherokee strip 
cattlemen had no other choice inasmuch as Kansas, Colorado, 
and Texas forbade the movement of cattle into their areas 
before 1 December because of "Texas fever. 1111 
The Exchange directors, moreover, argued that if 
cattlemen dumped their animals on the Kansas City market, it 
would be destroyed for all the producers in the Southwest. 
Also, since the summer had been unusually dry in Indian 
Territory "producing a shortage of grass" and their 
condition led to "thin and unmarketable" cattle. The recent 
rains would improve the pastoral conditions and the the 
conditions of the herds. To delay the expulsion order would 
enable the ranchers to market "fattened" cattle instead of 
"green" cattle. It would also assure continued employment 
of drought stricken farmers turned cowboys. The petition of 
the Exchange met with some success. The government delayed 
the execution of the order by two months. The intervention 
11secretary to J. M. Rusk, Commissioner of Agriculture, 
25 August 1892, Ibid. 
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of the Exchange had not only prevented losses to the 
producer, but also increased the efficiency of the trade. 12 
Although lobbying activities of the Kansas City 
Exchange had an indirect influence upon the livestock trade, 
that was not true in other areas. Control of the market 
reports and limiting the hours for marketing directly 
improved market conditions. 13 Consider the use of the 
telegraph, an integral part of the modern marketing of live 
animals. At the expense of the shipper, commission 
merchants notified the shippers by telegraph when the prices 
were high. The Texas Live Stock Journal reported on 9 
February 1889, for example, that "last Friday and Saturday" 
the cattle market advanced 15 to 25 cents a hundred weight. 
Simultaneously, several thousand telegrams quoting the 
advance had gone out from the Exchange building. The Texas 
Journal regretted that Texans were not close enough to the 
market to take advantage of these shifts in prices, that 
only "nearby men would have a chance to get in before the 
rush." The Journal took perverse pleasure in that all the 
shippers acted at once, loaded nearly 17,000 cattle onto 
rail cars, and rushed them to market. As a consequence, the 
advance in prices was lost, and few reaped the expected 
returns. 14 
12 rbid. 
13constitution, 1903, vol. 8, Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
1 4Texas Live Stock Journal, 9 February 1888. 
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The use of the telegraph, as with other aspects of the· 
commission trade, was subject to misuse. Some merchants 
misquoted the market, falsely reported high prices, and 
encouraged shipments during periods of low prices. This 
activity eventually brought the reputation of the commission 
merchants and the Exchange into disrepute. In the early 
months of the Exchange, the directors counselled together on 
how to deal with the problem. They could not force the 
Western Union Telegraph Company to report the prepaid 
telegrams sent to the shippers without the permission of the 
commission merchant involved. So the Exchange passed a rule 
in 1887 that no commission merchant could be a member unless 
he signed an agreement granting the telegraph company 
permission to furnish the secretary of the Exchange a copy 
of all prepaid telegrams quoting the market. The rule 
limited the quoting of the market by a commission merchant 
to only those sales made by the merchant himself. 15 
In truth the Exchange took over all reporting 
functions. They provided a telegraph report on the major 
markets (such as Chicago and Omaha) in the Exchange. A 
shipper could remain in the Exchange building and read the 
reports daily as they came in from the other centers. In 
this manner a commission merchant could not fraudulently 
15Minutes of the Board of Directors, 7 February, 6 
August 1888, 14 March 1892, vel. 3, RKCLE (Microcopy 
Collection 158); Committee Report, 17 September 1887, Ibid.; 
Resolutions on Telegraph, 6 September 1886, vel. 1, Ibid. 
quote the market, and the information became available to 
all shippers at the same time. 1 6 
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The Exchange also regulated the hours the Kansas City 
Stockyards remained open. Underlying this decision was the 
abuse of the trade which took place after hours. Fraudulent 
commission merchants conducted their business during the 
evening hours because there were fewer people in the yards 
to observe it going on. Also the livestock shipped in on 
night trains were often sold before all the buyers appeared 
in the market during the day. It gave an unfair advantage 
to some buyers. Some members of the Exchange wanted to 
control the hours of the stockyards as early as 1886, but 
they did not have enough votes to do so until 1893.17 
The Kansas City Live Stock Exchange anticipated 
financing their regulatory activities through assessments on 
the members. For example, it assessed members $5 in 1887 
and 1890, and $10 in 1891. But in 1894, the president of 
the Exchange reported "for almost 3 years there has been no 
assessments made, and there are liable to be none for as 
many years to come" because merchants were in such poor 
financial condition. In 1893, the president asked the 
approval of the membership for a levy of $20 per member to 
"cover possible expenses of an extraordinary nature which 
16Annual Report, 8 February 1895, vol. 3, Ibid.; 
Committee Report, 29 March 1895, Ibid. 
17Petition to Directors, 19 May 1886, Ibid.; Minutes of 
the Exchange, 4 January 1892, Ibid.; Minutes of the Board of 
Directors, 26 January 1893, Ibid.; Report of Election, 13 
February 1893, Ibid. 
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may be incurred." He explained that since 1886 the members 
had been assessed an average of $3.45. 18 Nevertheless, the 
membership voted against the assessment. 
Since merchants were reluctant to pay for the 
activities of the Exchange themselves, the organization 
found other means to fund its business. The sources came 
from three different areas: taxes upon each carload of 
livestock received at the Kansas City Yards, fees for 
membership and arbitration, and fines levied upon members 
for rule infractions. The cost of running the exchange was 
inexpensive. In 1908, for example, there were $14,559.54 
collected by the exchange treasurer and $12,028.54 
disbursed. The income for the exchange that year included 
$6,541.63 from taxing rail cars of hogs (45 percent of the 
income), $2,742 from taxing rail cars to run the 
Transportation Department (18 percent), $597 from 
arbitration fees (4 percent), $952 collected as membership 
fees (7 percent), $766.55 from interest and other sources (5 
percent), and $3,000 from fines of the members (21 
percent) . 19 
For the Kansas City Live Stock Exchange to perform the 
functions of a regulatory agency, it had to have the power 
to audit the books of the commission firms without their 
18Minutes of the Board of Directors, 28 February 1887, 
20 February 1888, 3 March 1890, 6 April 1891, Ibid.; Speech 
of the President, 9 February 1894, 10 February 1898, Ibid.; 
Annual Report, 1 June 1906, vol. 4, Ibid. 
19Annual Report, 29 May 1908, Ibid. 
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permission. For the first 32 years of the Exchange, the 
merchants only "assumed" they had the right, but in 1918 the 
Exchange formally ruled that "the board is empowered to 
examine or audit the books of any individual, firm, or 
corporation. 1120 
Auditing procedures were established early in the 
history of the Exchange. In 1892 s. M. z. Long, a shipper 
from Brooks, Kansas, complained that a commission firm had 
rendered a false account of sales on cattle consigned to 
Foster, Conrad & Co. in Kansas City. The intent of the 
action, according to Long, was to defraud. The Board of 
Directors invited G. w. Foster to appear and answer to the 
charges. Foster stated "the testimony of my bookkeeper 
would be better." The bookkeeper, H. M. Baker, appeared 
with the account of sales book. The Board observed that the 
posted account was different from that rendered to Long and 
found Foster, Conrad & Co. guilty of a technical violation 
of the rules. It also ordered the bookkeeper suspended from 
employment for 30 days for being a party to a transaction to 
defraud a customer on the market. 21 
Another example of regulation by audit occurred in 
1902. The Investigation and Judiciary Committee inquired 
into certain misconduct rumors on the part of s. A. Cooper, 
a member of the Exchange. The committee asked Cooper to 
20Minutes of the Board of Directors, 21 June 1918, 
Ibid. 
21Trial of G. W. Foster, 18 April 1892, vel. 3, Ibid. 
furnish his books as evidence of his denial of any wrong 
doing. Cooper refused. The committee requested a second 
time, but was refused again. At this point the board 
suspended Cooper from the Exchange and fined him $50o. 22 
The Kansas City Live Stock Exchange recognized early 
that shippers had no guarantees. They had no security 
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against crooked transactions. The "shingle of a commission 
house" was no sign of reliability, integrity, or 
sovereignty. This problem was not addressed until 1918 when 
the Exchange forced commission firms to put up a bond to 
insure that merchants returned all monies to shippers. 23 
Although few people thought in terms of a bond before 
the twentieth century, the circumstance it was designed to 
remedy the Exchange had addressed as early as 1893. If a 
commission merchant did not return the money received from 
the sale of livestock to the producer, it stipulated, he 
would be expelled and his membership sold in order to 
reimburse the shipper. 24 But this was not always effective. 
The problem of traders not paying for livestock became 
serious in late 1911. In response, the Exchange created the 
Kansas City Live Stock Exchange Clearing House where members 
were to pay for all livestock. Four cents per rail car was 
22Trial of s. A. Cooper, 1 August 1902, val. 4, Ibid. 
23Texas Live Stock Journal, 30 March 1889; Meeting of 
the Exchange, 21 June 1918, Ibid. 
24Atkinson, "Kansas City Livestock Trade," p. 288; 
Annual Report, 7 February 1893, val 3, RKCLE (Microcopy 
Collection 158). 
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levied on all consignments received to defray expenses. The 
organization also forced all non-member speculators and 
order buyers to obtain an open bond, surety, or bank 
guarantee before they could conduct business in the Kansas 
City Stockyards. 25 Then in 1912, it created a Collection 
Agency to insure that all buyers and sellers produced the 
cash for the sales of all livestock in the yards. 26 
But these efforts did not close all of the loop holes; 
commission firms continued occasionally to short shippers 
money. Thus in 1918, three years before the passage of the 
Packers and Stockyards Act, the Exchange provided a blanket 
bond for all commission merchants. It levied five cents per 
rail car on all incoming and outgoing shipments for the 
"creation of a fund to protect the patrons of the Kansas 
City market from the dishonest acts of members of the Kansas 
City Live Stock Exchange. 1127 
The Exchange first used the fund to reimburse shippers 
who lost money as a result of the insolvency of some 
commission firms forced by the economic depression of 1919. 
When Zook & Zook failed to return to A. H. Rouse some $6,537 
in early 1920, Rouse won a court settlement to recover the 
25Minutes of the Board of Directors, 22 December 1911, 
vol. 4, RKCLE (Microcopy Collection 158). 
26Minutes of the Board of Directors, 1 December 1911, 
vol 4, Ibid.i after the economic depression of 1919 it 
became popular for producers to irroneously claim that the 
exchanges had no provision for an audit or a bond, see U. S. 
Department of Agriculture, Packers and Stockyards 
Administration, Annual Report. 1922, pp. 4-5. 
27Minutes of the Exchange, 21 June 1918, Ibid. 
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loss of the money. The court attached all of the real 
property of the commission firm, including the certificate 
of membership. The Exchange directors then ordered that 
$2,500, the price of a membership, be paid to the federal 
court on behalf of the membership ofT. J. Zook.2 8 
The Kansas city Live Stock Exchange went far beyond the 
expectations of shippers in regulating the livestock trade. 
It increased the productivity of the trade simply by 
coordinating the activities of the railroads with the other 
participants in the stockyards. It also acted as a lobbying 
force, urging and pressuring the national government to 
modify or change its decrees. The Exchange reformed aspects 
of the trade little understood by outsiders. It recognized 
that unless the organization controlled the issuing of 
market information and regulated the hours that traders 
conducted business the activities of unscrupulous livestock 
commission merchants would discredit the Kansas City market. 
It even assumed the power to audit the books of commission 
merchants against their will in an effort to insure that the 
shippers received a correct return of funds. Finally, the 
Exchange wrestled with the concept of a bond, and arrived at 
a solution in 1918. 
The livestock producers in the Southwest were not 
pleased with all aspects of the Kansas City Live Stock 
Exchange upon organization in 1886. When the Exchange 
28Minutes of the Board of Directors, 5 August 1920, 
Ibid. 
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determined for the shipper the cost of marketing his 
livestock, the producers became alarmed. The next chapter 
describes the first attempt of shippers and the larger 
livestock commission merchants to resist the power of the 
Exchange. 
CHAPTER XIII 
RESISTANCE TO REGULATION 
FROM THE SOUTHWEST 
The Kansas City Live Stock Exchange carried out initial 
reforms and organized its governmental structure in 1886 
with little attention from the shippers of the Southwest. 
By contrast, the regulation of commission rates created a 
storm of protest with the cattle associations which led the 
resistance to rate regulation. But the Kansas City 
livestock merchants did not capitulate: instead, they 
aggressively continued their goal of regulating the 
Southwestern livestock trade. Their success depended upon 
their ability to force the larger cattle commission firms to 
join the Exchange. 
Setting uniform commission rates for all livestock 
shipped to Kansas City was no easy task. The Exchange used 
the same rates in 1886 for cattle, hogs, and sheep as was 
"common" in the trade. The basic rate was 50 cents per head 
for cattle and 10 cents per head for hogs or sheep. All the 
major livestock markets unofficially recognized these rates 
in 1877, and the rates established a guide for the industry. 
The larger cattle commission firms generally disregarded the 
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rates, but the commission merchants marketing hogs and sheep 
followed the schedule closely. 1 
As the livestock industry increased in complexity 
throughout the 1880s, the simple charge per head became 
inadequate. The volume of animals shipped to Kansas City (3 
million in 1886) made a charge per rail car an easier method 
of rate assessment. This required some calculations for no 
two cars carried the same number of animals. Indeed, rail 
cars in the 1880s differed in length, some were 28 feet 
long, but others were 34 feet; shippers squeezed more range 
cattle (20-24) into a rail car than corn fed animals (17-
19); for hogs, sheep, and calves, shippers used double-deck 
as well as single-deck cars and some shippers sent in mixed 
cars of cattle, hogs, and sheep. The Exchange members 
adjusted the rate schedules for every possible combination 
of shipment. 2 
The Kansas City Live Stock Exchange published the rates 
in 1886. A merchant's commission for selling a single-deck 
carload of hogs or sheep was $6; for a double-deck car it 
was $10. The Exchange set the rate for cattle at $12 for a 
carload of 24 or more animals; set it at 50 cents a head for 
loads of less than 24 animals; and assessed $10 per car for 
calves and yearlings. If a shipper s.ent in a mixed carload, 
the charge was 50 cents per head for the cattle, 25 cents 
1Minutes of the Board of Directors, 22 February 1886, 
vel. 3, RKCLE (Microcopy Collection 158). 
2u. S. Congress, Senate Report no. 829, p. 45. 
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per head for the calves, and 10 cents per head for the hogs 
or sheep. For these $12 per carload was the maximum rate. 3 
The Exchange also set the rate of commissions for order 
buying. Livestock commission merchants received open orders 
from eastern packing houses and corn belt feeders for 
specific types of animals. The packers wanted heavy ones 
while the feeders wanted lighter animals. The Exchange set 
the charge for order buying at 50 cents a head for cattle 
with a maximum charge of $12 per carload. For sheep the 
charge was $6 for a single-deck car and $10 for a double-
deck one. For live hogs the charge was $4 per single-deck, 
$5 per double-deck, or 3 cents per head. 4 
The Kansas City Live Stock Exchange made exceptions to 
the rate schedule for "inside traders." The Exchange 
assessed yard traders in the Kansas City Stockyards one half 
the commission rate charged a shipper and permitted a rebate 
to commission merchants at Omaha, st. Joseph, Denver, and 
Wichita on stock forwarded to Kansas City from those 
markets. 5 
The Board of Directors decided which markets qualified 
for a division of commissions, and which markets did not. 
In 1886, the Exchange charged the markets at Fort Worth, 
Texas and Pueblo, Colorado, full rates but enabled smaller 
3Minutes of the Board of Directors, 22 February 1886, 
vol. 3, RKCLE (Microcopy Collection 158). 
4Articles of Association and Rules and Bylaws (Kansas 
City: Lawton & Burnap Printers, 1892), pp. 18-19. 
5 rbid., p. 20. 
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markets to apply for special rates. Two years later both 
Forth Worth and Pueblo applied for and received a more 
favorable rate. Gradually, the Exchange recognized 
additional markets as the livestock trade developed in the 
West. By 1903 eleven markets received a rebate on stock 
forwarded to Kansas City. They were Chicago, East st. 
Louis, St. Louis, Omaha, Wichita, Denver, Pueblo, St. 
Joseph, sioux City, Milwaukee, and Fort Worth. 6 
The Board of Directors set down rigid guidelines on the 
use of solicitors in the market area. From 1886 to 1921 
these agents caused considerable irritation. Controlling 
their activities was difficult as solicitors lived as far 
away from Kansas City as New Mexico, and the commission 
firms rarely revealed their identity. The Exchange rules 
barred the payment of solicitors by commission and they 
required solicitors to register with the secretary of the 
Exchange by name and address. Moreover, the organization 
wanted all solicitors to be employed on a full time basis. 
No commission house, for example, could employ a solicitor 
who was also a live stock agent for a railroad. 7 
The Exchange dictated how many solicitors a firm could 
put in the field. In 1892, it limited a commission firm to 
three traveling solicitors. In 1895 no firm solicitor was 
to operate in Kansas, Oklahoma Territory, Indian Territory, 
6Minutes of the Board of Directors, 20 July 1895, vol. 
3, RKCLE (Microcopy Collection 158); Constitution, 1903, 
val. 8, p. 20. 
7Ibid., pp. 18-19. 
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Missouri, or Nebraska, although any number of agents could 
operate outside of that trade area. In 1903 five men could 
act as solicitors and travel anywhere; ten years later the 
Exchange reduced the number to one. 8 
The trade area and the rules within which a solicitor 
operated were more specifically defined by 1921. The Kansas 
City solicitors were limited to an area bounded on the east 
by the Mississippi River, on the south by a line from the 
southern border of Arkansas through Fort Worth to the 
southeast corner of New Mexico, on the west by the eastern 
borders of New Mexico and Colorado, and on the north by the 
Platte River and the south boundary of Iowa. By 1921, an 
approved solicitor had to register all his movements with 
the secretary of the Exchange, unless he anticipated a trip 
of less than 30 days. There were also certain feedlots in 
the Kansas city trade area a solicitor could not visit 
without a written request from the owner. The solicitor 
filed the request with the secretary of the Exchange. 9 
Upon the publication of commission rates in 1886, there 
was an explosion of protest from cattle raisers in the 
Southwest. Producers' associations, normally antagonistic 
to one another, united into a front against the Exchange. 
Even the Farmers' Alliance of Parker county, Texas, (the 
8Minutes of the Board of Directors, 14 March 1892, 9 
May 1892, 27 June 1895, vol. 3, RKCLE (Microcopy Collection 
158); Minutes of the Board of Directors, 8 April 1902, 6 
June 1913, vol. 4, Ibid. 
9Minutes of the Exchange, 20 December 1922, vol. 5, 
Ibid. 
progenitor of Texas Populism) joined with the Texas and 
Southwestern Cattle Raisers' Association to declare the 
action "oppressive and unjust." The International Range 
Association sent a committee to Kansas City and argued 
against the actions of the Exchange. 10 
The protest rested upon economic considerations. 
Producers claimed the transportation, feed, and yardage 
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charges levied by the railroads and stockyards exceeded the 
cost of producing range cattle. The feed charges in Kansas 
city were $1 per bushel for hay and 75 cents per bushel for 
corn. The yardage charge was 20 cents a head for cattle, 8 
cents for hogs, and 5 cents for sheep. This was cheaper 
than Chicago, however, for there producers paid $1.50 per 
bushel for hay and $1 per bushel for corn. The yardage 
charges in Chicago were 25 cents for cattle, 8 cents for 
hogs, and 8 cents for sheep. 11 Producers demanded 
retrenchment in expenses regardless, including a reduction 
in marketing charges. Complicating the problem was a 
decreasing demand for range beef in the United States. The 
range steer rarely weighed over 1,000 pounds in 1886, and 
the eastern consumer had no taste for lean beef. Instead, 
they wanted the fattened corn fed beef from the Midwest. 
10Minutes of the Southwestern Cattle Raisers' 
Association, 1886, p. 108; Texas Livestock Journal, 6 
February, 13 March 1886; Daily Drovers Telegram, 30 January 
1886. 
11 b'd l.._L., 5, 8 February 1886 
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Consequently, while the price of range cattle dropped, the 
demand for corn fed beef remained high. 12 
The protest was also ideational. The argument of the 
producers changed very little from 1886 to 1921, yet there 
was little relationship between the commission rates and the 
economic problems of the shippers. The rates were not new 
and changed little over time. The commission charges on 
cattle, for example, remained the 50 cents a head for 36 
years. During that same era the price of cattle varied from 
a low of $3.65 a hundred pounds in March 1889 to a high of 
$9.60 in August 1912, an increase of 263 percent. What 
really offended the producers was that a small body of 
commission merchants in Kansas City affected them at a11. 13 
The protest against the Exchange in the 1880s did not 
come from the Corn Belt feeders. They tolerated the system. 
Feeders from the Midwest bought cheap cattle from the 
Southwest at bargain prices, fed them corn for six months, 
and then marketed them at top prices. Thomas sturgis, 
secretary of the Wyoming Stock Growers' Association, in an 
address to Southwest cattle producers, noted the results: 
The major problem of the range cattle business is how 
to get our range steer, after his 4 years of buffalo 
grass and alkali water, into such condition that he can 
look, without humiliation, across the pens of the 
12Texas Livestock Journal, 1 May 1886; Kansas City Live 
Stock Indicator, 17 February 1887. 
13Edward E. Dale Manuscript Collection, Western History 
Collection, University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, Box 
106, Folder 7, doc. 1, pp. 8-9. 
stockyards at his sleek and pampered brothers from 
Illinois. 14 
The agitation against the Exchanges continued in 
Southwest throughout the late 1880s. In a Convention of 
Interstate Cattlemen in Ft. Worth, Texas, in 1890, the 
cattle raisers summed up their charges. J. L. Brush, 
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president of the Colorado Stock Growers' Association, spoke 
for the group when he charged the commissions of 50 cents 
per head were too much for range steers. It was laudable 
the Exchanges sought uniformity in rates, but said Brush, 
there was a difference between the southwestern and 
Midwestern livestock trade. He argued that the eastern 
feeder rarely shipped more than one consignment of stock to 
market, while the southwestern producer often shipped large 
trains of cattle, a volume that alone established a basis 
for a rate reduction. 15 
Brush offered an alternative to published commission 
rates. He wanted full grown cattle charged at 25 cents a 
head. If the animal brought over $25 at the market, he said 
the rate should be 1 percent of the gross amount, with a 
maximum charge of 50 cents per head. These changes, Brush 
reasoned, more accurately reflected the value of the animal. 
Let the corn fed steers carry the higher commission 
charges. 16 
14Texas Livestock Journal, 1 May 1886. 
15Proceedings of the Interstate convention of Cattlemen 
(Washington, Government Printing Office, 1890), p 25. 
16 b'd l..__L., p. 28. 
140 
Brush also pointed out inconsistencies in the actions 
of the Exchanges. He noted that livestock commissions were 
never fixed charges as the Exchanges claimed. Unwilling to 
give consideration to the producer, the Exchanges willingly 
permitted members to divide their commissions with firms 
from other markets. In this, opined the producer, 25 cents 
was a satisfactory profit for the commission firm! Brush 
chided that "the commission merchants did not seem to suffer 
from degradation and are not proposing to go out of 
business." Exchange members were willing "to divide with 
another firm, but not with the owner" who shipped directly 
to them. 17 
The commission merchants also reaped an excessive 
treble commission charge on range steers Brush complained. 
The merchant received a commission from the producer for 
selling the steer, but he also received a commission for 
executing an order to buy. The commission firm received a 
third fee from the packer when the fattened steer returned 
to the market. "Instead of being a misfortune to the 
commission merchant, the whole system of trade, Brush 
concluded, was "a picnic. 1118 
The Fort Worth meeting had no effect. The Exchanges 
refused to capitulate. According to W. H. Thompson, 
president of the Chicago Live Stock Exchange, a 25 cents 
commission per steer was not a living wage for a commission 
17Ibid. I p. 32. 
18Ibid., pp. 33-34. 
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merchant. The purpose of exchanges was to bring uniformity 
of commission rates and the problem was the Southwestern 
cattle trade. Midwestern livestock producers, Thompson 
pointed out, were not in sympathy with their Southwestern 
counterparts. In fact, they supported the rate structure. 
The exchanges certainly appreciated the range cattle 
business, but in the case of Chicago, it consisted of only 
10 percent of the trade. But range cattle were the lowest 
grade of animal and the hardest to market. Therefore, 
Thompson explained, the larger shipments from range cattle 
raisers meant larger expenses for commission merchants. 19 
It was one thing to publish standard rates; it was 
something else to enforce them. The Kansas City Live Stock 
Exchange understood that enforcement depended upon the 
cooperation of larger commission houses. Firms such as 
James H. Campbell & Co. (successor of Andy J. Snider & Co.) 
and Hunter Evans & Co ignored the wishes of the Exchange and 
rebated commissions back to the shippers, thus undercutting 
the power of the Exchange. So instead of directing 
enforcement efforts at the shippers, the Exchange singled 
out the offending commission firms. 
In September 1886 (six months after the Exchange 
organized), the Board of Directors reported an increase in 
complaints from smaller commission firms concerning the 
rebate practices of their larger competitors. They could 
not compete against such unfair tactics. In 1887, the 
19Ibid. I pp. 28-29. 
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Exchange sought to address the problem. Such evidence was 
difficult to collect, the board requested suggestions from 
the ·members. Nor was there a model to follow from st. Louis 
or Chicago; those two markets were the major violators of 
the Kansas City rules. So the Kansas City Exchange 
innovated its own approach to this unique problem. 20 
The Chicago Live Stock Exchange was the major 
difficulty. Because it refused to control the rebating of 
commissions, Chicago firms with branch offices in Kansas 
ignored the Kansas City rules. The Chicago market received 
four times (2,015,000 versus 491,000) the volume of cattle 
as did its competitor and viewed the entire livestock 
producing areas of the United States as their domain. They 
looked with disdain, contempt, and amusement upon their 
Kansas cousins. Moreover, the Chicago Exchange placed no 
restrictions on its solicitors nor did it divide commissions 
on stock forwarded from Kansas City. Also, Chicago competed 
vigorously for consignments in the Kansas City trade area, 
while the Kansas City merchants were not competitive in the 
corn Belt except for eastern Kansas and Missouri. 21 
An opportunity to deal with commission rates and 
rebates came through the back door. The Chicago Exchange 
20complaint of J. H. Payne, 6 September 1886, vol. 3, 
RKCLE (Microcopy Collection 158); Minutes of the Exchange, 
12 February 1887, Ibid. 
21Atkinson, Kansas City Trade, pp. 329-331, 349-358; 
Minutes of the Board of Directors, 22 November 1894, vol. 3, 
RKCLE (Microcopy Collection 158); Minutes of the Directors, 
1 December 1890, Ibid. 
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proposed in 1887 that all livestock exchanges should unite 
in a national organization to "consider the general 
interests of the livestock commission men of the West." It 
suggested the formation of the National Live Stock Exchange 
to facilitate uniformity in rules and to provide a united 
front against the producers associations. This proposal 
stemmed from an immediate grievance Chicago had against 
Kansas City. Consignments of cattle on their way to the 
former stopped at the latter for rest and water. There the 
Chicago merchants believed the Kansas City merchants 
substituted dead, diseased, or injured stock in their 
possession for healthy animals on the Chicago bound stock 
trains. Chicago, therefore, received a disproportionate 
number of worthless animals from the Southwest. Merchants 
there wanted their Kansas City counterparts to join the 
National Live Stock Exchange so that the two exchanges could 
reconcile these problems.22 
The Kansas City merchants happily accommodated them. 
Meeting in Chicago in March 1887, they promised reforms in 
the manner in which Chicago trains were handled, but they 
also demanded concessions. Specifically, they wanted 
Chicago firms doing business at Kansas City to terminate 
commission rebates to shippers, and they wanted Chicago 
merchants to split commissions with them on stock forwarded. 
Upon the latter the Chicago group choked. It divided the 
22Minutes of the Directors, 12 February 1887, Ibid.; 
Minutes of the Exchange, 7 January 1889, Ibid. 
ranks of the larger Exchange, delaying passage of any 
resolution regarding split commissions until 1891, or 4 
years later. 23 
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It also delayed implementation of a strong National 
Live Stock Exchange. The Kansas City merchants did not join 
the national organization until Chicago started splitting 
commissions. Moreover, they were only casually interested 
in making sure than no merchant substituted any dead, 
diseased, or injured animals on stock trains bound for 
Chicago. 24 
Applying pressure on the Chicago Live Stock Exchange 
brought no immediate solution to the problem of split 
commissions. Nevertheless, the Kansas City Exchange on its 
own began blacklisting firms guilty of commission rebates. 
This action eventually led to resolutions of the split 
commissions question. To obtain evidence on rules 
violations on suspected firms, the Exchange hired detectives 
to board stock trains moving in and out of the Southwest. 
The detectives took depositions from Iowa to New Mexico on 
the activities of the livestock commission merchants at 
Kansas City. These produced information pertaining to split 
commissions involving a Chicago firm. After investigating 
23Minutes of the Directors, 1 December 1890, Ibid.; 
Kansas City Live Stock Indicator, 24 February 1887; Minutes 
of the Board of Directors, 18 April 1893, RCLSE (Microcopy 
Collection, University of Oklahoma) . 
24Meeting of the Exchange, 2 January 1890, vol. 3, 
RKCLE (Microcopy Collection 158); Meeting of the Exchange, 5 
February 1891, Ibid. 
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the matter further, the Kansas City Exchange notified 
Harrison & Co. of Chicago that half commissions were due D. 
Thomson & Co. of Kansas City on 6 August 1887. When there 
was no response, the Board of Directors notified the 
offending Chicago firm that shipments of live stock from 
commission men at Kansas City to them would cease until the 
claim was settled. Promptly, Harrison & Co. wired D. 
Thompson the money in question. The threatened boycott had 
been effective.25 
The Board of Directors at Kansas City pressed their 
Chicago counterparts further. When complaints of unfair 
treatment on the question of split commissions continued, 
the Kansas city board recorded that Chicago "sedulously 
refused" to change its rules and prepared to do battle with 
Chicago's largest commission firms individually. 26 
An opportunity soon presented itself. When the Kansas 
City firm of J. R. Stoller & Co. complained that Chicago 
firms refused to cooperate on stock forwarded to them, the 
Board held a special meeting, examined the correspondence 
and the bill of lading on the cattle in question, and acted. 
It requested that Clay, Robinson & Co. and Evan, Snider & 
Buel divide commissions with Stoller. 27 When the Chicago 
25Meeting of the Exchange, 21 June 1887, Ibid.; Meeting 
of the Directors, 1 August 1887, 20 February 1888, Ibid. 
26Annual Report, 5 February 1890, Ibid. 
27John Clay did not mention these activities in his 
autobiography, My Life on the Plains (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma, 1923; reprint 1963). 
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firms refused, the Kansas City merchants responded by 
boycotting them, refusing to forward livestock to the two 
firms in Chicago until Stoller received compensation. Other 
Chicago firms boycotted were Rappal, Lamb & Co., Hunter, 
Walter & Co., and Anderson, Patterson & co. 28 
As earlier, the boycotts made the point. In 1891, the 
Chicago Board of Directors adopted rules authorizing split 
commissions. In response, the Kansas City Exchange joined 
the National Live Stock Exchange in 1891. 29 
But the rivalry between the two exchanges continued. 
In 1895, the Kansas City Exchange withdrew from the National 
Exchange over questions of representation. The Kansas City 
organization believed correctly that Chicago controlled the 
National Exchange through its membership rules. The 
feelings between the two exchanges became strident at times. 
President J. c. McCoy, in his address before the exchange 
accused the Chicago merchants of being "greedy of gain" and 
of having a "grasping eagerness of gain" in 1897. McCoy 
vowed, "we bow not to this idol, let us turn to something 
better." 3° Kansas City returned to the larger organization 
in 1903 when they needed the support of Chicago to justify 
increasing commission rates. Throughout the formative years 
(1886 to 1921}, it used its membership in the National Live 
28Meeting of the Exchange, 13, 18 January 1890, Ibid.; 
Annual Report, 5 February 1891, Ibid. 
29Meeting of the Directors, 1 February 1891, Ibid. 
30Presidential Address, 28 June 1897, Ibid. 
Stock Exchange as a way to coerce concessions from the 
Chicago Exchange. 31 
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The Kansas City Live Stock Exchange also innovated ways 
to stop the Kansas City firms from rebating commissions to 
shippers. In early 1887, the Board of Directors reported 
rumors of "questionable transactions" on the part of members 
but it took them a year to act. 32 To defend themselves A. 
G. Evans of Hunter, Evans & Co. (based in st. Louis), G. w. 
Campbell of James H. Campbell & Co. (based in Chicago), and 
c. G. Means of c. c. Means & Co. (of Kansas City) were 
invited to appear before the Directors in August 1888. They 
appeared as requested. G. W. Campbell (apparently unaware 
of the rules) admitted James H. Campbell & Co. rebated $5 
per car for all consignments of stock from shippers in the 
range cattle sections, whether the consignments went to 
Kansas City, Chicago, or St. Louis. 33 A. G. Evans was more 
cautious; he stated Hunter, Evans & Co. did not cut 
commissions "to his knowledge." The firm employed all 
solicitors by the month and paid them a stipulated salary, 
whether they sent in a "thousand hoofs or not one." Evans 
confessed he had recently paid $120 to a party sending in 24 
cars of cattle. 34 c. G. Means denied any cutting of 
31Minutes of the Directors, 14 January 1895, Ibid.; 
Minutes of the Directors, 11 July 1903, vol. 4, Ibid. 
32Minutes of the Directors, 12 February 1887, val. 3, 
Ibid. 
33Testimony of G. W. Campbell, 15 August 1888, Ibid. 
34Testimony of A. G. Evans, 15 August 1888, Ibid. 
148 
commissions on the part of his house "since the Exchange was 
inaugurated. 1135 
The Board of Directors acted quickly upon the 
confession of G. w. Campbell (brother of James H. 
campbell) .3 6 It held a special meeting and notified the 
home office that "your house is constantly violating the 
rules of the Kansas city Live Stock Exchange." The board 
notified the Chicago firm it would investigate the charges 
formally on 18 December 1888 at 3 o'clock p.m. The Board 
invited James H. Campbell & Co. to make a defense on its own 
behalf. 37 
The Exchange detectives contacted the shippers involved 
in the case. One shipper from Kiowa, Kansas, provided a 
clear deposition of how the commission firms avoided the 
rules of the Exchange. In his case, he wrote, he had 
initiated the contact with the firm of James H. Campbell & 
Co. and notified it of his desire to ship. He was then 
telegraphed to "see our agent, L. B. Collins." Instead of 
Collins, a Tom McGee appeared at his hotel at Kiowa, and 
stated that he represented James H. Campbell & Co. in 
Collin's absence. McGee then wired "both directions" along 
the CRI & P railroad to locate Collins, who then surfaced at 
Amarillo, Texas. Both McGee and the shipper boarded the 
35Testimony of C. G. Means, Ibid. 
36Powell, Kansas City Traders, p. 262. 
37Minutes of the Directors, 8 December 1888, vol. 3, 
RKCLE (Microcopy Collection 158). 
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train at Kiowa for Amarillo (using the free passes provided 
by the railroad for shippers and commission merchants), 
arriving in that Texas town about midnight. 38 
The next morning McGee and the shipper met Collins at 
the Amarillo stockyards. The shipper asked Collins what 
"kind of a deal" could be arranged on cattle consigned to 
Kansas City from Kiowa. Collins offered either a rebate of 
$5 per car, or a commission charge of 25 cents per head. 
Collins empathized with the shipper and stated that "he saw 
some time ago that the shippers of cattle were getting the 
worst of the commission business." Collins promised the 
Kansas cattleman a check at Kiowa when the cattle were 
shipped or cash "at his place" at Kansas City. 39 
The shipper explained to the Board of Directors that 
commission firms intentionally evaded the rules of the 
Kansas City Livestock Exchange. Collins had openly admitted 
that James H. Campell & Co. preferred the rebate method 
rather than the lower commission rate of 25 cents. Collins 
had explained that the commission firm would enter the 
commission rate into the books at Kansas City at the rate 
set by the Kansas City Live Stock Exchange, but the rebate 
would be paid in cash. If the Exchange audited the books of 
the commission house at Kansas City, the books would show 
the required rate, not the actual rate. 40 




Collins explained to the shipper he did business in 
this way with all the "big syndicates." He had just sent 
the "manager" of the Spur Ranch a draft for a rebate and 
charged the amount to his expense account. Collins asked 
permission to notify his house that he had made the 
arrangements and wanted to know how many cattle would be 
consigned. He took the shipper to the freight agent and 
arranged for a number of cars to be placed at his disposal. 
During the trial, G. w. Campbell "denied none of these 
charges" and the Board of Directors fined the firm $400. 41 
Another deposition concerning Hunter, Evans & co. led 
to a fine of $400 for that firm also. In this case the 
shipper testified that on 17 October 1888, while on a train 
between Canadian and Panhandle City, Texas, W. R. Curtis of 
Hunter, Evans & Co. asked if he had made arrangements for 
transporting his cattle. The shipper replied that he had 
not. Curtis proposed to handle the 1,500 animals (70-75 
rail cars) at a commission rate of 25 cents per head, but he 
cautioned the shipper that the proposition was confidential. 
Hunter, Evans & co. would enter the transaction as 50 cents 
a head in their books in Kansas City, but the shipper would 
receive a 25 cents rebate upon shipment or in Kansas City. 
"That is the way we fix it," Curtis admitted, "so as not to 
conflict with an arrangement which was existing between the 
commission houses in Kansas City." Hunter, Evans & Co. made 
41rbid. 
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no defense against the rebate charges, and A. G. Evans paid 
the $400 fine. 42 
The trial of c. c. Means & Co. revealed similar 
transactions in 1888. According to a signed deposition, M. 
H. Snyder, a solicitor for C. C. Means, told a shipper the 
standard commission for handling cattle was 50 cents per 
head. But when snyder discovered there were 1,900 steers 
ready for shipment (90-95 rail cars), he offered a rebate of 
$5 per car even though Means & Co. "deprecated the cutting 
of rates." After the presentation of this evidence, 
merchant c. G. Means requested time to find an important 
witness to refute the charges. When the Board inquired as 
to the nature of the evidence he expected to obtain, Means 
replied, "that is my business." The Board of Directors 
summarily refused to hear the witness and fined Means 
$400. 43 
The Kansas City Live Stock Exchange set an important 
precedent in the trial of these three large commission 
firms. It asserted successfully the right to regulate 
commission rates and to discipline violators of the rules; 
it also prevented the more powerful commission firms, which 
traditionally insisted on "going it alone," from undermining 
the functions of the Exchange. 
But rebating and cutting of commissions were only part 
of the problem. The Exchange also moved to control the 
42 Deposition of Shipper, 22 December 1888, Ibid. 
43 Deposition of Shipper, 22 December 1888, Ibid. 
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unfair activities of solicitors in the market area who 
destroyed competition and gave unfair advantage to the 
commission firms which used them. To this end the Exchange 
filed charges against several firms for flagrantly violating 
the rules governing solicitors. J. R. Stoller & Co., who 
earlier had received assistance from the organization on 
split commission from Chicago, was accused of violating 
rules by secretly using G. E. Lyon as a solicitor at Raton, 
New Mexico. Lyon was the cattle inspector for the New 
Mexico Sanitary Board and an employee of the New Mexico 
Cattle Raisers' Association. The Exchange charged that Lyon 
gave the Stoller company an undue advantage in New Mexico. 44 
The Kansas City board also believed Evans, Snider & Buel 
gained competitive advantage by hiring J. M. Chittim, the 
livestock agent for the MK & T railroad, as a solicitor. 45 
The same was true of James H. Campbell & Co. who hired 
Jerome Harris as a solicitor in San Antonio, Texas. Harris 
was also employed by Jarvis, Conklin Mortgage and Trust Co., 
a firm that financed cattle in southern Texas. 46 
The Exchange also convicted smaller firms of violating 
the rules on solicitation. Both White & Rial, and Larimer, 
Smith & Bridgeford retained solicitors at Glasco, Kansas. 
The former paid J. N. Haddock, Jr., the owner of the general 
merchandise store, to send stock to its house, while the 
44Minutes of the Directors, 6 June 1892, Ibid. 
45Minutes of the Directors, 17 October 1892, Ibid. 
46Minutes of the Directors, 1, 6 June 1892, Ibid. 
latter employed D. H. Geirger, a vice president in the 
Glasco Bank. Both firms were tried, convicted, and fined 
for their activity. 47 
153 
The regulatory efforts of the Board of Directors of the 
Kansas City Live Stock Exchange were successful. Despite 
vigorous protests from shippers from the Southwest, it held 
to its rate structure and refused any variation on the use 
of solicitors. When the Chicago Live Stock Exchange proved 
unwilling to cooperate in changing its own rules to regulate 
the activities of the larger cattle commission companies, 
the Kansas City Exchange boycotted the guilty firms and 
forced them to abide by the Kansas City rules. After the 
cases of James H. Campbell, Hunter, Evans & Co., and c. c. 
Means & Co., all the commission firms doing business at 
Kansas City joined the Exchange. The Exchange continued to 
try, convict, and fine violators for rebating commissions 
and misusing solicitors but it had established its right to 
regulate the cattle trade in the Southwest. 
The Exchange also had to prove to shippers that it had 
the right to control and regulate the membership of the 
Exchange. The next chapter describes the membership 
regulations established by the organization, and the 
attempts of producers to break those rules. 
47Minutes of the Directors, 6 June 1892, Ibid. 
CHAPTER IX 
AMERICAN LIVE STOCK COMMISSION COMPANY 
The Kansas City Live Stock Exchange successfully 
resisted the efforts of shippers and a few merchants to 
undermine the commission rate structure set in 1886. Two 
years later a group of Southwestern shippers made another 
attempt, joined in this case by the Kansas Populists, to 
destroy the power of the Exchange. They created a 
"cooperative" house called the American Live Stock 
Commission Company, the aim of which was to bypass the 
commission merchants of the Kansas City Exchange. The issue 
centered on the right of the Kansas organization to control 
and regulate its own membership. In 1889, the Exchange 
locked the upstart American group out of the stockyards. 
The cooperative sought injunctive relief from the District 
Court. The ensuing court case determined the right of the 
livestock exchanges to regulate the trade. 
At stake was the right of the Kansas City Live Stock 
Exchange to determine who could be a livestock commission 
merchant and how many would operate out of the Kansas City 
Stockyards. The constitution of 1886 vested that power in 
the Exchange. In practice,· however, the organization far 
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exceeded that authority. Unlike either Chicago or st. 
Louis, it understood that anything short of the total 
participation of all interests in the stockyards within the 
confines of the Exchange would undermine its purpose. 1 Upon 
this premise the organization frequently resorted to 
coercion to enforce its will. 
As already noted, the largest firms joined the Exchange 
only under duress. When, for example, Hunter, Evans & Co. 
refused to sign the rules and bylaws of the Exchange in 
1886, the Board of Directors sent a hand picked committee of 
five members to "request that" A. G. Evans take out a 
membership. 2 When Evans failed to do so, the committee 
called again to inform that without a membership the firm 
would not enjoy the privileges of the Exchange. 
Specifically the Exchange would not provide any inspection 
service for hogs sent in by the firm nor would it act on the 
firm's behalf in commercial disputes with other members or 
shippers. Hunter, Evans & Co. joined the Exchange. 3 
The Exchange also pressured Andrew Drumm to take out a 
membership. Next to Andy Snider, Drumm was the most 
powerful cattle merchant in Kansas City from 1889 to his 
death in 1919. He accumulated vast wealth as a drover, 
banker, and rancher in Kansas and Indian Territory in the 
1constitution. 1903, vol. 8, RKCLE (Microcopy 
Collection 158), pp. 7-11. 
2Minutes of the Board of Directors, 12 February 1887, 
vol. 3, Ibid. 
3Minutes of the Board of Directors, 8 March 1888, Ibid. 
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1880s and for years was the Secretary of the Cherokee Strip 
Livestock Association and ranching partner with Andy Snider. 
He had entered the commission business in Kansas City in 
1889. 4 Seeing himself as an individualistic entrepreneur, 
Drumm avoided the Exchange when he first arrived at Kansas 
City. He believed that he could successfully carry out a 
commission business without "cooperating" with other 
merchants. Drumm formed a commission house in 1889 with F. 
o. Flato, the former office man for Hunter, Evans & co. 5 
The credentials of Drumm, Flato & Co. failed to impress 
the directors of the Kansas City Live stock Exchange. They 
sent a committee to interview Andrew Drumm, and "requested" 
that he take out a membership in the organization by 1 April 
1889. When Drumm ignored the request, the secretary of the 
Exchange notified him that if a membership was not purchased 
immediately, the inspectors of the Exchange would stop 
docking hogs from his firm. Drumm, Flato & Co. thereupon 
joined the Kansas City organization. 6 
After a thorough check of all traders operating as 
commission merchants in the yards, the Board of Directors 
discovered in 1890 that there were still 44 merchants who 
were not members. A list of.those in non-compliance was 
then posted on the bulletin board with a notation that the 
4Minutes of the Board of Directors, 1 April 1889, Ibid. 
5Berkemeir, Major Andrew Drumm, pp. 1, 57. 
6Minutes of the Board of Directors, 1 April, 6 May 1889 
Ibid. 
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organization would not tolerate further evasion of the 
membership rules. In response the offending commission 
merchants either left the yards or joined the Exchange. 7 
The Exchange not only forced all commission merchants 
operating in the Kansas City market to become members, it 
also regulated the number of livestock commission merchants 
that could operate there. The instrument for controlling 
the number of members was the membership fee. In 1886 the 
cost for a membership was $10, but the board raised it to 
$100 in 1887. Due to difficult times in the livestock 
trade, the number of commission merchants decreased from 144 
in 1886 to 136 in 1892. The board, however, believed there 
were more merchants needed in the Kansas City yards. In 
1892 it notified prospective merchants that the price of 
membership would increase to $1000 in a year. In response, 
157 new memberships were purchased. That constituted the 
largest increase in new memberships in the history of the 
Exchange between 1886 and 1921. By this ploy there were 293 
members in 1894. 8 
Thereafter and until 1921 the Board of Directors kept 
the number of licensed commission merchants at Kansas City 
close to 300. If the membership fell below that number, the 
Board added others by suspending the rules and foregoing the 
7Minutes of the Board of Directors, 1 March 1890, Ibid. 
8Minutes of the Board of Directors, 6 February 1886, 11 
January 1892, Ibid. 
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$1,000 fee. Where this was done, the following note was 
made in the records: 
By unanimous consent of the Board the rules were 
suspended and the Secretary was instructed to cast the 
vote of the Directors in favor of the following parties 
becoming members and to issue certificates for each on 
on his compliance with the conditions prescribed in the 
rules and bylaws. 9 
Conversely, when the number of active commission merchants 
approached 300, the Board refused to affirm a prospective 
member's application, or it required the new applicant to 
pay the full $1,000 membership fee. 
Despite the control the Board of Directors had over the 
number of members, the actual process of membership was not 
difficult. Any white male, resident of Kansas City of "good 
character, good credit, and of legal age" could apply. The 
rules required a written application, an endorsement of two 
members of the Exchange, and a deposit of $25. The 
secretary posted the application on the Exchange bulletin 
board for 10 days, after which time the board voted on the 
application. Final elections required seven affirmative 
votes from the nine members on the board. The new member 
then signed an agreement to abide by the rules and by-laws 
of the Exchange, paid the necessary fees, and took his seat 
on the Kansas City Live Stock Exchange. 10 
If the Board of Directors was not accepting new 
memberships, a prospective member could gain admittance by 
9Minutes of the Board of Directors, 6 July 1896, Ibid. 
10constitution, 1903, vel. 8, Ibid., pp. 15-18. 
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purchasing a certificate of "unimpaired or unforfeited" 
membership from an inactive member. If the latter had paid 
all the assessments, and had no outstanding, unadjusted, or 
unsettled contracts, the board generally allowed the 
transfer for $5. The membership of a deceased member was 
transferred in a like manner. Between 1886 and 1917 the 
number of memberships transferred greatly outnumbered 
original memberships. During those 31 years, there were 
1,753 new members added to the Exchange; 736 merchants 
purchased original memberships, and 1,017 merchants bought 
their memberships from an inactive member. 11 
The Board of Directors used its power over the transfer 
of memberships to regulate the members in other ways. No 
one, for example, could sell his membership or use it as 
collateral for a loan until all his obligations were 
fulfilled. The Board rejected the application of w. H. 
Rayburn to transfer his membership because Rayburn owed 
considerable money to another member of the Exchange. 12 
In 1889 the American Live Stock Commission Company 
challenged the right of the Board of Directors to determine 
who could and could not be a livestock commission merchant 
in Kansas City. Historians have generally interpreted the 
American as a part of the late nineteenth century 
"cooperative crusade." Herbert Myrick and Keach Johnson 
11Annual Report, 7 June 1917, vol. 4, Ibid. 
12Minutes of the Board of Directors, 4 February 1889, 
vol 3, Ibid. 
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described it as an example of a mighty struggle in the 
stockyards between the grangers and the trusts. 13 Actually 
the American Livestock Commission Company was the brain 
child of large cattlemen from the Southwest--not agrarian 
crusaders, although Kansas Populists later did lend it 
support. 
The firm originated in secret meetings held in the 
Midland Hotel in Kansas City in early 1889. The Chicago 
Daily Drovers Journal reported that "leading cattlemen of 
the West" quietly arrived in Kansas City over a period of 
time in late January. An alert reporter for the Journal 
originally believed the meeting related to the Cherokee 
cattle Company, but as it turned out, that was only a guise 
to obscure the real purpose of the meeting. The Journal 
reported "there is something far more important in the 
wind. 1114 And indeed there was. The cattlemen aimed to 
organize a gigantic commission company for the sale of 
livestock. Andy Snider, millionaire rancher of Kansas City 
and former head of the Andy Snider Cattle Commission Co., 
was one of the active promoters of the new company. He, it 
was rumored, would be the manager of the Kansas City office. 
The three day meeting gave birth to the American Live Stock 
Commission.Company. Selected as its Board of Directors were 
13Herbert Myrick, How to Cooperate (New York: orange 
Judd Co., 1912), pp. 220-245; Keach Johnson, "Struggle in 
the stockyards: The Rise and Fall of the Cooperative 
Livestock Commission Company," Arizona and the West 18 
(Winter 1976):332. 
14Daily Drovers Journal of Chicago, 2 February 1889. 
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Samuel Lazarus of Texas, A. Gregory of Illinois, and 
Nicholas T. Eaton and Thomas B. Bugby of Kansas City. 15 
Organizers justified their actions in language employed 
by the populist and robber baron historian Edwin Snyder. 
They believed that "for a long time" the cattlemen had been 
"losing out" in the livestock business because of a 
"combine" of the commission men and large packing houses. 
This conspiracy had forced the sale of cattle at 
"ridiculously low" prices. Contrary to what was later 
understood, these cattlemen viewed the Exchange as one of 
the evil "interests" in the stockyards. In their view, the 
Kansas City commission merchants coerced the packers into 
joining their Exchange and then forced them to buy only from 
mernbers. 16 
The American Live Stock Commission Company was 
envisioned as a means to break down the power of the Kansas 
City Live Stock Exchange. Indeed, the American threatened 
to boycott Kansas City if the commission firms and packing 
houses discriminated against it. The new organization 
promised not ship "a head of stock" to Kansas City, but 
instead to ship their cattle to Chicago. Anticipating 
opposition from the Kansas City "combine," the Directors of 
the firm even incorporated the American in Illinois. 17 
15Ibid., 31 January, 23 February 1889. 
16Ibid. 
17Roy v. scott, The Agrarian Movement in Illinois 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962), p. 75; Daily 
Drovers Journal of Chicago, 23 February 1889. 
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The Kansas City market, ironically, received by far the 
largest number of shipments to the American. In 1890, 
members sent 5,065 rail cars (or 52 percent) to Kansas City, 
3,710 rail cars (or 38 percent) to Chicago, 531 rail cars 
(or 5 percent) to st. Louis, and 497 ( or 5 percent) to 
Omaha. The percentage of the total receipts was also higher 
in Kansas City. These figures, however, did not indicate an 
overwhelming support for the dissenting organization. In 
1890, the firm received 10 percent of the cattle at Kansas 
city and 4 percent of the hogs. In Chicago the American's 
trade comprised 4 percent of the cattle market and less than 
1 percent of the hog trade. And the American apparently 
rebated $101,346 to its members. 18 
The new livestock commission company was hampered by 
internal division from the start. The initial promoters 
wanted a pledge from every stockholder binding them to 
transact all of their business through the cooperative. 
Many objected to this. E. M. Hewins, president of the 
Cherokee Strip Live Stock Association in 1889, left the 
meeting in protest and thereafter refused to take part in 
the organization. 19 
Nor did the rebate practice of the American Live Stock 
Commission Company endear it to the older Kansas City 
Exchange. By the terms of its charter, the American rebated 
18Myrick, Cooperate, p. 225; Atkinson, "Kansas City 
Trade," pp. 140-141. 
19oaily Drovers Journal of Chicago, 2 February 1889. 
65 percent of the net earnings back to the shippers in 
proportion to the number of rail cars shipped. The 
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remaining 35 percent it distributed among the stockholders 
in proportion to the number of shares held. 20 
Controversy swirled more intensely after the Kansas 
Populists joined the "cooperative" effort. Controlling 9 
percent of the stock in the American, the Kansas Alliance 
sent to Kansas city as its agent Edwin Snyder, the populist 
vice-president of the Kansas State Board of Agriculture and 
robber baron historian. Snyder in time also represented 
the Nebraska Alliance and the Kansas state Grange, both of 
which also became stockholders in the commission firm. 21 
Despite the Populist connection, the officers and 
managers of the American Live Stock Commission Company were 
not poor grangers. Director Samuel Lazarus, for example, 
was a part owner in the huge Pitchfork Land and Cattle 
Company in the Panhandle of Texas and ranked as one of the 
wealthiest men in the state. 22 The president of the 
American, H. w. Creswell, had prospered as a drover and 
ranch owner in Texas for years; in 1890 he owned a large 
ranch in Colorado. 23 Nor was Eli Titus, the general manager 
20Myrick, Cooperate, pp. 222-224. 
21Kansas City Livestock Indicator, 3 April 1890; 
Myrick, Cooperate, p. 226. 
22David J. Murrah, The Pitchfork Land and Cattle 
Company: The First Century (Lubbock: Texas Tech 
University, 1983), pp. 5, 7, 70. 
23 oodge City Times, 19 April 1879. 
of the American, a poor man. On the contrary, Titus was the 
"largest cattle speculator" at the Kansas City Stockyards. 
He formed a partnership with E. M. Hewins, secretary of the 
Cherokee Strip Live Stock Association, in the 1870s while 
Titus was the livestock agent for the AT & SF railroad. The 
chattel mortgage records of Sumner County, Kansas reflect 
the magnitude of the partnership's capital wealth: ten 
years before the American organized the firm of Hewins & 
Titus had loaned to A. M. Colson $12,000 for 11 months on 
1,300 head of Texas cows.2 4 
w. F. Peters was the only member of the American who 
was not a large cattle dealer. Peters was the commission 
merchant hired by the cooperative because it needed an agent 
who was already a member of the Kansas City Livestock 
Exchange. In so doing, the American hoped to avoid applying 
(and being turned down) for a membership. Although the 
Kansas city Exchange was not aware of the arrangements made 
in the first months of 1889, the American feared that its 
mode of operation would be discovered and the cooperative 
would not be able to function in the stockyards. Hopefully 
Peters would smooth the way. He had a good reputation in 
the Kansas City yards, he had been a charter member of the 
Exchange and even a director in 1887. 25 
24u. s. Biographical Dictionary: Kansas Volume, pp. 
632-633; Chattel Mortgage Record, 7 October 1881, vol. 5, p. 
190, Sumner County Register of Deeds, Winfield, Kansas. 
25Powell, Livestock Traders, p. 269; Kansas City 
Livestock Indicator, 29 November 1890; Report of Election, 
13 February 1887, vol. 3, RKCLE (Microcopy Collection 158). 
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The Kansas city board began receiving reports of the 
improper business methods of the American in late 1889. It 
wanted clear evidence of a violation of the rules of the 
Exchange before acting. Not disposed to let the cooperative 
go unchallenged, the board on 11 June 1890 instructed the 
Secretary of the Exchange to notify H. w. creswell, the 
President of the American Live Stock Commission Company, 
that charges had been preferred against the American for 
violating the rules of the Exchange on rebating commissions 
to shippers. 26 He was requested to attend a hearing on the 
charges. Creswell refused to participate. Nevertheless, at 
the scheduled hearing the charges against the cooperative 
were read into the record--by none other than Chester A. 
Snider. Ironically Chester was the son of Andy Snider, one 
of the promoters of the American. 27 He cleverly turned the 
rhetoric of populism against the cooperative. The American, 
he charged, was a "combination" among various "wealthy" 
cattlemen formed to regulate the supply of cattle and 
control prices. The design of the company was to "oppress 
and drive from business the smaller independent dealers." 
As evidence Snider pointed to advertisements of the "trust" 
which claimed no railroad would dare dispute its damage 
claims for fear of reprisals by the large and powerful 
membership. The American, he said, obviously sought to 
26Minutes of the Board of Directors, 11 June 1890, 
Ibid. 
27Powell, Kansas City Traders, p. 215. 
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acquire control of the entire livestock transportation 
business. Because of the immense number of cattle it 
controlled and the aggregate wealth of the stockholders, the 
cooperative, Snider concluded, would regulate the offerings 
of cattle on the principle markets and thus "steady" prices 
to consumers. 28 
Upon receipt of the charges filed against them, the 
American Live Stock Commission Company sought assistance 
from the Kansas Populists. The Populists controlled the 
legislature in Kansas in 1890, and sympathized with the 
grangers. Eli Titus, general manager of the American, 
traveled to Topeka and sought legislation to prevent the 
Kansas City Live Stock Exchange from expelling the 
"cooperative" commission company from the Kansas City 
market. Titus had enough influence with the populist 
legislature to pass the "Roe Bill." The bill declared the 
regulation of commissions on the sale of livestock in the 
State of Kansas unlawful, and thus, effectively outlawed the 
Kansas City Live Stock Exchange. 29 
In response, the Board of Directors of the Kansas City 
organization revoked the membership of the American Live 
Stock Commission Company. They also expelled all members of 
28speech of Chester A. Snider, 2 March 1891, vol. 3, 
RKCLE (Microcopy Collection 158). 
29Minutes of the Board of Directors, 31 March 1891, 
Ibid.; Kansas Farmer, 11, 18 March 1891; Raymond c. Miller, 
"The Populist Party in Kansas," (Ph.D Dissertation, 
University of Chicago, 1928), p.62; Kansas, Session Laws of 
1891 (Topeka: Kansas Publishing House, 1891), pp. 294-295. 
------
167 
Exchange associated with the cooperative. The board 
insolently declared that the Exchange would "have nothing to 
do" with the Roe Bill or "with any laws which may be 
enacted" by the Kansas Legislature. 30 They further adopted 
a new rule, no. 16, which gave them more disciplinary power 
over members--the authority to black ball a member. This 
power was immediately employed against the American. 
Previously, the Board could do nothing more than refuse to 
dock any of an offending firm's hogs. Now it could prevent 
commission merchants, traders, packers, and railroads at the 
Kansas City Stockyards from doing business with an offending 
party. The implementation of Rule 16 against the American 
effectively shut it out of the Kansas City market. No 
packer would buy its livestock, and no trader would buy its 
animals for speculation.3 1 
With the Roe Bill in the statute books, the American 
Live Stock Commission Company sought an injunction against 
the Kansas City Live Stock Exchange to prevent the 
expulsion. Attorneys for the cooperative filed the case of 
William G. Peters v Frank Cooper, et. al. in the Wyandotte 
County District Court in Kansas City, Kansas, on 2 March 
1891. They challenged the membership rules of the Exchange 
on the grounds that the Kansas City market was a "public 
market," and, therefore, not subject to interference or 
30Minutes of the Board of Directors, 2 March 1891, vol. 
3, RKCLE (Microcopy Collection 158). 
31Minutes of the Board of Directors, 14 March 1891, 
Ibid. 
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regulation by a private agency. Since livestock shipped to 
Kansas City was an interstate trade from various states in 
the West, charges levied upon shippers by the Exchange 
constituted a "restraint." The American believed that the 
Exchange rules were an injury to the shippers and the public 
at large. Furthermore, they were in violation of the Roe 
Bill recently passed by the Kansas legislature. 32 
Attorneys for the American also cited the 1876 case of 
Munn v Illinois. In this case the court ruled in favor of 
state regulation of grain elevators in the Midwest. Grain 
elevators stood at the very "gateway of commerce" and the 
elevator warehousemen took a toll from all who passed. As 
the "system" tended towards conspiracy and monopoly, the 
court affirmed the appropriateness of placing warehouseman 
in the grain trade under public regulation so "that they 
take but a reasonable toll." The same principle, the 
attorneys argued, should be applied to the stockyards. The 
yards stood at the "very gateway of commerce" to the 
Southwest, and these commission merchants took a toll in the 
guise of a commission upon livestock. As a consequence, 
"public interest" should be entitled to protection via the 
power of the state and the courts. 33 
The attorneys of the Kansas City Live Stock Exchange 
challenged all of the arguments made by the plaintiffs. 
32Petition and Precipe, William G. Peters v Frank 
Cooper et al, 2 March 1891, Wyandotte County District Court, 
Kansas City, Kansas, pp. 1-14. 
33 b'd ~., pp. 15-17. 
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They maintained there was no price fixing on the part of the 
Exchange, and that any shipper could sell his own stock. 
Moreover, the Kansas City market was "not affected with a 
public interest" because all of the sales were "private 
affairs" between the individual buyer and seller. They 
argued, also, that the Exchange had a right to regulate its 
own members. Since the officials of the American Live Stock 
Commission Company had signed an agreement to abide by the 
rules and by-laws of the Exchange when they became members, 
failure to comply was grounds for expulsion. Rather than 
meet their good faith commitments, the American had actually 
launched a secret conspiracy to undermine the Exchange. Its 
representatives had made false and defamatory statements 
about the Kansas City market and brought discredit upon it. 
The Exchange, argued its lawyers, had the "constitutional 
and civil rights" to be left at "liberty to refuse business 
relations with the American without being required to assign 
any reason whatsoever." And as the Kansas City Exchange had 
rules which allowed it to expel any member who was guilty of 
extortion, the "dishonorable, deceitful, and fraudulent" 
acts of the American justified expulsion. 34 
The livestock exchanges at Chicago and Omaha also 
brought suit against the American Live Stock Commission 
Company. Both the Kansas City and Omaha cases were dropped 
in order that the case in Illinois could be taken to the 
State Supreme Court. The Illinois court ruled in favor of 
34Plaintiffs Reply, Ibid., pp. 1-11. 
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the Exchanges on 31 October 1892. It acknowledged that the 
Exchanges did have the right to regulate their own 
membership, a right that legalized expulsion. However, the 
court conceded that there was a good basis for declaring the 
stockyards a public market by reason of their magnitude and 
far reaching influence on the consumer. Nevertheless, the 
court declared that until legislatures specifically 
determined that the stockyards were public markets the 
exchanges had the right to regulate the livestock trade. On 
the question of membership of a private organization, the 
court agreed that exchanges could discipline their 
membership. 35 
The court case involving the American Live Stock 
Commission Company had monumental implications for the 
Kansas City Livestock Exchange. Previously the Exchange had 
merely "assumed" that the community granted it the right to 
regulate the livestock commission trade out of Kansas City. 
The American case implied that the courts accepted this 
premise and would grant it protection under the law. The 
Exchange was safe from the aggressive assaults of shippers 
from the West as long as a legislature did not declare the 
yards a "public market." That it took 32 years before a 
legislature so declared suggests an ambivalence on the part 
of the grangers concerning who regulated the livestock 
trade. Not until the agricultural depression of 1919 did 
35Arnerican Live Stock Commission Company v Chicago Live 
Stock Exchange, Northwest Reporter 274-283 (1892). 
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the shippers press for federal regulation and a declaration 
of the stockyards as a "public market." 
CHAPTER X 
FINANCING THE CATTLE TRADE OF THE SOUTHWEST 
The Live Stock Exchange and the commission firms at 
Kansas City were essential links in the financing of the 
cattle industry in the Southwest in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. The commission merchants made 
money available in capital scarce areas, and the Exchange 
served as a watchdog over their activities. commission 
merchants left few records that detail the extent of their 
involvement in cattle finance. Chattel mortgage records in 
Texas, Oklahoma Territory, and Kansas counties, however, 
record this activity. Furthermore, the correspondence of 
the Wichita cattle Loan Company describes the processing of 
"cattle paper" from the cattle ranges to eastern banks. The 
next two chapters outline the background for cattle finance, 
the extent that commission merchants were involved, how the 
Kansas City Live Stock Exchange regulated that activity, how 
the commission firms assisted in getting capital into 
frontier areas, and the procedures used in transferring 




The history of financing the livestock industry in the 
Southwest was a story of cattle finance, not hogs or sheep. 
The Kansas City Live Stock Exchange records contain no 
references to difficulties encountered in financing hogs or 
sheep. Several reasons account for this. Hogs production 
in the nineteenth century required little capital, and local 
banks provided what little financing was necessary. Also 
hog producers rarely sought sources of capital outside their 
local areas. The financing of the sheep industry bypassed 
the livestock exchanges also. Sheep herders were primarily 
wool producers. The sale of sheep for mutton was only a 
secondary interest, and, therefore, the short-term financing 
for sheep came through the wool trade, and not the livestock 
trade. 
The potential for fraud in cattle finance was great. 
As with other "evils and abuses," the absence of the 
producer in many of the transactions made it difficult to 
check these transactions. But the Kansas City Live stock 
Exchange had the power to act quickly and decisively on the 
behalf of the producers. It audited commission firms 
account books; it forced repayment of misused funds; it 
expelled fraudulent merchants; and it recommended 
prosecution when criminal activity was uncovered. 
Surprisingly, there were few cases of fraud which came to 
light in the history of the Exchange. The most frequent 
mention of these problems occurred in the years 1897 to 
1902. 1 
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Historians have long recognized the importance of 
financing the cattle trade. Edward E. Dale, the historian 
of the range cattle industry, admitted in 1924 that "the 
financial side of the cattle business is a subject upon 
which comparatively little has been written, and yet it was 
the most important." Neither Dale, nor his students, 
pursued the study; undoubtedly the reason was a lack of 
sources. 2 
The intriguing question is how did the cattle raisers 
get the money to finance operations in areas where there 
were few sources of capital. Historians have provided two 
answers to that question. Gene Gressley, in Bankers and 
Cattlemen, wrote that the major source was eastern capital. 
He describes the formation of joint stock companies on the 
cattle ranges of Wyoming and how they raised capital through 
Wall Street. According to Gressley, the livestock 
commission merchant was an important "steward" of eastern 
capital. Gressley's work is helpful in understanding the 
financing on the Wyoming cattle ranges from 1880 to 1885, 
but he tells only part of the story. 3 
Other historians have argued that much of the capital 
for the cattle trade was self-generated. This was 
1Daily Drovers Journal of Chicago, 24 October 1899. 
2Dale, "Passing of the Range," p. 16. 
3Gressley, Bankers and Cattlemen, p. 183. 
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particularly so in the Southwest. The dissertation by David 
B. Gracy II, entitled "George Washington Littlefield: A 
Biography in Business," relates how a Texas entrepreneur 
accumulated sufficient capital as a frontier merchant and 
cattle drover to finance his own cattle deals, and those of 
others as well. A similar published study by David J. 
Murrah, entitled c.c. Slaughter: Rancher, Banker. and 
Baptist, describes how another southwestern entrepreneur 
slowly accumulated his own capital as a merchant, drover, 
and banker without resorting to eastern capital. 4 
Both the "eastern capital" and the "self-generated 
capital" hypotheses are correct. Chattel mortgage records 
in the Southwest demonstrate that self-generated capital 
financed the early cattle trade. By the early 1880s, 
however, those same records reflect that cattle producers 
looked to outside financing. In this quest the commission 
merchants in Kansas City played an integral part in the flow 
of eastern money into the Southwest. 
The chattel mortgage was not new in the history of 
American finance. As Southwestern entrepreneurs migrated 
from East to West, they naturally carried with them ideas 
and concepts concerning business, and the chattel mortgage 
was one of them. They simply adapted a European business 
institution to the cattle trade of the American Southwest. 
4David B. Gracy II, "George Washington Littlefield: A 
Biography in Business," (Ph.D dissertation, Texas Tech 
University, 1971), pp. 3-93i David J. Murrah, c.c. 
Slaughter: Rancher, Banker, Baptist (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1981), pp. 60-73. 
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The "chattel" was of French-Norman origin and referred to 
mobile property such as animals, money, jewelry, or grain. 
The word "mortgage" was also French; it meant "an active or 
living pledge" given as security for paying money. A person 
of small capital (or who was real estate poor) generally 
utilized the chattel mortgage; entrepreneurs used it only 
out of necessity and replaced it by superior means of 
financing when they became available. It was no accident 
that the states of Texas, Kansas, Colorado, New Mexico, and 
Oklahoma all passed chattel mortgage laws, although Missouri 
did not. 5 
Chattel mortgage records stored in County Clerk's 
offices in Texas counties and the Register of Deeds offices 
in Kansas and Oklahoma counties detail cattle financing. 
For the purposes of this study, the records of six counties 
were examined, but only in part. Documents are so 
voluminous that only selected years of each county could be 
examined. Furthermore, not all counties had records for the 
same years. For example, the county Clerk in Palo Pinto 
County, Texas, only made available the years from 1870 to 
1877; the Young county records were complete only after 
1877; information on Day County, Oklahoma, existed only for 
1897 and 1898. But Roberts County, Texas, and Ford and 
Sumner Counties, Kansas, had a complete set of chattel 
mortgage records. 
5Joseph E. Cobbey, Chattel Mortgages (St. Paul: West 
Publishing Co., 1893), !:1-3. 
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There was limitation as to the comparative value of the 
documents. The interest rates were seldom mentioned, and 
the release dates of the mortgages were not consistently 
recorded. Therefore, a comparison of interest rates charged 
in these frontier counties with the cost of money in the 
East was impossible. It was also impossible to tell which 
mortgages were paid off and those that remained unpaid. 
Nevertheless, all counties recorded the terms of the sale, 
the mortgagee, the mortgagor, the amount loaned, and a 
description of the property. The records made it possible 
to find out who was financing cattle in what years, when 
outside financing first appeared, and what were the other 
sources of capital. Most importantly, these records traced 
the involvement of the Kansas City livestock commission 
merchants in financing cattle in the different counties. 
Cattle sales in the Palo Pinto County County from 1870 
to 1877 relied upon chattel mortgages. Not only did capital 
come entirely from local sources, but the chattel mortgage 
was a vehicle of long term financing. The latter was 
unique, for ordinarily such mortgages were a means of short 
term finance. The earliest recorded chattel mortgage was in 
1867, but the greatest number occurred in 1871 and 1872. 6 
Of the $226,074 in cattle sales recorded in 1871, 
chattel mortgages secured 58 percent of them. The average 
6Bill of Sale, 1870, Bill of Sale, Mortgages, Personal 
Property, Book A, 1871, Bill of Sale, 1872-1877, Palo Pinto 
County Clerk's Office, Palo Pinto, Texas~ in this county for 
these years the bill of sale and chattel mortgage were 
entered in the same register. 
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size of the loan was $6,271, and the average term on the 
loan was 12 months. The largest loan with the most generous 
terms was a sale made by Palo Pinto rancher and drover John 
Hay to Whatley & Daniels for $40,000 on "cattle running in 
Palo Pinto and adjacent counties." Hay received three 
notes: one was for $5,000, due in 8 months; two notes were 
for $17,500 each, the first due in 20 months, and the second 
due in 32 months. 7 
In 1872, there were fewer cattle sales than in 1871. 
Cattlemen, however financed a higher percentage of the 
$168,639 in sales. Sixty-nine percent of the transactions 
were made on borrowed money. The average size of the loan 
also increased by $1,000 over the 1871 figure to $7,271, 
although the average length of the loan was again 12 months. 
As in 1871, John Hay sold the most cattle, financed the sale 
himself, and granted the longest terms. On 6 February 1872, 
he sold to I. Conater cattle worth $25,000 in "Palo Pinto 
and adjacent counties." Hay received five notes of $5,000 
each with terms of 8, 20, 23, 44, and 54 months. 8 
The heaviest borrowers were drovers. John Gage, John 
Hittson, Jack Daniels, John Hay, John Dalton, and o. Lynn 
drove cattle out of North Central Texas to Kansas, Colorado, 
and Wyoming. All purchased at least part of their cattle on 
7Bill of Sale, Mortgages & Personal Property, 10 May 
1871, Book A, p. 49, Ibid. 
8Bill of Sale Record Book, 6 February 1872, p. 210, 
Ibid. 
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credit. The rancher was both producer and the financier. 
The drover brought back to North Central Texas gold, specie, 
or u.s. Currency. Both the drover and rancher accumulated 
considerable capital through this exchange. The terms of 
the contract could be complicated. c. c. Slaughter, both a 
drover and a rancher, recorded the following mortgage: 
Know all men by these presents that I, C. C. Slaughter, 
of the County of Palo Pinto and State of Texas for and 
in consideration of the sum of $12,000 to me secured by 
Mr. P. Johnson of the County of Stephens •.. $2,000 gold 
dollars secured by bond •.• the deed to a certain tract 
of land being 1 1/2 miles northeast of Palo Pinto and 
known as the Johnson Place, and $4,000 in gold secured 
by promissory note of the said Johnson due and payable 
on 1 July 1872 ••• $16,000 by gold by promissory note of 
said Johnson due and payable on 1 May 1873 ... have 
bargained, sold, and conveyed ... all that certain stock 
of cattle now running and ranging in Palo Pinto and 
adjacent counties •.• marked and branded .• 9 (with c.c. 
Slaughter's brand) •.. dated 1 April 1872. 
Such mortgages ceased in 1873 in Palo Pinto County. 
Drovers Jack Daniels and John Hay purchased several herds of 
cattle on credit, but they never returned to pay their 
debts. According to w. c. Cochran, a small rancher who 
first registered a brand in Palo Pinto in 1858, the Hay and 
Daniels "swindle" bankrupted a good many ranchers. Daniels 
and Hay had been ranchers in Palo Pinto as early as 1862, 
but unlike most who remained producers, they also engaged in 
trading and droving cattle. According to Cochran, the two 
drove numerous herds out of the county in the early 1870s 
and always returned to pay off their debts. Over time they 
"established a good credit," a rating that naturally aided 
9Bill of Sale, 11 April 1872, p. 103, Ibid. 
their swindle. Daniels later surfaced in California, but 
Hay was not heard from again. No wonder that all cattle 
sales in Palo Pinto County from 1873 to 1877 were for 
cash! 10 
Records of Young County, Texas, and Ford County, 
Kansas, detail the first outside financing in their local 
areas, and the first appearance of commission firms. 
Graham, the county seat of Young County was 60 miles 
northwest of Palo Pinto County and south of Wichita Falls, 
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Texas. In southwest Kansas, Ford County was the termination 
point for the cattle drives out of Texas from 1877 to 1886. 
Dodge City, the largest town in the county, was an important 
entrepot for the trade. 11 
In Young County the capital for cattle finance was self 
generated until 1897. From 1880 to 1883 eighteen ranchers 
transacted loans and signed a total of 59 notes. The 
average size of a loan was $23,024, and the average size of 
a single note was $7,021. While the amount of the note 
remained about the same as ten years earlier in Palo Pinto 
County, the amount of money loaned to one rancher jumped 300 
percent from $7,271 in 1872 to $23,024. The largest loan 
10w.c. Cochran, "Story of the Early Days Indian 
Troubles and Cattle Business of Palo Pinto and Adjoining 
Counties," (Barker History Center, University of Texas, 
Austin, Texas), pp. 34-35. 
11Alyce M. Bradshaw, "From Pioneer to Prosperity, 1876-
1926: A Narrative of Growth and Development in Young 
County, Texas, as Reported in the Graham Leader (Masters 
Thesis, Midwestern University, 1969), pp. 1-10; Robert R. 
Dykstra, The Cattle Towns, pp. 56-62. 
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was made on 5 July 1881 when James D. Reed, a former drover, 
loaned $110,000 to Saul & Armstrong on "cattle running in 
Fisher, stonewall, and Haskell counties, in addition to a 
ranch wagon and equipment." 12 Of the 18 sources of capital 
listed in the chattel mortgage records from 1880 to 1883, 
moreover, 17 were from Young County. There were no 
commission firms and only one bank involved. On 29 August 
1881, the city National Bank of Dallas loaned to William 
Rusk $3,165.55 for 12 months on "all of the Wise cattle 
running in Young and Throckmorton County.n 13 
The first livestock commission firm to bring outside 
capital into Young County was c. c. Daly of Chicago in 1890. 
It loaned J. W. Wilcox of Clay County, Texas $12,000 on 27 
November 1890 for six months on 800 three year old steers. 14 
But this transaction was an exception. It was another four 
years before Evans, Hutton, Hunter & Co., a commission firm, 
loaned $16,000 for 60 days. Not until 1897 did the 
financing of cattle by commission firms become a co~~on 
occurrence. 15 
Between 1877 and 1887 there was a somewhat different 
pattern in Ford county, Kansas. As in Texas, local ranchers 
12Register of Chattel Mortgages, 15 July 1881, vol. 1, 
p. 2, Young County Clerk's Office, Graham, Texas. 
13Register of Chattel Mortgages, 29 August 1881, vol. 
1, p. 3, Ibid. 
14Register of Chattel Mortgages, 27 November 1890, vol. 
1, p. 33, Ibid. 
15Register of Chattel Mortgages, 12 November 1894, vol. 
1, p. 83, Ibid. 
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and merchants transacted the major financing. From 1877 to 
1887, there were 44 notes recorded; the average size of 
which was $16,237 and the average terms of which were 12 
months. Thirty-three of the lenders were Ford County 
residents; six were from banks; five were from commission 
firms. The first record of a local bank loaning money on 
cattle was the Bank of Dodge City on 16 January 1884. 16 
But the Kansas City livestock commission merchants 
financed cattle in Kansas much earlier than in Texas. The 
livestock commission firm, Quinlin, Montgomery & Co., was a 
party to the first three financial transactions in Ford 
County, 13 years before a commission merchant financed 
cattle in Texas. On 23 August 1877 it loaned $60,000 for 
three months; 17 on 12 July 1878 it loaned 20,000 for four 
months; 18 and on 23 May 1879 the firm loaned $20,000 for 
three months. 19 Quinlin, Montgomery & Co. then sold these 
notes--a pattern common in the trade in the 1890s--to 
eastern sources of capital. The $20,000 note from John 
Fraser, dated 12 July 1879, received the following 
endorsement: "Kansas City, Missouri, July 6, 1878. For 
value received we hereunto assign the within mortgage to 
16chattel Mortgage Register, 9 September 1884, Book A, 
p. M-12, Ford County Register of Deeds , Dodge City, Kansas. 
17chattel Mortgage Register, 23 August 1877, Book A, p. 
F-1, Ibid. 
18chattel Mortgage Register, 12 July 1878, Book A, p. 
E-1, Ibid. 
19chattel Mortgage Register, 23 May 1879, Book A, p. c-
3 , Ibid. 
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Plankton & Armour. 1120 As in Young County, Texas, Kansas 
City livestock commission merchants were little involved in 
cattle finance until 1897, but the extent of their 
involvement was better detailed in other counties for the 
years 1897 to 1902. 
Chattel mortgage records for Day County, Oklahoma 
Territory (in west central Oklahoma later organized as Ellis 
and Roger Mills Counties), Roberts County, Texas (in the 
Panhandle of Texas), and Sumner County, Kansas (south 
central) , demonstrate the importance of livestock commission 
merchants in Kansas City in financing the livestock business 
in capital poor areas. In Day County, Oklahoma Territory, 
between 1 June 1897 to 1 June 1898 ranchers borrowed 
$255,398. Of that amount the Kansas City merchants loaned 
an amazing $227,760 or 89 percent of the capital, while 
local banks supplied only $27,538, or 11 percent. 21 
The percentage of involvement by commission merchants 
in the other counties was not so dramatic. In Roberts 
County, Texas in 1900, cattle raisers borrowed $400,802; the 
Kansas City commission merchants supplied $197,695, or 49 
percent of the capital, while banks supplied $179,529 or 45 
percent. Unidentified lenders supplied the remaining 6 
20chattel Mortgage Register, 12 July 1878, Book A, p. 
E-1, Ibid. 
21Day County Real and Chattel Mortgage Register, 1 June 
1897-1 June 1898, vol. 1, pp. 1-114, Ellis County Clerk's 
Office, Arnett, Oklahoma; Mrs. Owen w. Lentz, local 
historian, assisted in finding these records. 
184 
percent of the money. 22 In Sumner County, Kansas, for 1897 
producers borrowed $218,155 on cattle, of which $122,195, or 
56 percent, came from the commission merchants. Only 
$86,001, or 39 percent, came from local sources. 
Unidentified lenders supplied the remaining 5 percent of the 
capita1. 23 
Comparing the size of loans made by local sources with 
those made by the commission firms reflects the importance 
of the commission merchants in financing the cattle trade in 
capital poor areas. In Day County, if a cattle rancher had 
substantial financial requirements, he had to utilize 
outside financing. The local banks could only loan an 
average of $724 to a rancher. Use of a commission firm in 
Kansas City could increase a ranchers potential capital 
eight times. The average loan made by a commission merchant 
in Day County was $5,673. In Roberts and sumner Counties 
the figures were less striking, but nevertheless 
significant. The commission firms loaned two times as much 
as the local sources. In Roberts County the average size of 
a loan was $7,060, while the local banks loaned an average 
of $3,452. In Sumner County, the Kansas City Commission 
firms loaned $3,302 on the average, while the local banks 
loaned $1,720. 
22 chattel Mortgage Register, 11 January-5 December 
1900, Roberts County Clerk's Office, Miami, Texas. 
23 chattel Mortgage Register, 1 January 1897-30 December 
1897, val. 27-28, Sumner County Register of Deeds, Winfield, 
Kansas. 
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The commission firms also gave the producers better 
terms on the money borrowed in two out of the three 
counties. In Day County, the firms granted 2.1 months 
longer on money borrowed: 6.2 months compared with 4.1 
months for local banks. In Sumner County, the commission 
firms granted livestock producers 1.9 months longer than 
local sources, while in Roberts County, there was no 
difference in the terms, 5.5 months granted livestock 
producers between the outside financing and local capital. 
In all three counties the largest loans carne from 
commission firms at Kansas City. In Day County the firm of 
Offutt, Elmore & Cooper loaned $10,665 for 9 rnonths; 24 ; in 
Sumner County, Fish, Tower & Doyle loaned $15,000 for 3 
rnonths; 25 in Roberts County the Kansas City Livestock 
Commission Company loaned $29,183 for 6 rnonths. 26 
One striking pattern concerning the financing of cattle 
in the Panhandle of Texas emerges from a study of the 
chattel mortgage records. The Emporia National Bank of 
Emporia, Kansas, loaned more money to cattle raisers in 
Roberts County, Texas, than any single bank, in or outside 
of the county. In 1900 it loaned $64,706, or 16 percent of 
all money loaned. This reflected an important pattern in 
24Day County Real and Chattel Mortgage Register, 20 
October 1897, vol. 1, p. 79, Ellis County Clerk's Office, 
Arnett, Oklahoma. 
25chattel Mortgage Register, 23 July 1897, vol. 27, 
Sumner County Register of Deeds, Winfield, Kansas. 
26chattel Mortgage Register, 31 October 1900, Roberts 
County Clerk's Office, Miami, Texas. 
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the livestock trade of the Southwest. The Flint Hills 
ranchers around Emporia looked to the Panhandle of Texas for 
feeder steers. These ranchers grazed the Panhandle steers 
on the grasses of eastern Kansas, and then shipped them to 
market. Thus the Panhandle ranchers got special treatment 
from Emporia. The Emporia National Bank appears to have 
given cattle producers the longest terms of any financing 
institution. It never stipulated the terms of the loan in 
the chattel mortgage records, but the date the loan was paid 
off was always 12 months after the loan was made. This bank 
granted Texas ranchers twice the time to pay back a loan 
than the 5.5 months required by other financial sources in 
the county. 27 
The chattel mortgage records from Day, Sumner, and 
Roberts Counties also helped to answer questions concerning 
competition among any number of commission firms operating 
in local areas. With obvious limitations, the record 
reflects that competition in the trade, was generally 
dominated by one or two commission firms. However, it was 
rare that the same commission firm was dominant in all six 
counties. 
cattle producers had the widest choice of commission 
firms in Sumner County. In 1900, there were 10 commission 
firms from Kansas City supplying funds on cattle, but two 
firms were the most active. Fish, Tower & Dial controlled 
27chattel Mortgage Register, 30 April, 12 May, 27 July, 
3, 19 October, 7, 14 November, 5 December 1900, Ibid. 
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39 percent of the trade in Sumner County; Siegel & Sanders 
had 31 percent; eight other firms competed for the remaining 
30 percent of the trade. 
In Roberts County the pattern was similar. Whereas 
there were five commission firms operating in the county 
from 1897 to 1901, Tamblyn Live Stock Commission Company 
financing 43 percent of the contracts. seven commission 
firms operated in Day County, but Offutt, Elmore & Cooper 
conducted 69 percent of the business. Drumm & Flato loaned 
20 percent of the funds with three loans, one of which was 
in the amount of $40,373. The largest amount loaned by 
Offutt, Elmore & Cooper was $21,232. 
Although a limited sample, the chattel mortgage records 
of the six counties suggest that a pattern existed in the 
trade. In the early 1870s and early 1880s the primary 
sources of capital were local. The commission firms 
infrequently loaned money in the 1880s and early 1890s, if 
at all. They entered the field vigorously only in 1897. 
After 1902 the banks and cattle loan companies replaced the 
commission firms as a source of outside capital. 
The records of the Kansas City Livestock Exchange 
substantiate this pattern. Before 1897 there was little 
mention of financing cattle. The only question that came 
before the Board of Directors from 1886 to 1897 concerned 
the liability of stolen cattle that were also mortgaged. 
The courts decided that any sale of stolen mortgaged cattle 
was the liability of the commission firm, placing the Kansas 
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city commission firms at considerable risk. It was 
impossible to tell if a load of cattle was stolen, and even 
more difficult to determine if the cattle were mortgaged. 
So the Exchange passed resolutions and offered rewards for 
the conviction of persons sending mortgaged cattle through 
the stockyards. The dilemma was resolved in 1898 when the 
Kansas Supreme Court ruled that commission merchants were 
not liable for stolen cattle. 28 
After 1897 Exchange records reflect considerable 
involvement of commission merchants in livestock finance. 
For the Board of Directors this involvement generally meant 
adjudication of disputes involving members of the Exchange 
and efforts to provide protection for offended parties. For 
example, in 1899, the commission merchant W. H. McCallister 
of Kansas City arranged a loan for James Brody of Lebanon, 
Kansas. McCallister endorsed or guaranteed payment of the 
note and discounted it with the Painesville National Bank of 
Painesville, Ohio. When the note came due, Brody sent a 
check for $2,500 to McCallister in Kansas City as full 
payment. McCallister, however, failed to transfer the 
funds to the Painesville National Bank. on 13 June 1900, 
James Brody applied to the Directors of the Kansas City Live 
Stock Exchange for assistance. The Painesville National 
Bank brought a legal suit against James Brody for payment of 
the note. It was discovered that McCallister had endorsed 
28Minutes of the Board of Directors, 31 January 1889, 3 
February, 21 November 1892, 7 July 1897, vol. 3, RKCLE 
(Microcopy Collection 158) 
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the note, but it was meaningless--he had no financial 
capital and was bankrupt. The Kansas City Live Stock 
Exchange tried the case and found McCallister guilty of 
dishonorable and uncommercial conduct and expelled him from 
the Exchange. Sadly, the case demonstrated that the weak 
link in transferring capital from the East to the West often 
was the commission merchant. 29 
That fact was demonstrated as well in the case of 
McKee, Zook & Whitford. This firm misapplied money on four 
notes. The first note, dated 25 February 1901 and due on 25 
October 1901, was made by Aaron H. Marton of Toronto, Kansas 
for $534.60. Marton sent $300 to Kansas City to be applied 
against the note, but McKee, Zook & Whitford failed to do 
so. Another note was from F. M. Vermullion of Lemonville, 
Missouri for $2,999, while two others were from J. H. 
Hutchinson & J. R. McQuigg of Grand, Oklahoma Territory for 
$2,174 and $1,029. All of these producers sent money into 
McKee, Zook & Whitford, but the money was not applied to the 
notes assigned to banks in the East. 30 
The Board of Directors tried the case against McKee, 
Zook & Whitford. On 20 January 1902 it suspended the 
offending commission merchants from the Exchange until the 
misapplied funds had been properly credited. The suspension 
notice appeared on the bulletin board of the Exchange and 
29Trial of W. H. McCallister, 6 August 1900, vel. 4, 
Ibid. 
30Minutes of the Board of Directors, 11 August 1902, 
Ibid. 
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the members refused to handle any of the live stock coming 
into the Kansas City Stockyards consigned to McKee, Zook & 
Whitford. Josia Baker, a salesman for the firm, later paid 
the Exchange 20 percent of the misapplied funds. The Board 
erased his name from the names of the suspended members and 
reinstated him to full privileges. The other merchants left 
the commission business. 31 
In sum, the Kansas City livestock commission merchants 
were essential in financing cattle in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. Although commission firms 
financed some of the trade before 1897, it was unusual. 
After that date commission firms financed from 50 to 90 
percent of the trade in local areas of the Southwest. After 
1902 they lost the opportunity to finance the trade to 
larger banks in urban areas and the cattle loan companies. 
The Kansas City Live Stock Exchange regulated this activity 
as a watchdog agency. When shippers or other commission 
firms protested of unfair dealings on the part of a member 
of the Exchange, the organization brought corrective 
pressure to bear upon the offending member. 
Although chattel mortgage records leave the picture 
still incomplete, the correspondence of the officers of the 
Wichita Cattle Loan Company illustrates further the process 
of financing the cattle industry. 
31Trial of McKee, Zook & Whitford, 20 January 1902, 5 
March 1902, Ibid. 
CHAPTER XI 
THE WICHITA CATTLE LOAN COMPANY 
The Wichita Cattle Loan Company financed cattle in the 
Southwest much like the livestock commission merchants in 
Kansas city. The cattle Loan Company secured short-term 
funds on cattle in the West and sold the cattle paper to 
eastern banks. Both cattle loan companies and commission 
merchants were transition institutions in the development of 
the Southwest from frontier to commercial agriculture. Both 
provided needed financial services to cattle producers, 
although they were soon replaced by more competitive 
financial institutions as the region developed 
economically. I 
While no papers or correspondence of a Kansas City 
commission firm survived over the decades, those of the 
Wichita Cattle Loan Company did. The latter gave a rather 
complete picture--albeit indirect--of the financial 
activities of commission merchants. Additionally, they 
explain in much greater detail the processing of cattle 
1see u. s. Federal Reserve, Bulletin, Cattle Loan 
Companies, October 1922, val. 8, p. 1171, for the connection 
between financing between livestock commission firms and 
cattle loan companies. 
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paper out of the Southwest, why commission merchants 
supplied funds in capital scarce areas, the changing nature 
of the cattle business, and why the cattle industry was so 
difficult to finance. 2 
The Wichita Cattle Loan Company was one of many loan 
companies organized from the 1890s to the 1910s in the 
nation's livestock market centers. The Wichita Company 
formed in 1910 to make the Wichita, Kansas, market 
competitive in relationship to Kansas City. The president 
of the loan company explained to an official of a Chicago 
bank in 1913 that 
Within the last 60 days our Bank and Loan Company 
influenced the shipping of at least 4,000 head of 
cattle to Wichita that would not have come here were it 
not for our operations. 3 
The Union Stock Yards National Bank in Wichita owned 
the Loan Company; the officers of the two were identical. 
The bank created the loan company to get around the 
restrictions placed upon a national bank. Unlike a national 
bank, a loan company could loan an unlimited amount of money 
to any one lender. And it did not have a reserve 
requirement. The loan company was not a permanent 
institution. Indeed, the officers planned to use it only 
2correspondence, 1911-1918, Wichita Cattle Loan 
Company, Union Stock Yards, Wichita, Kansas. 
3J. F. Ebersole, "Cattle Loan Banks," Journal of 
Political Economy 22 (June 1914) :577-580; F. T. Ransom to F. 
H. Rawson, Union Trust Co, Chicago, Illinois, 15 November 
1913, Correspondence, 1911-1918, Wichita cattle Loan 
Company, Union Stock Yards, Wichita, Kansas. 
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until the reserves of the Union Stock Yards National Bank 
were adequate to cover all loans. 
This arrangement was common among stockyards banks in 
the early twentieth century, as the chattel mortgage records 
in Wallace County, Kansas illustrate. The Interstate 
National Bank of Kansas City, Missouri loaned $30,292 on 26 
September 1913 to a rancher in Sharon Springs, Kansas. The 
rancher needed another $20,800, but the extra funds were in 
excess of the limitations placed on the Interstate. So the 
officials at the Interstate National Bank simply loaned the 
extra money through the loan company created for that 
purpose. On the same date as the first transaction (26 
September 1913), the Interstate Cattle Loan Company loaned 
the extra $20,800 to the same rancher. In this manner, the 
Kansas City Bank remained competitive in the cattle trade in 
the Southwest. 4 
Officials in Wichita found that producers preferred the 
Kansas City market over the Wichita market because the 
Interstate National Bank and the Interstate Cattle Loan 
Company provided short term money on their livestock. When 
financial institutions in Kansas City were loaned up, the 
producers sought assistance from the commission merchants in 
Kansas City, such as Andrew Drumm or the Clay, Robinson & 
4chattel Mortgage Register, 26 September 1913, Wallace 
County Register of Deeds, Sharon Springs, Kansas. 
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Co. So to establish a competitive market in Wichita, 
officials in the stockyards created a cattle loan company. 5 
The two principals in the Wichita Cattle Loan Company 
were the President F. T. Ransom and the Cudahy Packing 
Company. The Cudahy family owned 25 percent of the stock in 
the Loan Company, but they did not control it. The share 
Ransom controlled was not clear. The Cudahy Packing Co. 
used the Cattle Loan Company to attract a supply of 
livestock to their Wichita plant. Previous to this time, 
the stock trains passed through Wichita without stopping, 
with the trade following the credit channels. The Cudahy 
competitors in Kansas City--Armour, Swift, and Morris--drew 
the supply of livestock away from Wichita. 6 
F. T. Ransom became the President of the Wichita Cattle 
Loan Company and the Union Stockyards National Bank on 24 
May 1910. Ransom was an experienced loan officer in the 
cattle business. He started loaning money on cattle at the 
Tootle-Lemon National Bank in St. Joseph, Missouri, and then 
moved to the National Stockyards National Bank in St. Louis, 
before arriving at Wichita. 7 He had an uneasy relationship 
5Ransom to D. A. Siegfried, Boatman National Bank, 22 
November 1910, Correspondence, 1911-1918, Wichita Cattle 
Loan Company, Union Stock Yards, Wichita, Kansas. 
6Ransom to M. R. Sturtevant, Central National Bank, St. 
Louis, Missouri, 15 September 1911, Ibid.; Ransom to F. H. 
Rawson, Union Trust Co., Chicago, Illinois, 15 November 
1913, Ibid. 
· 7Ransom to G. C. Lacy, Tootle-Lemon National Bank, St. 
Joseph, Missouri, 2 November 1917, Ibid; Ransom to A. T. 
Collier, National Shawmut Bank, Boston, Massachusetts, 7 
Jqne 1911, Ibid. 
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with the Cudahy Packing Company, the character of which he 
described to a close friend in Pennsylvania: 
. . . there is going to be a real great time at our 
next Board meeting (10 April 1917), three times within 
the past 7 years I have built up an organization here 
and have had it wrecked by the butting in of the Cudahy 
interests, trying to run a bank as they would a packing 
house. Either they sell to me or I sell to them 
because I do n~t intend to fool my life away under such 
circumstances. 
Ransom won the control of the loan company in 1917, but 
it had served its purpose. The following year it ceased to 
exist. In 1918 the Federal Reserve Bank in Kansas City 
began to rediscount the notes from the Union Stockyards 
National Bank, relieving one need of the latter to seek 
funds from eastern banks. The Bank was able to handle all 
of the loan business without the assistance of a loan 
company. 9 
If the Cudahy Packing Company or F. T. Ransom formed 
the Wichita Cattle Loan Company for profit, they were sorely 
disappointed. The years 1915 and 1917 should have been 
profitable years for any cattle-related institution. The 
"golden age" of agriculture, they were the years livestock 
prices escalated due to the war in Europe. But a vice 
president of the loan company wrote in January 1916: 
During the last six months of 1914 we carried an 
average of over $1 million of paper, never lost a 
dollar on account of bad loans, and yet our profits for 
those 6 months were $684.00. We could have carried 1/3 
8Ransom to C. F. Shaw, Fourth Street National Bank, 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 31 March 1917, Ibid. 
9"Proceeds to Your Credit," Federal Reserve Bank, 
Kansas City, Missouri, 6, 19 June 1918, Ibid. 
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the volume we did and have made a considerable profit, 
but we preferred to pay as high as 8 percent in order 
to take care gf our business, and there was no 
competition. 1 
Ransom himself apologized to the National City Bank of New 
York city for the poor showing: "you will observe that we 
paid no dividends in 1917 on account of the heavy loss of 
the Wichita Horse and Mule Auction Commission Company.n11 
The method of operation for the the Wichita Cattle Loan 
Company was essentially the same as the livestock commission 
firms at Kansas City. The Loan Company re-discounted the 
excess and surplus notes of the Union Stockyards National 
Bank in capital intensive areas of the United States. These 
cattle notes were similar to commercial paper, except the 
collateral was livestock. Ransom sent most of the Wichita 
cattle paper to the National City Bank and Liberty National 
Bank of New York City, or the Continental & Commercial 
National Bank of Chicago. The Loan Company also re-
discounted notes at the National Shawmut Bank, and First and 
Second National Banks of Boston, the Central National Bank 
and the Boatman National Bank of St. Louis, and the Union 
Trust Company of Chicago.12 
The Wichita Cattle Loan Company had considerable 
advantage over a commission firm. It was able to guarantee 
10vice President to Glen Woods, Newton, Kansas, 29 
January 1916, Ibid. 
11Ransom to Thos A. Reynolds, National City Bank, New 
York City, New York, 22 April 1918, Ibid. 
12Ransom to F. H Rawson, Union Trust Co, Chicago, 
Illinois, 15 November 1913, Ibid. 
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the cattle paper it sold in the East. An endorsement by a 
commission firm rarely meant anything, unless it was Andrew 
Drumm or Clay, Robinson & Co, for the commission merchants 
had little equity. 
Although it procured cattle paper from 80 country banks 
in Oklahoma, Texas, New Mexico, and Kansas, the Wichita firm 
did not handle the paper unless the local bank endorsed and 
guaranteed it. When President Ransom sold notes to eastern 
banks, the Wichita cattle Loan Company also endorsed it. He 
explained to F. c. Waite of the Merchants National Bank in 
Boston: "we absolutely guarantee the payment of these notes 
in your bank at maturity.n 1 3 
The process that a rancher or farmer had to go through 
to secure a loan through Ransom was rigorous. He wrote in 
November 1913 that the Wichita firm extended credit only to 
"cattlemen and farmers of unquestioned financial standing 
and credit." That specifically excluded tenant farmers, for 
Ransom did not loan to anyone who did not own land. Indeed 
"we do not loan to renters no matter what the security," he 
declared. 14 
According to Ransom, the loan company took a chattel 
mortgage sufficient to pay the loan at its maturity as 
security for the credit advanced to the producer. The 
13Ransom to v. R. Thayer, Merchants National Bank, 
Boston, Massachusetts, 15 May 1914, Ibid; Ransom to F. C. 
Waite, Merchants National Bank, Boston, Massachusetts, 1 
April 1914, Ibid. 
14Ransom to F. H. Rawson, Union Trust Co, Chicago, 
Illinois, 15 November 1913, Ibid. 
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company required a financial statement from the borrower, 
and Ransom obtained from the Register of Deeds or County 
Clerk an abstract of all the relevant chattel mortgages on 
file in the county where the producer lived. Although these 
loans were based primarily upon the integrity of the maker 
and were good without any security, Ransom took a chattel 
mortgage simply as a "form of segregation of a part of the 
farmers' assets to insure the liquidation of the loan at 
maturity.n 15 
Two examples illustrate the type of producer to whom 
the Wichita cattle Loan Company loaned money. c. D. Leonard 
lived north of Saxman, Kansas and was one of the Saxman 
State Bank's better customers. Leonard owned 1,300 acres of 
the "best land in this county" and $10,000 worth of personal 
property. He was 60 years old in 1917 and had lived near 
Saxman for "the past 30-40 years." The Saxman State Bank 
had loaned Leonard $2,100--"which is nearly our limit," 
wrote the cashier--he needed additional funds to purchase 
corn for his livestock. Leonard owed "a little on a part of 
his land, but very little considering the value." The 
Saxman state Bank had always accepted Leonard's notes 
unsecured and was anxious to "take care of our good 
customers even if they want more than the bank can handle." 
The bank urged the Wichita cattle Loan Company to handle 
Leornard's note for additional funds. Ransom was happy to 
15Ibid. 
handle this cattle paper, although as security he also 
executed a chattel mortgage on Leonard's cattle. 16 
The second example of a producer worthy of a loan 
involved a cattle speculator by the name of Thompson in 
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Mooreland, Oklahoma. According to Ransom Thompson expected 
to buy livestock in February and sell them in March or 
April. In the vicinity of Mooreland "there have been two 
successive crop failures and a number of small farmers are 
pretty hard up for cash." These small farmers had various 
types of stock which Thompson wanted to buy "back 5 to 20 
miles off the railroad." He then planned to hold them until 
the demand for "grass cattle" began to rise. In the 
meantime, he had "plenty of rough feed and a rail car load 
of cotton seed cake to round them out." With regard to 
collateral, Ransom wrote: 
As far as the land is concerned, Thompson is willing to 
make a Quit Claim Deed to be held as additional 
security. Besides that each of his notes would be 
endorsed by J. c. Krauth, of Mooreland, Oklahoma. 
Krauth is worth only about $12,000, and I have his 
endorsement on $6,000 worth of paper so I do not 
consider that his endorsement would add much in the way 
of financial strength, but it does add considerable 
when you know that he right on the spot watching things 
and that his record is A-1. Krauth came from Iowa and 
I traced him there and found that his reputation was of 
the best and he has mai~tained it while in the banking 
business at Mooreland. 
The Wichita cattle Loan Company employed an "inspector" 
to assess loan qualifications and to insure repayment. Such 
16o. L. Cully, Cashier, Saxman State Bank, Saxman, 
Kansas to Ransom, 7 February 1917, Ibid. 
17Ransom to D. A. Siegfried, Cashier, Boatman National 
Bank, St. Louis, Missouri, 7 January 1918, Ibid. 
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an office existed in Kansas City livestock commission firms, 
although a paucity of records leave the duties assigned to 
the position unclear. The activities of the inspectors or 
loan agents of the cattle Loan Company, however help to 
clarify those responsibilities. 
First, loan agents evaluated the collateral offered by 
those seeking to borrow money. J. L. Pryor, Vice President 
of the Union Stock Yards National Bank, wrote to J. T. 
Wheeler in Des Moines, New Mexico to ask him to serve in 
that capacity. A New Mexico rancher near Des Moines, Bruce 
Gentry, applied to the Wichita Cattle Loan Company for "a 
loan of $2,200 on 65 head of cows," a herd that Pryor wanted 
Wheeler to inspect before the loan was made. For his 
services Pryor promised Wheeler $5 a day and expenses as 
well as keeping Wheeler's own loans at 8 percent. Although 
interest rates had gone up 1 percent, "we will continue your 
loan at the old rate," Pryor wrote, "if you will help us a 
little with loans of these kind there." But he added 
"please do not recommend anyone to us unless you know him to 
be absolutely A-1 and a land owner. 1118 
Second, inspectors for the Wichita Cattle Loan Company 
checked on the "progress" of loans already made, especially 
in areas close to Wichita. When the Mechanic American 
National Bank in St. Louis wanted an update on some notes it 
had purchased on cattle in Oklahoma in 1913, the Wichita 
18J. L. Pryor, Vice President, Wichita Cattle Loan 
Company, to J. T. Wheeler, Des Moines, New Mexico, 4 
December 1917, Ibid. 
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firm provided it with confidence. The loans in question 
involved stock in Blaine and Dewey counties, Oklahoma, where 
the firm itself held paper valued at $40,000. Most of this 
amount had been endorsed by F. C. Hoyt, President of the 
Union State Bank in Wichita and of the First National Bank 
at seiling, Oklahoma. Moreover, loan inspector L. M. Hyre 
had recently been in the area for an entire week checking 
over every loan "even down to as low as $100." Hyre had not 
made a single unfavorable report. 
"Progress" inspections were generally very thorough. 
On one L. M. Hyre found all of the 177 cattle mortgaged by 
F. L. Fenton accounted for, as well as all of the hogs, 
horses, and mules described in the loan. In addition to the 
security, Fenton had from $3,000 to $4,000 in personal 
property, 160 acres of "good bottom land" (on which there 
was a mortgage of $2,000), and another 160 acres clear. 
Inspector Hyre reported that Fenton was in good credit 
standing locally as well as regionally. His farm "gave 
every evidence of thrift and good management.nl9 
The Leonard and Thompson transactions in addition to 
the rigorous inspections reflected the conservative lending 
practices of the Wichita Cattle Loan Company. Marginal 
borrowers could not obtain funds. The latter class usually 
turned to livestock commission firms, a fact that accounts 
for why 89 percent of the Day county in western Oklahoma 
19J. L. Pryor to Frank 0. Hicks, Mechanic National 
Bank, St. Louis, Missouri, 23 September 1913, Ibid. 
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turned to commission merchants for money. As President 
Ransom wrote in 1917: 
In the development of a new country, capital is a 
scarce article. It will be some time before banks in 
this new section will be in a position to supply funds 
to properly take care of the demand. 20 
Prudent financial institutions had good reason to be 
skeptical of conditions in Oklahoma. That state "would 
absorb the whole output of the United States mint if it 
could get a hold of it." Ransom declared because 
"speculators and boomers" had settled Oklahoma, he had "been 
fighting shy of Oklahoma loans unless they have a strong 
local endorsement." Kansas had gone through the same stage, 
but it "had settled down to a legitimate farming and cattle 
business." They made money from their efforts but in 
Oklahoma "this is entirely a side issue." According to the 
Wichita banker, "increase in values is what Oklahomans are 
looking for, and from this more than their own industry, 
they expect to obtain their own profit." Ransom believed it 
took a good banker "right on the ground" to tell the 
difference between a legitimate farmer and a speculator. 21 
To Ransom F. M. Overstreet, President of the Bank of 
Cherokee in Cherokee, Oklahoma, was not such a banker. 
Overstreet had hoped to use the Wichita Bank to help 
cattlemen in Northwest Oklahoma to develop their business. 
20Ransom to R. L. Templeton, Austin, Texas, 29 March 
1917, Ibid. 
21Ransom to D. A. Siegfried, Boatman National Bank, 12 
December 1910, Ibid. 
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He was rebuffed by Ransom who instructed him "permit your 
customers to buy only a few head .•.. 1122 The Cherokee banker 
had no alternative but to turn elsewhere. As he explained 
it to his Wichita antagonist: 
You cut us off on the loans. That caused us no little 
amount of trouble, as you know. I remember that you 
said you could take care of us for most any amount we 
would want. The only condition was that we pay 6 
percent and keep an amount on deposit in your bank 
equal to one half of the amount of paper given to you. 
on this basis we promised our people cattle money. All 
at once you cut us off and would not even renew the 
paper you already had out. Because of our promise to 
them to renew their notes, we fell back on the 
commission men, rather than disappoint them, and lose 
their business, or co~~el them to sell their cattle at 
a loss to themselves. 
Oklahoma producers had to pay a higher interest on 
loans than Kansas bankers. In 1911 E. A. Cudahy asked why 
the Wichita Cattle Loan Company charged Kansas banks 8 
percent and the Oklahoma banks 10 percent or more. 
Suspecting the conservative Wichita banker might prevent 
shipments to the Cudahy packing plant from a large cattle 
producing country, he wrote: 
I note that the Continental Bank charged you 4 to 5 
percent, and I think you ought to have at least a rate 
that would not exceed over half of one percent. 24 
22Ransom to F. M. Overstreet, Bank of Cherokee, 
Cherokee, Oklahoma, 21 September 1914, Ibid. 
23 F. M. Overstreet, Bank of Cherokee, Cherokee Oklahoma 
to J. M. Reynolds, 8 December 1914, Ibid. 
24Edward A. Cudahy, Cudahy Packing Company, Omaha, 
Nebraska to Ransom, 23 May 1911, Ibid. 
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Ransom replied that the interest rate in Oklahoma was based 
"to some extent on the security, but largely on the ability 
of the local banker to obtain whatever rate he asks.n25 
J. L. Pryor, vice president of the Union Stock Yards 
National Bank and the Wichita cattle Loan Company 
recommended that the Interstate National Bank of Kansas City 
stay out of Oklahoma. Also the president of the Bank of 
Shattuck in Ellis, Oklahoma, Pryor advised that the 
conditions in western Oklahoma were bad. There had been a 
wheat failure in 1917 "and the banks there are on the bum 
and are borrowing a lot of money." Country banks in 
Oklahoma would not have any balances until after harvest in 
1918. But, Pryor cautioned, "it is dry down there now and 
we may not have a wheat crop there next year.n26 
The Wichita banker was also uneasy about the social 
unrest in western Oklahoma. The cashier of the Bank of 
Shattuck had just written: 
••• there is some excitement here today. The other day 
our city officials arrested a socialist preacher, and 
now there are about a hundred socialists here to get 
him, so t~;y say. However, so far they have not done 
anything. 
The activities of the Wichita Cattle Loan Company 
reflected the changing nature of cattle finance. As 
25Ransom to E. A. Cudahy, Cudahy Packing Company, 
Chicago, Illinois, 31 May 1911, Ibid. 
26Pryor toM. J. Heeling, Interstate National Bank, 
Kansas City, Missouri, 24 October 1917, Ibid. 
27w. H. Lathman, Cashier, Bank of Shattuck, Shattuck, 
Oklahoma to Pryor, 2 August 1917, Ibid. 
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indicated, its officers believed that only bankers familiar 
with the producer made good decisions on credit. Generally 
loaning money depended upon the operations of specific 
cattlemen, the economic conditions of the area, and the 
extent of disease. It was difficult, Ransom observed to M. 
R. Sturtevant of the Central National Bank, at st. Louis in 
1911, to generalize about cattle loans unless the banker 
knew the man and how he operated. Several customers, he 
reported, bought nothing but yearling steers "of the very 
highest quality." Ransom loaned them the purchase price of 
the cattle; the cattlemen fed the stock 4-6 months; and the 
herd was then marketed as "baby beef." Other cattlemen 
operated differently, yet were excellent credit risks. 
Three farmers bought only the "cheap class of old cows and 
castoffs," and fed cattle continually from 90 to 120 days. 
Since one buys cattle before one feeds them, they had silos 
and molasses mills, and their profits were "remarkable. 1128 
The financing of cattle also depended upon the 
availability of grain. The Wichita company always 
anticipated a heavy demand for money in the fall of the 
year, but the success of the grain crop determined how the 
money would be used. If there was a poor corn crop, there 
would be an abundance of rough food, in which case the 
demand would be for young cattle. On the other hand, if 
28Ransom to M. R. Sturtevant, Central National Bank, 
St. Louis, 15 September 1911, Ibid. 
there was a good grain crop, there would be considerable 
demand for two and three year old steers. 29 
The availability of wheat also dictated loaning 
conditions. In 1914 the wheat crop in Kansas was good. 
Awaiting a rise in price, farmers stored their grain and 
took out loans to meet expenses. In December 1914 the 
country banks had to borrow money from the Wichita Cattle 
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Loan Company to meet customer demands. Shortly the price of 
wheat rose, the farmers sold their grain, and paid off their 
loans. So the demand for credit was very light by February 
1915. Consequently, country banks in Kansas requested 
short-term cattle paper in which to invest their excess 
funds. 30 But a "tremendous feed crop" produced in the 
summer a changed credit picture. The country banks 
experienced a strong demand for credit to buy cattle and 
quickly were loaned up again. This condition caused the 
Wichita Cattle Loan Company to sell cattle paper in st. 
Louis. 31 
Other factors than the availability of grain affected 
the credit picture. Some farmers moved wheat to the 
railroads in November 1915 because of an increase in wheat 
prices. But so many of the farmers in the area tried to 
29Ransom to E. A. Cudahy, Cudahy Packing Company, 
Chicago, Illinois, 19 July 1913, Ibid. 
30vice President to Jefferson Park National Bank, 
Chicago, Illinois, 1 February 1915, Ibid. 
31vice President to R. s. Haines, Third National Bank, 
St. Louis, Missouri, 22 October 1915, Ibid. 
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sell their wheat at the same time that there was a "rail car 
famine." Since farmers could not get their wheat to market, 
they asked the banks for extensions of 30 to 60 days. This 
dried up the money available for cattle loans. 32 
But other farmers did just the opposite. J. L. Pryor 
declared: 
• • . the recent rise in the price of wheat will shut 
off the shipping entirely because it appears to be an 
iron clad rule of the farmers never to sell on a rising 
market for fear that they may not get the top price. 
They generally wait until the high point has been 
passed, and then rush in on a falling market.3 3 
The quarantining of cattle also interfered with 
financing. The Commercial & Continental Bank of Chicago 
bought a note through the Wichita Cattle Loan Company from 
H. K. Frederick & Co of Mulvane, Kansas for $9,482 in 1915. 
The Chicago bank inquired as to why the note was not paid on 
time. Wichita parties reported that the Frederick cattle 
had been exposed to foot and mouth disease by registered 
Holstein cows imported from Wisconsin. Subsequently 
veterinarians from the Bureau of Animal Industry had placed 
them, along with other herds in a 12 square mile tract, in 
quarantine. After the herds were cleared, preventive 
isolation ceased and the Frederick cattle were marketed. 
The Chicago bank was paid. Even the ewers of the 
slaughtered cattle were compensated by the state of Kansas 
and the United states government. 
32vic$ President to c. H. Dwinnell, First National 
Bank, Boston, Massachusetts, 13 November 1915, Ibid. 
33Ibid., 15 November 1915. 
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The activities of the Wichita Cattle Loan Company 
illustrate much about the financing of the cattle trade in 
the Southwest. They give considerable insight into the 
actual processing of the chattel mortgage and cattle paper, 
and they help explain why areas like Oklahoma frequently 
relied upon financing by the commission merchants. Finally, 
they demonstrate that each particular area had its own needs 
for capital and that the availability of wheat or corn 
substantially affected those credit needs. Also that 
animals were alive made them susceptible to contagious 
diseases which could slow payment on notes. 
CHAPTER XII 
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRENDS 
In the twentieth century, the Kansas City Live Stock 
Exchange entered a new era. By 1900, it had won the right 
to regulate the middlemen in the livestock trade of the 
Southwest. There were no new organizational innovations 
within the Exchange from 1900 to 1921, but there were new 
trends in the livestock trade in general. The packers began 
bypassing the Stockyards and buying their requirements 
directly from the country. The shippers organized more 
effectively and increased pressure upon the national 
government to declare the stockyards a "public market." 
The important change was not political, it was 
technological. The invention of the internal combustion 
engine, and its application to the transportation of live 
animals in the form of the motor carrier, brought a second 
organizational revolution in the livestock trade. The motor 
truck freed the livestock industry from dependency upon the 
railroad, and the ancillary organizations which evolved 
because of it, e.g. the livestock commission merchant and 
the livestock exchange. In the 1920s, the Kansas City 
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stockyards declined in influence as the trade decentralized 
in the Southwest. 
The first indication of these new changes appeared in 
the records of the Kansas City Live Stock Exchange as early 
as 1896. The Fowler Packing Company opened and operated a 
stockyards on the Missouri Pacific Railroad north of the 
Kansas City stockyards; they sent circulars to the country 
and encouraged hog producers to send their stock directly to 
these "Mistletoe Stockyards." The Fowler Packing Company 
promised to pay the producer the current market price for ., 
their animals based upon the latest reports from the Kansas 
City stockyards a few hundred feet to the south. The 
circulars justified the change to the producer--it 
eliminated the middlemen. 1 
This activity alarmed the livestock commission 
merchants. Until 1896, animals marketed in and out of much 
of the Southwest went through the Kansas City Stockyards. 
The commission merchants became complacent and assumed their 
livelihood would continue. They little understood how much 
their prosperity depended upon the railroads, or that when a 
new means of transportation replaced the railroad that new 
business methods would replace their own. Through the 
organization and operations of the Live Stock Exchange they 
succeeded from 1886 to 1896 in thwarting the challenge to 
1Minutes of the Board of Directors, 28 November 1896, 
vol 3, RKCLE (Microcopy Collection 158). 
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their livelihood. Yet the motor truck brought the changes 
long sought by the grangers. 
The success of the Fowler Packing Company encouraged 
the trend away from the Kansas City market. The packers 
started going directly to the country to purchase their 
requirements. Although the Kansas City Live Stock Exchange 
took notice in September 1903, it was powerless to do 
anything about it. In February 1904, the Exchange did send 
letters to the different railroads centering at Kansas City 
asking them "to allow but one location for the unloading of 
livestock and that location to be the place commonly known 
as the Kansas City Stockyards." The railroads were all 
members of the Exchange, but they ignored the request. 2 
The receipts of livestock reported by the Kansas City 
market indicated the success of these competing operations. 
In 1904, 818,787 hogs, 37 percent of all those received went 
directly to the packer and bypassed the stockyards. The 
initial enthusiasm of the producers for this new method of 
marketing abated somewhat, for in 1914 only 21 percent of 
the hogs received went directly to the packers. 
Nevertheless, there was a definite trend away from the 
Kansas City Stockyards. 3 
The use of the motor carrier encouraged the trend of 
selling directly to the packers. The motor truck increased 
2Minutes of the Board of Directors, 7 September 1903, 
18 February 1904, vol 4, Ibid. 
3Atkinson, "Kansas City Trade," p. 181. 
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the flexibility of the producers in that they were no longer 
bound to the railroad. The clearest demonstration of the 
effect of the truck was in Iowa. In that state the number 
of hogs marketed directly to the packers increased from 32 
percent in 1920 to 49 percent in 1927. Of course every hog 
that by-passed the stockyards represented less income for 
the commission merchant. 4 
At the same time, packers shifted their operations from 
the railroad terminal markets farther into the livestock 
producing areas. Freight rates for shipments east were 
advantageous to the new interior slaughtering points, and 
direct marketing grew in popularity among the livestock 
producers. The development of livestock auction markets in 
local areas (made possible by the truck) accelerated the 
move away from terminal markets. 5 
Although the use of the motor carrier and bypassing of 
the stockyards were major changes in the distribution of 
live animals, the twentieth century also witnessed a rise in 
cooperative organizations. These too trimmed the business 
of the commission merchants. In 1915, U. S. Secretary of 
Agriculture D. F. Houston saw "cooperation" as the "new 
4country Gentlemen, 25 September 1915; Paul L. Miller, 
"Direct Packer Buying in the Marketing 9f Livestock," 
Journal of Farm Economics 9 (April 1929):287. 
5u. S. Department of Agriculture, Marketing Research 
Division, Research Report 223, Livestock Auction Markets in 
the United States (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1958), p. 5; u. s. Department of Agriculture, Marketing 
Research Division, Report 299, Livestock Terminal Markets in 
the United States (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1979), p. 2. 
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faith" of American farmers. The Secretary counted 7,500 
organizations in the nation which, he said, were "more or 
less cooperative." These included 2,500 cooperative 
elevators, 2,500 cooperative creameries, and more than 1,000 
cooperative fruit and produce associations. 6 
In the livestock trade, cooperative shipping 
organizations and livestock commission agencies organized 
and attained considerable success in the early twentieth 
century. But it is possible to overemphasize the 
cooperative "faith" among agrarians: American livestock 
producers cooperated with each other because it was good 
business, not because it was ideologically sound. The first 
cooperative shipping associations were, for example, the 
cattlemen's associations organized in the late 1860s and 
early 1870s. The nature of the range cattle business forced 
the cattle raisers to cooperate. That the range steer was 
mobile, and there were no fences on the ranges, insured that 
cattle raisers cooperated in controlling the movement of 
livestock. The cattlemen's associations won concessions 
from the railroads on freight rates because of their united 
efforts. 7 
6Missouri, State Board of Agriculture, Yearbook of 
Agriculture. 1915, pp. 81-82. 
7Ernest s. Osgood, The Day of the Cattlemen 
{Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1929), pp. 
114-115; William w. Savage, Jr., The Cherokee Strip 
Livestock Association: Federal Regulation and the 
Cattlemen's Last Frontier (Columbia: University of Missouri 
Press, 1973), p. 8. 
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The first cooperative shipping association in hogs 
began in 1884 in Superior, Nebraska. The Farmers' Shipping 
Association started when 92 farmers banded together and 
eliminated the cost of the shipper. In their first year of 
business, the association shipped 39 cars to market and made 
$92,537. Prior to shipping stock in this manner, the owners 
sold their animals to the local buyer or shipper. A single 
hog farmer rarely had enough animals to fill a rail car, and 
consequently, freight rates were prohibitive. By shipping 
the stock to market cooperatively, the producers minimized 
transportation costs and sold their hogs in a competitive 
market rather than a local market monopolized by the 
shippers. 8 
Despite these early precedents, cooperative shipping 
associations only organized on a large scale after the turn 
of the century. The first cooperative organization for 
shipping livestock in Minnesota organized in 1908; by 1916 
there were 200 organizations in the state. The first 
cooperative livestock marketing association in Missouri 
emerged in 1911. The Missouri Farm Management Association 
organized a lamb shipping club in Boone County and saved $84 
on the first carload of lambs. As important, the members 
reported, was that the local buyers in the county increased 
8successful Farming, February 1918, p. 72. 
the price they paid on hogs and operated on a narrower 
margin. 9 
Commission merchants at the Kansas City Live Stock 
Exchange began discussing cooperative shipments in 1905. 
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They noted an increasing number of shipments from shipping 
associations in the country, and that the associations 
requested the commission merchants make returns to each of 
the farmers individually, and not to the shipping 
association alone. 10 By 1919, the cooperative movement 
among shippers was well developed, and a national 
organization tied the them together. In the same year the 
National Federation of Livestock Shipping Associations 
reported over 2,000 cooperative livestock shipping 
associations: the largest number were in Minnesota (700), 
Wisconsin (600), and Iowa (400); the states reporting the 
least number were Nebraska (250), Michigan (200), and 
Illinois (60). There were no shipping associations reported 
in the cattle producing regions of the Southwest. 11 
The livestock producers organized shipping associations 
in states where dairy and hog farming prevailed. Dairy 
farmers made their livelihood from producing milk, not beef, 
9Ralph, Loomis, "Status of Cooperative Livestock 
Marketing in Missouri," Journal of Farm Economics 9 (July 
1927):142; u.s. Department of Agriculture, Farmers' 
Bulletin, no. 718, Cooperative Livestock Shipping 
Associations (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1916), p. 2. 
10Minutes of the Board of Directors, 29 November 1905, 
vol. 4, RKCLE (Microcopy Collection 158). 
11successful Farming, December 1919, p. 74. 
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and consequently, each year herds produced dairy calves 
which were of no use to the dairy farmer. There was little 
local demand for these calves, so the milk producers shipped 
them into corn or grass feeding regions. These farmers 
organized shipping associations for the same reasons the 
Farmers' Shipping Association of Superior, Nebraska did in 
1884: reduced freight rates as a result of cooperatively 
sharing the freight costs, by-passing the local buyer, and 
gaining accessibility to the more competitive markets in 
Chicago, Kansas City, or Omaha. 12 
Shipping associations also promised a higher return to 
the producer by sorting and grading the livestock before 
loading the trains bound for market. The producers learned 
this technique from the yard trader. As discussed 
previously, the yard traders began sorting and grading hogs 
and cattle in the Kansas City Stockyards in the 1880s. 
Livestock of similar grades, weights, and types brought 
higher prices on the market. The cooperative shipments 
allowed the producers to perform this function and reap the 
benefit instead of the speculator. 13 The shipping 
associations were short lived, not because the farmers lost 
the cooperative faith but because the motor truck rendered 
them less competitive. The case of Missouri illustrated 
this phenomenon. By 1921, there were 275 shipping 
12u. s. Department of Agriculture, Farmers Bulletin no. 
718, p. 1. 
13National Stockman and Farmer, 30 October 1920. 
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associations in the State. But those in counties within 
trucking distance of the livestock markets of Kansas City, 
st. Joseph, or st. Louis soon disbanded. The farmer 
preferred to truck his own produce to market. 14 
Inevitably, producers tried to organize another 
cooperative livestock commission firm similar to the 
American Live Stock Commission Company. The opportunity 
presented itself in 1906. From 1902 to 1905 commission 
merchants discussed the advisability of raising the 
commission rates on hogs and sheep. This issue caused 
heated debates within the Kansas City Live Stock Exchange, 
with many members warning that the hog and sheep producers 
would not permit it. They did not consider raising the 
price on cattle, for the commission merchants knew from 
experience the pressure the cattlemen's associations could 
bring to bear. If the cattle producers united in opposition 
to the commission merchants, along with the hog and sheep 
producers, the livestock commission merchants anticipated 
political repercussions.15 
They had good reason to want an increase in commission 
rates. The competition in the commission trade was intense 
by 1900, the prices of livestock were steadily increasing, 
the commissions on sheep had not changed since 1877, and the 
commissions on hogs were last changed in 1886. Although the 
number of commission merchants at Kansas City remained 
14Loomis, "Cooperative Marketing," pp. 143-144. 
15Johnson, "Struggle in the Stockyards," pp. 315-332. 
stable, merchants from other markets encroached upon the 
Kansas City territory and reduced the number of shipments 
per commission firm. 16 
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The increased competition created dissension among the 
merchants. One admitted "that it was a lamentable fact that 
the commission men are going around as a roaring lions 
seeking whom they may devour." He referred to the practice 
known in the trade as "body snatching." This practice of 
directors characterized as commission men who stood "in and 
about the lobbies of the Exchange, hobnobbing with 
prospective customers of other firms, and striving to 
subvert them to their own benefit." The dissension and 
determination of their position caused the board to take 
action. 17 
The merchants first considered ways to reduce their own 
costs. In these they hoped to act in concert with other 
exchanges who, like the one in Omaha, expressed interest in 
"reducing expenses of conducting the business." They 
understood that all the livestock exchanges had to act in 
unison on reducing costs or changing prices, for if one 
acted alone it would loose trade to competing markets. 18 
Thus in December 1903, in conjunction with the National Live 
Stock Exchange, the Kansas City merchants adopted the 
16Ibid., p. 318; Minutes of the Board of Directors, 15 
June 1903, vol 4, RKCLE (Microcopy Collection 158) 
17Minutes of the Exchange, 21 January 1903, Ibid. 
18Minutes of the Board of Directors, 12 January, 15 
June 1903, Ibid. 
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solicitor-telegram-meals rules. In order to reduce costs, 
they agreed to eliminate all solicitors, to refuse to pay 
for any telegrams sent or received, and to stop paying for 
the meals and lodging of feeders, buyers, or shippers while 
at Kansas City. 19 
These rules the directors of the Kansas City Exchange 
vigorously enforced. On 18 January 1904 they charged 
Campbell, Hunt & Adams with paying for and furnishing three 
livestock customers with three noonday meals. The firm 
pleaded guilty, and the board fined it $55. The rule was so 
effectively policed that hotel keepers adjacent to the 
stockyards complained about the detrimental effect it had 
upon their business and asked the board to rescind the 
restriction. 20 
Reduction of costs did not materially improve profits. 
Thus after two years of deliberation the livestock exchanges 
increased commission charges on hogs and sheep in 1905. The 
American National Livestock Association, the Wyoming Wool 
Growers Association, the Arizona Wool Growers Association, 
and the Corn Belt Meat Producers Association immediately 
complained. 21 Charging that the increased commission rates 
were "unreasonable, unwarranted, and arbitrary," producers 
19Minutes of the Board of Directors, 14 December 1903, 
Ibid. 
20Minutes of the Board of Directors, 18 January 1904, 
Ibid. 
21Minutes of the Board of Directors, 23 February 1906, 
Ibid. 
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commenced organizing another cooperative commission firm 
called the Cooperative Live Stock Commission Company. The 
commission merchants in Kansas City promptly retaliated by 
entering into an agreement with the Kansas City Traders' 
Exchange (yard traders) to boycott the cooperative. The 
boycott caused the new commission firm to have trouble 
selling its consignments. 22 The Exchange also suspended 
those commission merchants who worked for the Cooperative. 
Among these was the firm of Frederick Ehrke and s. G. 
Burnside which was deemed guilty of bad faith in that it had 
"entered into a contract with the so called Cooperative 
Livestock Commission Company." The directors believed that 
the cooperative was guilty of practices harmful to the 
welfare of the Exchange. 23 
Before the new commission firm was forced to cease 
operations in 1909, it filed a law suit against both the 
livestock and the traders exchange for restraining trade in 
violation of the anti-trust laws in Missouri. The case went 
to the Missouri Supreme Court which ruled on 24 May 1914 
that the Kansas City Live Stock and Traders Exchange were 
not in restraint of trade because the commission merchants 
and yard traders acted as a middleman, buying and selling 
for others, and had not engaged in trade as defined by 
22Johnson, "Struggle in the Stockyards," p. 315. 
23Minutes of the Board of Directors, 6 August 1906, vol 
4, RKCLE (Microcopy Collection 158). 
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law. 24 In addition to its economic failure, the cooperative 
also lost its legal point. 
The fortunes of cooperative commission agencies changed 
during World War I. The demand for meat was strong, and the 
receipts of livestock at the Kansas City market reached an 
all time high. Additionally, the War Industries Board 
exercised control over stockyards traders. In this context 
the Farmers' Union perceived an opportunity to inaugurate a 
new business method. 25 
The Nebraska Farmers' Union provided the model. In 
1917, it had organized the Farmers' Live Stock Commission 
Company which had borrowed $2,000 from the the parent 
organization and opened for business on the Omaha 
stockyards. When their application for membership into the 
Omaha Live Stock Exchange was rejected bought out a 
restaurant across the street from the Exchange and set up an 
office. The members of the Farmers' Union faithfully 
consigned their stock to the new commission company, and the 
cooperative marketed the livestock beyond the control of the 
Exchange. 26 
Cooperative commission agencies succeeded in other 
markets as well. The Farmers' Union Livestock Commission 
Company at Kansas City and Chicago operated under the joint 
24Johnson, "Struggle in the Stockyards," pp. 327-331. 
25u. s. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Markets, 
Annual Report, p. 2. 
26Missouri, Yearbook of Agriculture, 1921, p. 135. 
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supervision of the Farmers' Union and the Missouri Farmers' 
Association. In the St. Joseph market, the Farmers' 
Association successively operated a cooperative commission 
firm. 27 
While the increased demand of World War I for livestock 
products allowed the cooperative commission firms their 
first success, the collapse of agricultural prices in 1919 
insured their continued operation. Livestock producing 
associations pressured their congressional representatives 
to make changes in the way livestock were marketed. Several 
congressmen introduced bills in 1919 in Congress calling 
for government ownership and control of the stockyards. That 
proposed legislation failed, but on 15 August 1921 the 
Packers and Stockyards Act passed and declared the major 
stockyards of the nation "public markets. 1128 
Economists have generally agreed that the Packers and 
Stockyards Act was a failure. This assessment stems from 
the fact that the packers, through endless litigation in the 
courts, escaped regulation under the statute until 1932. 
Still the Act brought to an end an era of private regulation 
on the part of the livestock exchanges. Administrators who 
27Theodore Saloutos, "William Hirth and the Missouri 
Farmers' Association," Mississippi Valley Historical Review 
44 (October 1949) :19. 
28c. R. Fay, "The Success of Cooperation Among 
Livestock Producers in the United States of America," 
Southwest Political and Social Science Quarterly 9 (1928-
1929) :452; Minutes of the Board of Directors,, 29 January, 
29 August 1919, vol 4, RKCLE (Microcopy Collection 158); 
Wood, Kansas Beef, p. 265. 
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implemented the law eventually subverted the regulation of 
the exchanges and over time rendered the Board of Directors 
powerless. 29 
Ironically, the federal bureaucracy in achieving the 
goals of the Packers and Stockyards Act employed the system 
of operation worked out by the exchanges. It supervised the 
setting of commission rates, regulated the membership, 
disciplined commission merchants and traders, and conducted 
audits. The only significant difference was that the 
shippers and producers had direct input into the operations 
of the "public market." 3 0 
At the same time, the commission merchants learned to 
use the statute to their own advantage. The first hearing 
conducted by the bureaucracy saw the Kansas City Live Stock 
Exchange pitted against Armour & Co. and Fowler Packing 
Company with respect to the operation of the latter's 
Mistletoe Stockyards. The Exchange wanted the competing 
yards declared a public market also. Where the Exchange had 
failed previously to win access to the Mistletoe Yards, 
under the force of their own argument, its lawyers now 
29Richard J. Arnould, "Changing Patterns of 
Concentration in American Meat Packing, 1883-1963," Business 
History Review 45 (Spring 1971):18-34; Robert M. Aduddell 
and Louis P. Cain, "The Consent Decree in the Meat Packing 
Industry, 1920-1956," Business History Review 55 (Autumn 
1981) :359-378 and "Public Policy Toward 'The Greatest Trust 
in the World,'" Business History Review 55 (Summer 
1981):217-242. 
30u. s. Department of Agriculture, Packers and 
Stockyards Administration, Annual Report, 1922, pp. 1-2. 
succeeded. By using the new law the Exchange forestalled 
its own decline.3 1 
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Public regulation became part of the livestock trade as 
the markets in Kansas City and Chicago began to decline in 
importance. The motor truck eventually rendered the 
regulation meaningless, for as the livestock trade 
decentralized, the marketing of livestock by-passed the 
major stockyards. Nevertheless, the formative years of the 
livestock trade, from 1886 to 1921, were regulated by 
private institutions, imperfectly to be sure but still quite 
effectively. 
31 b'd .l__L. 1 P• 14. 
CHAPTER XIII 
CONCLUSION 
The Kansas City Live Stock Exchange was a part of the 
organizational revolution which transformed the United 
States in the late nineteenth century. While some 
industries concentrated into a few large firms, the Kansas 
City Live Stock Exchange decentralized the trade and enabled 
livestock commission firms to remain small enterprises. The 
Kansas City organization both reformed and regulated the 
livestock trade of the Southwest. 
A business historian must inquire as to why particular 
institutions appear in the American economy at specific 
periods of time. If placed within the context of the 
organizational revolution, the history of Kansas City Live 
Stock Exchange supplies several answers to that question. 
The Exchange was first and foremost a response to 
industrialization in the American West. It emerges in the 
wake of the changes wrought by the railroad and telegraph in 
livestock producing regions of the nation. As the new 
transportation system brought higher speed and volume in 
livestock traffic and placed new pressures on old business 
institutions, livestock entrepreneurs innovated new ones. 
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The livestock commission merchant was the first such 
institution in the livestock trade. By utilizing the 
railroad and telegraph, he eliminated the drover and 
democratized the trade in a generation. The marketing of 
livestock was no longer the domain of a few large drovers. 
In the new scheme the producer retained ownership of the 
livestock until a commission merchant marketed the animals 
in competitive urban markets. 
The Kansas City Live Stock Exchange was a response to 
industrialization, but it developed a unique organizational 
pattern. The livestock industry needed a regulatory agency; 
along with the new transportation system came new problems. 
The nature of marketing live animals created difficulties 
never before encountered and predetermined the 
organizational pattern of the Exchange. The railroads 
carried animals farther and faster than ever before, but 
they also carried animal diseases in the same manner, 
diseases that reached epidemic portions by the mid-1880s. 
The search for a solution to this disease problem eventually 
precipitated the organizational revolution in the livestock 
trade. 
It was no accident of history that the livestock 
exchanges organized in the mid-1880s. There were structural 
changes taking place in the trade. Under pressure from 
shippers and producers, the Department of Agriculture 
created the Bureau of Animal Industry, the first 
administrative agency in its history, and aggressively 
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pursued the quarantine of infectious diseases. This move 
spawned a controversy which resulted in a counter movement 
among the livestock commission merchants and in turn began 
the organization of the livestock exchanges, first in 
Chicago in 1884, and later, in Kansas City in 1886. 
But there were "evils and abuses" prior to the crisis 
in disease control which brought pressure to bear on the 
marketing system. The impersonalization of the market place 
permitted unscrupulous buyers and sellers to flourish in the 
stockyards. There was no authority in the marketplace to 
administer the trade and correct abuses. An economic crisis 
in the livestock industry in the mid-1880s caused western 
cattlemen to seek ways to eliminate the middlemen in the 
livestock trade. These efforts caused the organization of 
the Kansas City Live Stock Exchange 
But the Kansas City Live Stock Exchange was more than 
merely a response to industrialization: ideas were also 
influential. The stimulus for regulation did not come from 
the livestock commission merchants themselves, but rather 
from the producers. Aware of their need to intervene in the 
marketplace, cattlemen's associations shed their economic 
individualism and pressed for changes through their own 
cooperative economic power. At the same time the producers 
learned how to exert political pressure on the national 
government for concessions they demanded. This changing 
conviction on the part of the producers regarding the role 
of a positive state in regulating the economy was a major 
factor in the history of the commission merchants and the 
Exchange. 
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Other ideas guided the livestock commission merchants 
at Kansas City. They shared a conviction with the producers 
that there was a need for some regulation in their trade and 
the commission merchants looked for earlier precedents. 
Consequently ideas rooted in the commercial history of 
Western Civilization directed and molded the specific 
organizational form the exchange followed. The Kansas City 
Live Stock Exchange was thus a descendent of the 
international fairs which first appeared in medieval Europe, 
but it operated within an intellectual framework common to 
nineteenth century America which delegated the power of 
regulation of specific industries to private associations. 
Within the context of that unique perspective, the economic 
community at large granted to the Exchange the right to 
regulate aspects of the livestock trade. It responded by 
reforming the abuses prevalent in the trade; by determining 
who and how many commission merchants operated in the Kansas 
City market; by setting the rates charged for marketing 
livestock; and by monitoring the loaning of money. 
How successful was the Kansas City Live Stock Exchange 
in regulating the livestock trade of the Southwest? Only 
partially. 
The Exchange was an aberration among organizations. 
Unlike most private associations, labor unions and 
industrial corporations, it did not become oligopolistic. 
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No one interest group in the Kansas City market dominated 
the organization--neither the packers, nor the Stockyards 
Company, nor the large commission houses. Since the 
Exchange effectively eliminated the domination of the larger 
cattle commission houses, entrance into the trade was 
easier. 
Even the shippers and producers had access to the 
Exchange. They had not attended the initial organizing 
sessions, but their absence did not suggest impotence. That 
commission charges for cattle did not change for 36 years, 
sheep for 29 years, and hogs for 20 years, was due to 
pressure from the shippers and producers. 
The Kansas City Live Stock Exchange brought effective 
reform to the hog trade. The arbitrary use of the dockage 
system had created a crisis in the industry. The Exchange 
prevented state intervention by creating a private system of 
public inspection which worked well from 1886 to 1921. The 
inspection system failed to accurately monitor diseased 
animals, a failure that caused the establishment of the U. 
s. Bureau of Animal Industry to assume responsibility for 
that function. But the idea of other parties inspecting 
animals in the stockyards was not new, it was very much a 
part of the system of regulation envisioned by ninet~enth 
century Americans. Cattlemen's associations, the states of 
Kansas and Missouri, and the cities of Kansas City in both 
states had inspectors in the yards. All inspectors 
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monitored different aspects of the trade without interfering 
with the operation of the Exchange. 
The concept of of regulation envisioned by the 
merchants at Kansas City was more than setting commission 
rates, controlling membership, and performing a watchdog 
function over the financial aspects of its members. The 
Exchange administered the use of telegraph reports and 
controlled the hours of the stockyards effectively. The 
Exchange paid for these services in a way similar to a state 
agency, they taxed the shippers and producers, although 
early on it had assessed the membership for the funds. The 
Exchange audited commission firms in the Kansas City market 
as early as 1887 and required a bond on the part of 
commission merchants to insure the shipper received payment. 
It also set and enforced rates on commissions charged on 
livestock consigned to Kansas City. 
Inevitably the courts would rule on the right of the 
Kansas city Live Stock Exchange to regulate the trade of the 
Southwest. The first opportunity arose in 1889 in a law 
suit with the American Live Stock Commission Company. Prior 
to this time, the Exchange merely assumed it had the right 
of regulation, but after 1889 it had a precedent from the 
Illinois State supreme Court, and that remained unchanged 
until the u. s. Congress passed legislation and declared the 
stockyards of the nation public markets in 1921. Until that 
time, the Exchange had absolute control over its own 
membership, and the ambivalence of the agrarians to that 
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system implied they preferred private regulation over state 
regulation until 1921. 
The livestock commission merchants were effective in 
supplying needed capital in livestock producing regions of 
the Southwest. In some areas that ranged as high as 90 
percent of all the funds executed. It can be concluded that 
ranchers in Oklahoma Territory in the late nineteenth 
century could not have operated without the aid of the 
commission merchants in financing their business. The 
Kansas City Live Stock Exchange was less effective in 
controlling the abuses in the financing of the trade than 
they were in other areas. At such times shippers sought 
relief in the courts of law. 
The twentieth century ushered new trends into the 
livestock trade. The most important was the invention of 
the internal combustion engine, and its application to the 
motor carrier. The mobility of the motor truck granted the 
producer other options of marketing livestock, and the 
industry as a whole began to decentralize. No longer could 
the commission merchant dominate the trade; producers were 
no longer bound to the railroad. The Kansas City market 
reached a peak of hog receipts in 1901 (3.7 million), of 
sheep receipts in 1911 (2.1 million), and of cattle receipts 
in 1918 (3 million) after which it began to decline. 
Secondary changes also occurred. In the twentieth 
century the packing firms at Kansas City began by-passing 
the stockyards and purchasing livestock directly from the 
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producers. The Exchange and the commission merchants were 
not a part of the new trend. At the same time cooperative 
shipping associations became popular. 
A new interest in cooperation in general motivated the 
producers. During the First World War the first cooperative 
livestock commission firm operated in the Kansas City 
Stockyards against the will of the Exchange. The Farmers' 
Union was the first agrarian organization to succeed under 
the protection of the War Industries Board. For the first 
time in its history, the Exchange was powerless to do 
anything about it. There was no going back after the war, 
producers wanted permanent changes. 
By 1920, under pressure from livestock associations, 
both the states of Kansas and Missouri passed laws which 
made the stockyards a public market and the commission 
merchants subject to state regulation. But the national 
depression in agriculture which followed the First World War 
started a national movement for the regulation of the 
stockyards by the national government. With the passage of 
the Packers' and Stockyards Act of 1921 the livestock trade 
became subject to national supervision. The era of private 
regulation ended. 
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